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Abstract
This dissertation offers a new analytical narrative of the years from 405 to 425 C.E., a period
which extends from the final phase of the general Stilicho’s control over the administration of
the emperor Honorius, to the imperial accession of Honorius’ young nephew, the emperor
Valentinian III, under the regency of his mother, Galla Placidia. The narrative places the many
historical problems of this period, especially the rise of a whole series of usurpers and the influx
of non-Roman, “barbarian” groups into the western empire, in the weakness of the western
administration under the emperor Honorius. The imperial response to these challenges, in turn,
led to fundamental changes in the political life of the western empire, including new notions of
dynastic legitimacy, the integration of barbarian groups into Roman political life, and the rise of
over-powerful generals operating in their own personal interests, with or without the consent of
the imperial court at Rome or Ravenna. Such changes would come to characterize political life in
the western empire for the rest of the fifth century, ultimately shifting the locus of power from
the emperors themselves to their dominant military officials, and also to local sources of political
authority. This dissertation therefore argues that we must see the later decline of imperial
authority in the western Roman empire as a consequence of the challenges to the Honorian
regime during in this period, and the political transformations that emerged as a result.
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Introduction
This dissertation offers a new analytical narrative of the period from 405 to 425 C.E., which is
to say from the final years of the general Stilicho’s control over the administration of the
emperor Honorius between 405 and 408 to the restoration of the Theodosian imperial dynasty in
the west by an army from the eastern empire. The end point is this restoration, and the
installation of the young Valentinian III as western Augustus with his mother, the Augusta Galla
Placidia serving as regent for her son. The narrative places the many historical problems of this
period, especially the rise of a whole series of usurpers and the influx of non-Roman, “barbarian”
groups into the western empire, in the weakness of the western administration under the emperor
Honorius. 1 The imperial response to these challenges, in turn, led to fundamental changes in the
political life of the western empire, including new notions of dynastic legitimacy, the integration
of barbarian groups into Roman political life, and the rise of over-powerful generals operating in
their own personal interests, with or without the consent of the imperial court at Rome or
Ravenna. Such changes would come to characterize political life in the western empire for the
rest of the fifth century, ultimately shifting the locus of power from the emperors themselves to
their dominant military officials, and also to local sources of political authority. We must
therefore see the later decline of the western Roman empire as a major consequence of the
challenges to the Honorian regime and the political transformations that resulted from them.

1

The term “barbarian” had a wide range of meanings for Roman writers. Among others, the term could signify not
only individuals or groups living beyond the Roman limes, but also Roman citizens who had revolted from imperial
control or had otherwise acted contrary to Roman law, such as bandits or thieves. Nevertheless, while the category
was fluid, Roman presumptions on the superiority of Greco-Roman civilization always meant that term carried a
derogatory implication. For discussion of the term, see Guy Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West,
376-568 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 35-62. For the purposes of this dissertation, however, I
have adopted the current scholarly usage of “barbarian” as a general, neutral term in reference to individuals or
groups who were not Roman citizens.
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Scholars have traditionally viewed the conflicts of this period through the lens of
preconceived notions of ethnic identity, which often results in forced and overly simplistic
narratives of “barbarian”/“Roman” antagonism. In contrast to that scholarly tradition, this
dissertation takes an analytical and source-based approach to the political discord of the years
405-425, and abandons problematic notions of ethnic identity as an all-purpose explanation for
political action. This approach results in a far more complex narrative that sees Roman/barbarian
concord and cooperation behind many of the political actions of this period, both against and in
support of the weak regime of the emperor Honorius. Moreover, an analytical narrative allows us
to grant far more agency to individuals who are often depicted as passive actors in traditional
narratives. In particular, the present study argues that Galla Placidia, the half-sister of the
emperor Honorius, was a formidable political actor in her own right, far different from the mere
captured Roman princess as she is portrayed in so many traditional narratives. Finally, this
approach leads to more nuanced interpretations of the primary sources for this period, including
the works of the historian Orosius, the poet Paulinus of Pella, and the chronicler Hydatius.
The narrative model is well suited to the period covered in the present study because it allows
analytical arguments to be set within the overall context of imperial history. In a period for
which the sources are as fragmentary and conflicting as they are in the early fifth century,
analysis is inseparable from the construction of a reliable narrative. By contrast, the political
events of the period are not well suited to thematic discussion, which would necessitate massive
repetition of identical evidence in one chapter after another. Two stylistic consequences emerge
from the analytical narrative model. The first and most evident is the division of chapters into
episodic, chronological units. Each period is discussed and analyzed in chronological sequence
offering a wide variety of insights on individual events. Second, unless absolutely necessary,
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discussion and engagement of secondary works are primarily relegated to the footnotes. While
this is a common feature of much published scholarship, it is an admittedly unorthodox approach
in the context of a dissertation. Nevertheless, rather than disrupt the overall flow of the narrative
with constant discussions of the scholarship, discussion of the various point of scholarly
contention is confined as much as possible to the notes.
Within this narrative structure, the major chapters break down into natural chronological
units, each with a story to tell. Chapter 1 situates the main narrative in the major events of the
late fourth and early fifth century by discussing the early life of Galla Placidia until her capture
by Alaric’s forces during the sack of Rome in 410. This framework allows a close examination
of the general Stilicho’s techniques for dominating both the western imperial court and the
children of the emperor Theodosius. This chapter also examines the weakness of the imperial
court after the fall of Stilicho and its consequent inability to respond effectively to the threat of
Alaric in the years 408-410.
Chapter 2 details the imperial crisis during the years 406-410 from the perspective of the
Gallic provinces. In particular, this chapter presents the Rhine crossing of the Alans, Vandals,
and Suebi and the usurpation of Constantine III in 406 as the results of Stilicho’s policies in
weakening the defenses of Gaul in favor of the safety of Italy in the early years of the fifth
century. This chapter also examines the expansion of Constantine’s Gallic regime and its fall in
411 due to both internal dissension and the rise of a new political faction in Ravenna led by the
general Constantius.
Chapter 3 covers the years 411-414, which saw the entry of Alaric’s army, now led by his
brother-in-law Athaulf, into the Gallic political sphere. After forming short-lived alliances with
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both the usurper Jovinus and the Honorian regime, Athaulf rebelled against the control of the
central government and married Galla Placidia at the provincial capital of Narbonne in southern
Gaul in 414. This chapter discusses the political implications of this union for the western empire
at large, concluding that Placidia and Athaulf founded an alternative, yet potentially legitimate
imperial regime in southern Gaul in direct opposition to the Honorian administration at Ravenna,
one that claimed the loyalty of a meaningful proportion of leading Gauls.
Chapter 4 continues the discussions of the previous chapter. It examines the move of Athaulf
and Placidia’s regime to Barcelona, the murder of Athaulf in 415, and the subsequent position of
Placidia among her husband’s followers. Against the traditional depiction of Placidia as a captive
Roman princess, one that is standard in much of the scholarship and has at least some basis in
hostile primary sources, this chapter argues that Placidia continued to hold a respected and
powerful position as Gothic queen even after Athaulf’s death. She therefore had very little reason
to wish to return to her brother’s control. Nevertheless, the threat of famine in 415/416 forced
Athaulf’s successor Wallia to make peace with Constantius, and that required the return of
Placidia to Ravenna, where, as later chapters will show, she continued to scheme to retain her
independence.
Chapter 5 discusses Wallia’s campaigns on behalf of Honorius and Constantius against the
other barbarian groups settled in Spain from 416-418. It then moves on to consider the
circumstances surrounding the Gothic settlement on imperial soil in 418/419. The chapter argues
that Placidia’s continued relationship to the former followers of Athaulf created an essential
political link that helped to guarantee their loyalty to the Honorian regime. It also argues that
Constantius’ settlement of Wallia’s followers in Aquitania was meant to be a temporary measure
and was modeled on the precedent of Athaulf’s troop distribution in the region in 413/414.

5

Chapter 6 examines the major events of the years 419-422, including the reestablishment of
Honorius’ control over the provinces of the western empire, the rise of Constantius to the
imperial throne, and a new outbreak of political turmoil following his death in 421. The year 422
saw the breakdown of relations between the emperor Honorius and Galla Placidia, ultimately
leading to the exile of Placidia and her family to the eastern empire. Contrary to many scholarly
narratives, however, this chapter argues that we cannot see a direct relationship between the
factional violence between Placidia and Honorius at Ravenna in 422 and the contemporary
discord among the Roman military administration.
Finally, Chapter 7 examines the rise and fall of the usurper John, who seized the western
throne after the death of Honorius in August 423. This usurpation led to a new civil war between
the eastern and western empires in 425, resulting in the successful establishment of Galla
Placidia as regent for her son, Valentinian III, with the support of the eastern branch of the
Theodosian dynasty. This chapter argues that John’s regime failed mainly because of its lack of
support among the western military aristocracy. It also argues that after the failure of John’s
regime, the practice of usurpation ceased to be viewed as viable path for political discontent,
with major consequences for the future of the empire.
Two interrelated themes run through this whole narrative. The first is the usurpation of the
imperial prerogative from the dynastically legitimate Theodosian regime. The internal conflicts
in the western empire during the late fourth century saw the gradual decline of imperial authority
under the successors of the emperor Valentinian I, specifically his children, the emperors Gratian
and Valentinian II. This led to the extension of the power and influence of the eastern emperor
Theodosius into the western political sphere, not least through two separate civil wars against the
usurpers Magnus Maximus and Eugenius. At Theodosius’ death in 395, the briefly unified
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Roman Empire was again divided between his children, Arcadius in the eastern empire and
Honorius in the newly conquered western empire. The prestige and political authority of the
Theodosian regime in the west was therefore weak from the beginning of Honorius’ reign, a
situation complicated by the youth of the new emperor and the distracted politics of his regent,
the general Stilicho. In particular, Stilicho’s preoccupation in pursuing his rivalry with the
regents of the emperor Arcadius kept his attention focused on the eastern empire to the detriment
of the western provinces. Stilicho’s responses to the threats of Alaric (401-402) and Radagaisus
(405-406), it could be argued, required the depletion of Gallic military forces in order to
maintain a strong defense of Italy. But the ability to defend Italy further aggravated the situation
elsewhere in the west. The result was the rise of a long series of usurpers who offered direct
challenges to the leadership of the Honorian regime and to the Theodosian dynasty’s control over
the western empire as a whole.
Political chaos therefore characterizes the history of the western empire in the years 406-425.
At least ten men seized the purple during the course of this period, usurping the imperial
prerogatives of the emperor Honorius and establishing more or less powerful regimes. The
contemporary influx of barbarian groups into the western empire also directly informed the rise
and progress of many of these usurpations. While it is possible that the famous Rhine crossing of
the Vandals, Alans, and Suebi in 406 played some role in initiating these challenges to the
Honorian regime, these and other non-Roman groups, particularly the followers of Alaric and
Athaulf, frequently formed symbiotic relationships with various usurpers of this period. Through
the promotion or support of a usurper’s regime, these barbarian groups gained an opportunity for
integration into the Roman political sphere, a proposition which the legitimate regime at
Ravenna sometimes denied them. The reestablishment of Honorian control of the provinces
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therefore required both strong military leadership as well as a viable pathway for the absorption
of barbarian groups into the political and administrative fabric of the western empire.
A second theme of this dissertation, and one closely related to the first, is the rise of Galla
Placidia, the half sister of the emperor Honorius, as a political actor in her own right within the
shifting fortunes of the Theodosian dynasty. Placidia was descended from not one but two
imperial dynasties, those of Valentinian I and Theodosius. This inherited legitimacy, combined
with her momentous decision to reject the traditionally celibate role of princesses in these
dynasties, allowed Placidia to cast herself as a viable, alternative locus of legitimate authority in
political contests with the unstable Honorian regime. Placidia’s ambitions came to the fore with
her marriage to the Gothic king Athaulf in 414, and the foundation of an independent, yet
dynastically legitimate regime based first at Narbonne and later at Barcelona. After Athaulf’s
death in 415 and her return to Ravenna, Placidia’s continuing ties to Athaulf’s followers ensured
that they remained a powerful force in Roman politics on whom she could rely in times of need.
The implicit dynastic authority that Placidia inherited as a member of the Theodosian house
also seems to have played a role in the changing nature of intra-Roman political struggles during
this period. The multiple usurpations that Honorius faced between 406 and 420 typically
represented political discontent with some aspect of the central government’s rule. The rise of
Placidia as a political actor and her decision to marry Athaulf in 414 ultimately offered new
pathways for ambitious individuals to work for their own power within the confines of the
legitimate Theodosian dynasty. Placidia’s membership in the reigning dynasty certainly played a
role in the support her Narbonese regime enjoyed among the southern Gallic aristocrats. Her
decision to reject the traditional celibacy for women of the imperial house allowed Honorius’
dominating general Constantius to realize his own desires for imperial power through marriage
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to Placidia in 417. Finally, the comes Africae Boniface set a dangerous precedent for later fifthcentury political discord in 422 by revolting from the Honorian regime, while continuing to
claim an allegiance to the Theodosian dynasty on the basis of his professed loyalty to Placidia.
The weakness of the Honorian regime and the resulting conflicts and political maneuverings
of this period therefore set vital precedents for the future pursuit and conduct of factional discord
within the western Roman empire. Honorius and the Theodosian dynasty’s remarkable success in
dealing with usurpers during this period, despite the fundamental weakness that the mere fact of
constant usurpations actually demonstrates, ensured that after the destruction of John’s
administration in 425, usurpation ceased to be a viable option for opponents of the ruling regime.
Instead, an alternative paradigm had been established by Constantius, one that could serve as a
model for the future. Revolts against central authority continued after 425, but they now
manifested themselves as contests between ambitious ministers trying to establish a dominant
position within the legitimate imperial administration. As such, these disputants followed the
techniques of the more successful political actors of the Honorian regime, particularly Stilicho,
Constantius, and Boniface, and to some degree, also Alaric and Athaulf. The use of barbarian
groups by the usurpers Attalus and Jovinus, as well as Placidia’s alliance with Athaulf in 414,
also set notable precedents for the entry of non-Romans as valuable interest groups in Roman
political affairs. The conflicts of Honorius’ regime therefore fundamentally altered the course of
political life in the western Roman empire.

9

Chapter 1: Early History of Galla Placidia to 410

The last two decades of the fourth century saw the decline of the dynasty of the emperor
Valentinian (364-375) in the western empire and the extension of the eastern dynasty of
Theodosius (379-395) into the western political sphere. The successful usurpation of Magnus
Maximus (383-388) resulted both in the death of Valentinian’s eldest son, the emperor Gratian,
and later, the flight of his younger son, the emperor Valentinian II, from the imperial residence at
Milan to Thessalonica. In this city, a marriage alliance was formed between the western dynasty
of Valentinian and the newly established eastern dynasty of Theodosius. Theodosius, having
recently lost his first wife Aelia Flacilla, agreed to marry Valentinian II’s sister Galla. As a result
of this alliance, Theodosius launched a civil war against Maximus in 388 to restore Valentinian
II to the western throne. When Valentinian II died under suspicious circumstances in 392 and a
second usurper, Eugenius, seized the western throne, Theodosius again marched with his eastern
forces, successfully defeating the usurper and the western army in 394 and assuming control over
the united Roman empire.
The empire was again divided, however, following the death of the emperor Theodosius in
early 395. His two sons by his first wife, Aelia Flaccilla, now assumed control. Arcadius, aged
17 or 18, received the eastern empire. Shortly before his death, Theodosius had also raised the
ten-year-old Honorius as Augustus over the western empire. The youth of the two new emperors
meant that regents were required for the actual administration of their regimes. The general
Stilicho, who had previously married Serena, the niece and adopted daughter of Theodosius,
assumed control of Honorius’ western regime. Stilicho fortified his power through a
reorganization of the western military establishment as well as maintaining a close control over
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Honorius and his half-sister, Galla Placidia, the daughter of Theodosius and Galla. This resulted
in marriages between Honorius and Stilicho’s daughters, first Maria in 398 and after Maria’s
death, Thermantia in 407. Stilicho’s attempts to extend his control over the eastern empire,
however, initiated a long period of political antagonism between East and West, as the regents of
Arcadius had no intention of handing over power to the western regent.
As time passed and Honorius grew to maturity during the first decade of the fifth century,
Stilicho’s regime became increasingly unstable. In response to two Italian invasions under the
Gothic leaders Alaric (401-402) and Radagaisus (405-406), Stilicho was forced to severely
diminish the defenses of Gaul. This tactic resulted in a series of usurpations in the Gallic
provinces as well as the famous Rhine crossing of the Alans, Vandals, and Suebi in 406. With
these pressures came new factional discord from within the imperial court. The result was the
overthrow of Stilicho’s regime in 408.
After Stilicho’s death, political chaos consumed the imperial court as various factions vied for
control of the emperor Honorius. This situation received further complication with the invasion
of Alaric in 408 who also sought a position in Honorius’ regime. Over the course of the next two
years, Alaric used a variety of tactics to reinforce his position in the negotiations with Honorius’
court at Ravenna, including successive sieges of Rome and an alliance with the Roman Senate to
raise the usurper Priscus Attalus. When these tactics failed, Alaric finally abandoned diplomacy
and allowed his followers to sack the imperial city for three days in August 410. When Alaric’s
army departed from Rome on August 27, they carried not only immeasurable wealth, but also a
hostage of far more political value: Galla Placidia, the sister of the emperor Honorius.
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While examining various events in this overall narrative, this chapter particularly focuses on
the early life of Galla Placidia, the daughter of the emperor Theodosius and Galla. As with any
princess of the imperial house, Galla Placidia’s power stemmed from the prospect of dynastic
legitimacy inherent in her person. During the chaotic period of usurpations and power struggles
that characterized Honorius’ rule from 395 to 423, this capacity to bestow the potential for
Theodosian dynastic legitimacy on the regime of her spouse and on their offspring arguably
made Placidia the most potent threat to her brother’s control of the western empire. As we will
see in the following chapters, Placidia’s marriage to the Gothic king Athaulf in 414 established
an alternative to Honorius’ imperial regime that garnered support among the disaffected
aristocrats of southern Gaul and northern Spain. Furthermore, although Honorius raised his
general Constantius to co-emperor in 421, Constantius’ marriage to Placidia in 417 marked his
first steps toward imperial rule. Finally, Placidia’s status as regent and mother of Valentinian III
enabled her to claim rule of the western empire for much of the period from 425 to her death in
450.
Tracing events through the early life of Galla Placidia therefore situates this study in terms of
the event history of the late fourth and early fifth century, as well as provides a narrative
foundation for one of the key political actors during the period from 405 to 425 C.E. In
particular, this approach establishes the basis for Placidia’s power as the offspring of two
imperial dynasties, those of Valentinian and Theodosius, which arguably gave her better claim to
control over the western empire than her brother Honorius, who was descended from the
Theodosian dynasty alone. It also allows for a close examination of the policies of Stilicho in
dominating western imperial court and the children of the emperor Theodosius. Finally, this
approach provides context for the weakness of the Honorian regime after the fall of Stilicho in
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408, a time of political chaos in the western empire that ultimately led to the capture of Placidia
by the forces of Alaric.
This chapter argues several points within this overall narrative context. Against previous
scholarship that sees irregularity behind Placidia’s celibacy under Stilicho’s regime, this chapter
argues that this celibacy was perfectly in keeping with the traditional chastity of the daughters of
the dynasties of Valentinian and Theodosius. This chapter also examines the scholarly arguments
regarding Placidia’s role in the execution of her cousin Serena and concludes that we should not
assume that this event is evidence for Placidia’s rise as a completely independent political actor.
Finally, this chapter argues that it is far more logical to see Placidia’s period of captivity among
the forces of Alaric as beginning in 409 with the rise of the usurper Attalus, rather than as a
result of the fall of Rome in August of 410.

In the spring of 383, Magnus Maximus, a Spanish military officer serving in Britain, usurped
the purple and succeeded in overthrowing the western regime of the emperor Gratian. 2 In the

2

Zosimus, Historia nova IV.35.2-3. Zosimus composed his history in the eastern empire during the late fifth or
early sixth century. His value as a source for events of the fourth and fifth centuries varies depending on which
earlier author he was using to construct his narrative. For the period from 270-404, Zosimus primarily used the
Universal History of the pagan orator and historian Eunapius of Sardis. For the years from 407 to 410 (the year in
which the Historia nova abruptly ends), he relied on the work of Olympiodorus of Thebes. While modern
scholarship has slightly moved away from the estimation of the Byzantine writer Photius, who presented Zosimus as
largely a copier of earlier histories, it is nevertheless evident that Zosimus heavily relied on the work of both
Eunapius and Olympiodorus for the construction of the Historia nova, taking large portions verbatim from the
original texts. This fact provides us with some direction for accepting or rejecting Zosimus as a reliable source for
later fourth and fifth century events. In particular, we know that Eunapius’ history presented a severe indictment of
Christianity and the Christian emperors. This stance inevitably informs Zosimus’ history of these figures, as we will
see in the coming pages. Olympiodorus on the other hand was both a historian and diplomat who had ties to political
life of the western empire. Zosimus’ history is therefore demonstrably more reliable when he takes up Olympiodorus
as his source after 407. For recent work on Zosimus, Eunapius, and Olympiodorus, see François Paschoud, Cinq
Études sur Zosime (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1975); R. C. Blockley, The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of the
Later Roman Empire: Eunapius, Olympiodorus, Priscus and Malchus, Vol. 1 (Liverpool: Francis Cairns, 1981), 1-
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following years, he managed to establish his control over the regions of Gaul, Britain, and Spain,
as well as to receive the recognition of the eastern emperor Theodosius as a member of the
imperial college. 3 The legitimate dynasty of Valentinian, now represented by the child emperor
Valentinian II reigning under the regency of his mother Justina, remained in control of Italy,
Africa, and the Illyrian prefecture. 4 In summer of 387, however, Maximus broke the uneasy
peace that had settled on the empire in the intervening years. His invasion of Italy forced
Valentinian II, together with his mother, Justina, and at least one of his three sisters, Galla, to
flee the imperial residence at Milan and seek refuge in the city of Thessalonica, the capital of the
western diocese of Macedonia. 5
From Thessalonica, the imperial family implored the assistance of the eastern Emperor
Theodosius against Maximus’ aggression. The primary sources provide two quite different
accounts of Theodosius’ decision to intervene in this struggle for control over the western
empire. Augustine of Hippo claims that Theodosius was driven to help the beleaguered family
out of his firm respect for the memory of Gratian. 6 The historian Zosimus, however, drawing on

47; Wolf Liebeschuetz, “Pagan Historiography and the Decline of Empire”, in Greek and Roman Historiography in
Late Antiquity: Fourth to Sixth Century A.D. ed. Gabriele Marasco (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 177-218.
3

Theodosius seems to have given at least tacit recognition of Maximus in 384. Zosimus, Historia nova IV.37.3 tells
us that Theodosius’ praefectus praetorio (PPO) Cynegius displayed Maximus’ imperial portraits in Alexandria in
this year. In the year 386, Maximus’ consul, the PPO Euodius, was recognized in the east. As noted by R. Malcolm
Errington, Roman Imperial Policy from Julian to Theodosius (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
2006), 32-34.
4

In order to deal with the barbarian crisis of 378-382, Gratian had ceded control of the Illyrian prefecture to
Theodosius. By September, 382, however, Theodosius had returned the prefecture to western control. See Malcolm
Errington, “Theodosius and the Goths”, Chiron 26 (1996), 1-27; Errington, Roman Imperial Policy, 32-34, 83-84.
5

Zosimus, Historia nova IV.43.1.

6

Augustine, De civitate dei V.26.
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the earlier work of Eunapius, claims that Theodosius was hesitant until he saw and fell in love
with Valentinian’s sister. He agreed to help the refugees only after Justina offered the hand of
Galla in exchange for his help. 7
Many modern historians have rightly questioned both of these stated causes for Theodosius’
intervention. Zosimus himself or his source, the pagan orator Eunapius, is a hostile witness to the
activities of Christian emperors such as Theodosius, and his account is not only overly romantic,
but in fact seeks to show the natural laziness and cowardice of the emperor. This evident bias
severely discredits Zosimus’ testimony. 8 In a similar way, Augustine’s account visibly labors to
create the image of Theodosius as the good Christian emperor of the Nicene literary tradition. 9
This fact casts doubt on his testimony about Theodosius’ benevolent intention of helping the
dynasty that had raised him to the purple. 10
A better interpretation of Theodosius’ reasons for giving aid to the young Valentinian II
derives from a close study of the politics of the period. In a recent article, Neil McLynn plausibly
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As argued by Kulikowski, Rome’s Gothic Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 159; Errington,
Roman Imperial Policy, 35-37.
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argues that Theodosius had himself usurped the eastern throne in 379. He had also raised his son
Arcadius to the purple in 383 without the permission of the senior emperor Gratian, thus raising
the tension between east and west. 11 While there is no reason to doubt the internal security of his
eastern throne, his decision to marry into the unquestionably legitimate dynasty of Valentinian
therefore provided a valuable prop to his claims over the eastern empire.
There is also reason to suspect that Theodosius wished to expand his own influence into the
western empire. In this endeavor, Theodosius’ marriage alliance with the dynasty of Valentinian
and his military support in restoring Valentinian II to the western throne, would allow the eastern
emperor to act as a paternal regent over the West, a position that might prove useful when the
time came to provide a portion of the empire for his second son, Honorius. The three years that
Theodosius spent in Italy following the defeat of Maximus show that no matter what the
ostensible power situation, Theodosius had no intention of allowing control of the West to slip
from his fingers. 12 Finally, in terms of imperial security, the eastern emperor had little choice but
to attack Maximus if he did not wish to have a potentially hostile co-emperor in control of the
resources of the western empire. 13
Regardless of Theodosius’ actual reasons, his marriage to Valentinian II’s sister, Galla, came
quickly on the heels of his agreement to help the beleaguered imperial family. The couple seems
to have remained in Thessalonica through the fall and winter of 387. Late in the spring of 388,
11
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Theodosius set out against Magnus Maximus with his land army, while Valentinian and Justina
returned to Italy, seeking refuge in Rome. Zosimus seems to suggest that Galla also accompanied
her mother and brother on this occasion. 14 The sixth-century chronicler Marcellinus comes,
however, places Galla in Constantinople in 390, embroiled in a court dispute with her thirteenyear-old stepson, Arcadius. 15 It is therefore probable that in this section Zosimus or his source
has confused Galla with one of her sisters, Justa or Grata, and that Galla herself remained behind
in the eastern empire after the departure of her family and new husband. 16
It is possible that Galla had already conceived her first child before the start of the campaign
in 388, which would have informed the decision for her to remain in the eastern empire. 17 Galla
would ultimately bear at least two, and probably three, children to the Emperor Theodosius,
though only her daughter, Placidia, would survive to maturity. In his eulogy for Theodosius
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delivered in 395, Ambrose of Milan paints the image of Theodosius’ arrival in heaven, where he
is reunited with the children he had lost on earth. These include Pulcheria, a daughter of
Theodosius’ first wife Aelia Flacilla, and Gratian, whose name suggests that he was a son of
Galla who, like Pulcheria, did not survive childhood. 18 An attested inscription in the Church of
St. John the Evangelist in Ravenna, which Placidia founded sometime after 425, also mentions
this Gratian as well as an otherwise unknown child named John. 19 Galla is known to have died in
childbirth along with her infant in 394. 20 As this John is not attested elsewhere, he may have
been the infant who died on this occasion. 21
No source records the date of Galla Placidia’s birth or that of Galla’s other offspring. It is
possible, however, to narrow the potential dates logically to either 388-389 or 392-393. Such
years account for the fact that Theodosius was resident in the western empire from 388 to 391,
and also for the conception of the child who died with Galla in 394. The famous letter of
Ambrose to Theodosius, rebuking him for the massacre at Thessalonica, however, serves as
evidence for the latter of the two possible periods. In closing his letter, Ambrose refers to
Theodosius as the “father of Gratian”. 22 As the letter was composed in c. 390, this detail suggests
that Galla had already given birth to the aforementioned, unfortunate son of Theodosius, who
was not destined to survive childhood. Gratian’s conception could only have occurred before
18
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Theodosius had left for the West in 388. We should therefore date the birth of Placidia to the
period after Theodosius had returned to the eastern empire, in the years 392 or 393. 23
At some point in her youth, Placidia was given her own household and properties as befitted
an imperial princess. In a letter concerning the events of the year 400, Synesius of Cyrene makes
a passing reference to a palace in Placidia’s possession that had formerly belonged to the
praefectus praetorio (PPO) Ablabius. 24 The fifth-century Notitia urbis Constantinopolitanae also
records a total of three properties associated with Placidia, a Palatium Placidianum and Domum
Placidiae Augustae in region one and another Domum Augustae Placidiae in region ten. 25 From
an entry in the Chronicon Paschale, we know that at least one of these Constantinopolitan
properties still bore Placidia’s name as late as the seventh century. 26
Nevertheless, Placidia was not destined for a happy childhood. In quick succession she lost
her brother Gratian, her mother, and her father. The date for Gratian’s death is unknown, though
based on Ambrose’s references to the child, the event seems to have occurred between c. 390 and
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c. 395. 27 As we have seen, Galla died in childbirth at Constantinople, just before Theodosius set
out for another civil war with the western empire in the early summer of 394. 28 Following this
successful campaign, the emperor summoned Honorius (the younger of his two sons born of his
first wife, Aelia Flacilla) from the east and placed the ten-year-old Augustus on the western
throne. 29 The infant Placidia probably traveled with her brother on this journey from
Constantinople. 30 Early in the year 395, however, Theodosius’ health began to deteriorate. On
January 17 he died at Milan before his fiftieth birthday, leaving Placidia and Honorius in the care
of his niece and adopted daughter, Serena, and her husband, the general Stilicho. 31
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According to Stilicho’s official propaganda, as articulated in 396 through the poet Claudian’s
panegyric for the third consulship of Honorius, the emperor Theodosius on his deathbed had
entrusted Stilicho, his general and adoptive son-in-law, with the regency for both of his young
sons Honorius and Arcadius. 32 Unfortunately for Stilicho, the officials of the eastern court had
no intention of relinquishing control over the emperor Arcadius, who had remained in
Constantinople. The following three years saw Stilicho’s aggressive attempts to extend his
influence in the East through intrigue, assassination, and at least two military actions (395 and
397), ostensibly efforts to deal with the renegade forces of Alaric. 33 By 398, however, the two
halves of the empire had descended into a situation best described as a “cold war”. While still
actively hostile, the eastern and western empires largely limited their actions to political
posturing for the next decade. 34

Stilichonis 69-70: Nubilis interea maturae virginis aetas / urgebat patrias suspenso principe curas… She may
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With the East denied to him, Stilicho set out to secure the stability of his regime in the West.
Unlike his counterparts in the East, the PPO Rufinus and later the cubicularius Eutropius,
Stilicho was not content to allow his power to rest on the uncertain grounds of civilian office and
personal influence with the emperor Honorius. 35 Since there existed no official position for an
imperial regent in Roman government, Stilicho solidified his power through a variety of changes
to the administration of the western empire as well as through the introduction of a new titular
formula to properly articulate his relationship to the emperor Honorius. As an unforeseen
consequence, Stilicho’s success laid the foundation for the military dominance of the imperial
court, a situation that would persist to a greater or lesser degree until the end of the western
empire.
Already in 395 Stilicho had many advantages over his eastern rivals Rufinus and later
Eutropius. As the husband of Theodosius’ niece and adopted daughter, Serena, he was actually a
member of the Theodosian house by marriage. Theodosius had therefore groomed him for high
office. 36 Furthermore, unlike his brother Arcadius who was seventeen or eighteen, the emperor
Honorius was only ten years of age at his father’s death and legally required tutela, at least until
the age of fourteen. 37 Finally, Stilicho held a military rather than a civilian office, potentially
making his dismissal far more difficult, depending on his relationship with the troops. 38
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Regardless of these advantages, Stilicho took further measures to fortify his new position and
thereby strengthen his regime. The military administrations of the eastern and western empires
were fundamentally different in the late fourth century. In the East, military command was
regionally divided between at least five men of more or less equal rank holding the title magister
utriusque militiae (MVM), indicating that they commanded both infantry and cavalry
divisions. 39 In the West, however, only two men, styled magister peditum praesentalis (master of
the infantry in the emperor’s presence) and magister equitum praesentalis (master of the cavalry
in the emperor’s presence), held the highest military ranks, with functional dominion over the
entirety of the western empire. This obvious tendency for greater centralization of military power
in the West received further support from the fact that, though technically equal, the magister
equitum was generally subordinate to the magister peditum. 40
Stilicho had risen through the ranks of the military administration of the eastern empire,
assuming office of MVM by the year 393. 41 Following the death of Theodosius in 395, Stilicho
retained this office which assumed new meaning in the western context. Building on previous
tendencies for the functional superiority of the magister peditum over the magister equitum,
Stilicho absorbed the functions of both offices into his new position as magister utriusque
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militiae praesentalis. The office of magister equitum continued to exist, but in a much reduced
role. As magister militum praesentalis, Stilicho either appointed or confirmed the appointment of
all of the comites rei militaris and the duces throughout the empire, as well as their subordinate
officials. 42 With these changes to the western military administration, Stilicho ensured that the
full power of the western Roman military complex centered on his person alone.
Stilicho also used propaganda to articulate his relationship to the sons of Theodosius.
Drawing on the general’s familial connections to the Theodosian house, the Egyptian poet and
court propagandist, Claudian, could explain Stilicho’s position in terms of familial values.
Claudian therefore depicts Stilicho as a parens principum, showing reverentia and pietas
towards the young emperors. 43 The poet also presents Serena as a mother to the emperor
Honorius. In addition, Claudian frequently reminds the public that the emperor Theodosius
himself assigned the regency of his sons to Stilicho, thus reinforcing the legitimacy of the
general’s regime. 44
In 398, a series of military and political setbacks led Stilicho to take a further measure. There
is little reason to doubt that Stilicho and Serena had always planned to marry Honorius to one of
their daughters. Such an enterprise would not only bind the emperor still closer to his
benefactors, but also add the potential for one of their descendants to wear the purple. In 397,
42
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however, Stilicho launched an abortive expedition against Alaric in Greece that caused the
eastern court to label him a public enemy. 45 Stilicho was also forced to deal with the African
rebellion of Gildo in this year. 46 Such problems inevitably opened his regime to criticism. 47
Therefore, in February of 398, political expediency probably caused Stilicho and Serena to
rush a marriage between their thirteen-year-old daughter Maria and the emperor Honorius, aged
fourteen. While the marriage did serve to strengthen Stilicho’s hold over the western empire in a
time of crisis, it would ultimately produce no offspring. When Maria died childless in 407,
Honorius was quickly married to her younger sister, Thermantia, with the same results. In fact,
some authorities claim that when Thermantia was returned to her mother after the fall of Stilicho
in 408, the marriage was still unconsummated. 48
We know little of Galla Placidia’s life throughout this ebb and flow of political stability in
Stilicho’s regime. It is reasonable to assume that she was raised in the household of Serena and
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received some education as a Roman girl of imperial rank. 49 At some point in her youth, she
received the title nobilissima puella as a bronze plaque discovered at Rome testifies. 50 The
location would suggest that she received this title under Stilicho’s regime rather than during her
early life in Constantinople. Rome may in fact have been her primary residence in these early
years, as she was later among those trapped in the city during the tumultuous events of 408-410.
In his panegyric on the consulship of Stilicho in 400, Claudian hints at the regime’s larger
dynastic plans through his description of a series of embroidered images on Stilicho’s consular
robe. The poet describes an image of Serena comforting her daughter Maria, who has just given
birth to an imperial heir. Nymphs wash the son of Honorius and Maria in a fountain of gold. In a
second image, an older Stilicho teaches the child the arts of war. A third image depicts Stilicho’s
son Eucherius in a hunting tableau. Finally, an image depicts the goddess Venus conducting a
marriage between Eucherius and an unnamed daughter-in-law who is both the “offspring of an
emperor and the sister of emperors”. Obviously, Galla Placidia is Eucherius’ intended bride-tobe. 51
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Regardless of Stilicho’s plans in c. 400 for the further binding of his descendants to the
Theodosian house, the union of Eucherius and Galla Placidia would never take place. In his
influential biography of Placidia, Stewart Irvin Oost suggests that the marriage was postponed
until such time as Honorius and Maria had produced a child. If the wedding of Eucherius and
Placidia were to occur before this time, Stilicho’s detractors could easily interpret the union as a
dynastic threat to the security of the young emperor. This threat would have become even more
marked if Eucherius had produced a child with Placidia before Honorius and Maria. It was
therefore a political liability. 52
As a corollary to this plausible hypothesis, Oost further suggests that Stilicho may have
deliberately kept Placidia out of the public eye in an attempt to hide the awkward fact that she
remained unwed well past the normal age for Roman women. 53 In this way, Stilicho hoped to
preserve Placidia for a later marriage to Eucherius. As evidence, Oost cites Placidia’s failure to
appear in the triumphal procession described in Claudian’s Panegyricus de sexto consulatu
Honorii Augusti written in 404, as well as her absence on a bulla discovered in the probable
tomb of Maria in 1544, bearing the names of the imperial family. 54
While Oost’s hypothesis on the delayed marriage of Placidia and Eucherius is perfectly
sound, the second, suggesting that there was some program to hide Placidia, is untenable. With
regard to the cited evidence, Serena and her daughter Thermantia are also absent from
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Claudian’s description of the triumphal procession in 404, and Serena is a far more glaring
omission than Placidia. The bulla, which Oost describes as bearing the names of the imperial
family, is better explained as bearing the names of Maria’s family. The inscription reads Honori,
Maria, Stelicho, Serena, vivatis! Stelicho, Serena, Thermantia, Eucheri, vivatis! 55 Clearly, the
engraver chose to acclaim each of Maria’s families separately. The first part of the inscription
celebrates the imperial family formed by her union with Honorius. The second part celebrates
her birth family. The fact that Stilicho and Serena are mentioned as part of the imperial family is
simply another piece of evidence for Stilicho’s official parens principum rhetoric and his close
hold over the imperial regime. Placidia’s absence is therefore hardly conspicuous. The
individuals named had immediate familial ties to Maria, while Placidia, as the sister of her
husband, was at least one degree removed.
Furthermore, Stilicho had no reason hide the fact that Placidia remained unmarried. Oost’s
hypothesis is based on two fallacious assumptions. First, Oost sees Placidia’s birth as occurring
in 388/389, meaning that she could have been eleven or twelve in 400, the date of Claudian’s De
consulatu Stilichonis, and possibly as old as twenty at Stilicho’s death in 408. 56 The work of
scholars such as Hopkins, Shaw, and Clark suggest that the typical age range of Roman women
at the time of marriage was between twelve and eighteen. 57 By Oost’s calculation, Placidia’s age
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in 408 would therefore seem to fall outside this “normal” range. As we have seen, however, it is
far more likely that Placidia was born in 392 or 393. 58 She could therefore have been only fifteen
or sixteen at Stilicho’s death in 408. As such, she was perfectly within the typical age range for
Roman marriage practices. This latter date for Placidia’s birth therefore undermines Oost’s
hypothesis that Placidia’s unmarried status under Stilicho’s regime was somehow abnormal,
requiring her seclusion from public view.
A far more important objection to Oost’s argument arises from an examination of imperial
marriage practices in the late fourth and fifth centuries. Since the reign of Valentinian I, the
daughters of the imperial house had traditionally adopted a life of celibacy. While we do not
know the personal motivations of all of these women, this dynastic tradition in general possessed
clear advantages in both the political and religious spheres. On the one hand, the adoption of
chastity as a Christian ascetic practice offered these women new opportunities for the exercise of
political and religious influence. On the other, the fact that the daughters of the reigning imperial
house remained unwed served to both secure and protect the main line of male dynastic descent.
This tradition was broken only on rare and politically significant occasions. Iusta, Grata, and
Galla, the daughters of Valentinian I, led celibate lives during their father’s lifetime. While Galla
later married Theodosius I in 387, this marriage was to an acknowledged member of the imperial
college and, as we have seen, undertaken in dire circumstances for the sole purpose of preserving
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the power of her brother Valentinian II. Iusta and Grata, however, continued to maintain their
celibate lifestyles under Valentinian II’s regime. 59
This practice also seems to have informed the later experience of Honoria, Galla Placidia’s
daughter and the sister of the emperor Valentinian III. Honoria was born in 417/418 to Placidia
and Honorius’ general Constantius. Sometime in the late 440s, she was discovered having sexual
relations with one of her ministers, a man named Eugenius. In the court scandal that followed,
Eugenius was put to death, while Honoria appealed to the Hunnic king Attila for aid. The result
was a dangerous diplomatic crisis. 60 While this episode is interesting for a variety of reasons, in
the present discussion, the significant factor in Honoria’s experience is that she had remained
unmarried well into her later twenties or early thirties. Though Honoria chose to reject celibacy,
her age on this occasion would suggest that she had previously adhered to this dynastic tradition
under the regime of Valentinian III.
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Finally, Aelia Pulcheria, Arcadia, and Marina, the daughters of the emperor Arcadius, are also
known to have embraced celibacy during the lifetime of their brother, Theodosius II. 61 Unlike
our previous examples, however, the inherent religious aspect of this dynastic tradition is more
pronounced in our sources for these women. This fact seems largely due to Pucheria’s
overwhelming success in translating her religious lifestyle into an effective tool in the political
sphere. 62 While Arcadia and Marina are little more than names in our sources, Pucheria emerges
as one of the dominant political actors in the eastern empire during the fifth century.
All of these examples would suggest that the dynasties of Valentinian and Theodosius
maintained a tradition of celibacy for the sisters of reigning emperors. Beyond the inherent
religious implications of tradition, recent history would certainly have informed the adoption of
such practices for the security of the reigning emperor. The revolt of Procopius in 365-366 had
displayed the problems that could arise if auxiliary branches of the imperial family were allowed
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to ramify, as had the Constantinian family politics of the 310s and 337. 63 In addition, it was not
beyond the realm of possibility that an overly ambitious husband might use his marriage to the
emperor’s sister to launch his own claim for the throne, as would happen in 421 with Constantius
III and in 451 with the Emperor Marcian. 64 In terms of imperial tradition, the radical element in
Stilicho’s policy, as expressed in Claudian’s panegyric, was therefore not that Placidia would
one day marry Eucherius, but that Placidia would marry at all. 65
Galla Placidia’s first steps onto the historical stage occurred in the aftermath of Stilicho’s fall.
The eastern emperor Arcadius died of unknown causes on May 1, 408. Honorius, as senior
emperor, wished to travel to Constantinople and supervise his nephew Theodosius II’s
assumption of the eastern throne. Stilicho, however, decided to use this occasion to extend his
power into the east, thus finally realizing his old claims to regency in both the east and the west.
Using the rise of the usurper Constantine III in Gaul as a pretext, he convinced Honorius that the
legitimate emperor must remain in Italy for the safety of his regime. Stilicho, himself, would go
to the East and supervise affairs. 66
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Unfortunately, Stilicho had chosen to extend his power to the East when his hold over the
western empire was already slipping. In 406, groups of Suebi, Vandals, and Alans had crossed
the Rhine frontier and moved as they pleased through the northern Gallic provinces. 67 The
seeming inability of Ravenna to deal with this situation may have led to the rise of the usurper
Constantine III, who succeeded in bringing much of the Gallic aristocracy under his sway and
forcing Honorian loyalists to flee to Italy for refuge. 68 Further, Stilicho’s dealings with Alaric
and his make-shift army had come to a head in 407, when the barbarian leader appeared on the
Italian frontier demanding four thousand pounds of gold for his recent work in Illyricum. Stilicho
had managed to push the necessary tax burden onto the disgruntled Roman senate, but the
victory only served to rouse further enemies among their number. 69
Stilicho’s plans for the East gave his critics the opportunity they needed to orchestrate his
downfall. The magister scrinii, Olympius, seems to have led the charge. 70 A rumor began to
circulate claiming that Stilicho was planning to seize the eastern empire and raise his own son
Eucherius to the purple, in place of the rightful heir, Theodosius II. A mutiny broke out among
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the troops at Ticinium (modern Pavia) in northern Italy on August 8, 408, resulting in a general
purge of Stilicho’s adherents. 71 When attempts to reclaim the situation failed, Stilicho took
refuge in a church in Ravenna. On August 22, he emerged under false promises of safety and the
waiting military entourage promptly put him to death. 72 His executioner, Heraclianus, was
rewarded for this perfidy with the office of comes Africae. 73 In the coming days, Stilicho’s son
Eucherius was also killed in Rome. 74 His daughter Thermantia, who had been married to
Honorius after Maria’s death in 407, was sent back to her mother, Serena, in Rome. 75
The court coup was a bloody affair and the list of notables who met their end in the general
purge is long. 76 Unfortunately for those who planned and implemented this plot, their actions
only served to initiate further turmoil for the western empire. The new regime of Olympius was
fractured and unstable at a time when the West required firm leadership. With Stilicho and his
adherents dead or persecuted, many now saw the opportunity to seize the general’s former status
as the dominant force in the western empire. One of these was Alaric, whose army was still
encamped just outside of Italy. The bloodthirsty practices of Olympius’ regime, including the
slaughter of the families of barbarian troops, caused Alaric’s army to swell with large numbers of
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Roman and non-Roman soldiers. The Gothic general entered Italy and through three successive
sieges from 408-410, attempted to use the imperial city of Rome as a bargaining chip in his
negotiations with the court of Honorius. If a strong hand had controlled Ravenna, Alaric might
have conducted successful negotiations, thus sparing Rome from the fateful sack it would endure
in August of 410. Unfortunately for all involved, Alaric’s aggression only served to aggravate
internal pressures and further destabilize the post-Stilichonian regime.
More than once, confusion and power struggles within the imperial court thwarted
negotiations. Olympius fell from power sometime in 409, only to be restored a short time later.
The magister officiorum was then beaten to death probably in late 410 or 411 at the command of
Honorius’ new handler and future co-emperor, Constantius III. 77 Jovius, the praetorian prefect of
Italy, seems to have controlled Honorius after the first fall of Olympius. Jovius, however, was
also a friend of Alaric because of their mutual service in the regime of Stilicho. When his loyalty
to Honorius was questioned, he therefore took an oath never to make peace with the Gothic
general. Unfortunately, this oath led him to reject Alaric’s reasonable demands in the second
round of negotiations. 78
Under the stress of siege and famine, the Roman Senate abandoned the ineffectual regime of
Honorius in late 409 and colluded with Alaric to raise a usurper from among their own number, a
distinguished senator named Priscus Attalus. When this tactic eventually proved no more
effective in realizing Alaric’s goals, Alaric stripped Attalus and his officials of their imperial
regalia in the early summer of 410. In the third and final round of negotiations with Honorius, a
77

Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 8. 2 = Müller-Dindorf 1. 8.

78

Sozomen, Historia ecclesiastica IX.7.
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personal enemy of Alaric in the emperor’s employ, a Goth named Sarus, launched a fateful,
unplanned attack on the general’s delegation. 79 In frustration at almost three years of unfulfilled
negotiations, Alaric laid siege to Rome for the third time in the summer of 410. On August 24,
the imperial city fell, probably to internal treachery, and Alaric’s motley forces spent three days
looting the riches of centuries. 80
During this tumultuous period, Galla Placidia moved for the first time from a mere name in
the background of honorific writing to a participant in Roman political life. Zosimus tells us that
shortly after Alaric’s first siege of Rome in 408, the senate came to believe that Serena had
summoned the Gothic general as revenge for the murder of her husband, Stilicho, and her son,
Eucherius. For this reason, “…it seemed best both to all the senate in common and to Placidia,
the sister of the emperor by the same father, that she [Serena] be killed....” 81 They believed that
Alaric would withdraw from Rome upon Serena’s death, as there would then be no one to betray
the city. While Zosimus states that Serena’s execution was, in one sense, due justice for her
previous desecration of the temple of Rhea, the historian nevertheless wholly absolves her of
guilt regarding the rumored collusion with Alaric. 82
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Zosimus’ attestation of Placidia’s involvement in the decision to execute Serena raises
important questions regarding her motivations. It is certainly possible, as Zosimus suggests, that
Placidia truly believed that Serena had summoned Alaric and that her death would end the siege
of Rome. Nevertheless, the fact remains that after the death of her father, Placidia had been
raised in the house of her cousin and foster sister. Why then, as a young woman of fifteen or
sixteen, would Placidia agree on such a horrible end for someone who for all intents and
purposes, had acted as her own mother?
While the sources provide no evidence concerning the relationship between Placidia and
Serena, scholars have generally concluded that Placidia’s actions on this occasion suggest that
she possessed a deep hatred of her foster mother. 83 This hypothesis is certainly possible. As we
have seen, Honorius and Galla Placidia had spent their lives as little more than pawns in regime
of Stilicho and Serena. The early marriage of Honorius to Maria, the planned union of Eucherius
and Placidia, and the hasty marriage of Maria’s sister Thermantia to the emperor following
Maria’s death in 407, all served as props to a regime whose claims to regency had grown
ludicrous well before Honorius reached the age of twenty-four in 408. Placidia and Honorius
may have recognized this manipulation as they grew to maturity, resulting in a consequent hatred
of Stilicho and Serena. This hatred, in turn, may have caused Placidia and Honorius to consent to
the execution of Stilicho, Serena, and Eucherius in 408. At the very least, it may have informed
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the siblings’ apparent willingness to believe the treasonous rumors regarding these individuals
which circulated in both Ravenna and Rome at this time. 84
Scholars who support this hypothesis therefore read the meager evidence of Zosimus as
evidence of Placidia’s formal acquisition of power. Bury and Sirago present her actively
involved in senatorial deliberations concerning Serena’s case. 85 Scholars such Demougeot and
Lütkinhaus suggest that she was a principle member of political factions within the city. 86
Nevertheless, while it is tempting to read Zosimus’ account as evidence for Placidia’s active
rise to political power at this time, it is more plausible to believe that her participation in the
decision to execute Serena was the result of senatorial coercion or intimidation. 87 Serena’s
execution took place when Rome was already in panic over Alaric’s first siege. Zosimus clearly
tells us that the senate believed that Serena was guilty of summoning Alaric. Both the senate and
people probably also desired a scapegoat, and Serena’s execution was perfectly in keeping with
the policies of Olympius’ new regime in Ravenna. 88 Unlike Stilicho, however, Serena was a
blood relative of the emperor and member of the Theodosian house. Few would dare to end her
life without the express approval of Honorius, and a barbarian army under the command of
Alaric stood between Rome and Ravenna. The emperor was effectively out of reach.
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In this situation, it is reasonable to assume that the Senate turned towards self-help in much
the same way as they would in 409 with the usurpation of Priscus Attalus. The consent of Galla
Placidia, also trapped in the city, was the closest the Roman senators could get to imperial
approval for their actions against Serena. Placidia herself was only fifteen or sixteen years old in
the autumn of 408. She had lived in Serena’s household since her early childhood and we have
no reason to doubt that Serena played a maternal role in her life. These facts alone make it
difficult to accept that she would actively pursue Serena’s death on her own initiative.
There is also some reason to think that Placidia may have feared for her own safety in 408.
The on-going purges of Stilicho’s family and followers may have seemed haphazard and
threatening to one so close to these individuals. Furthermore, Alaric’s siege of Rome brought this
already tense political atmosphere to a fever pitch and opened the very real possibility of urban
violence. Finally, the senate’s accusations against Serena would have shown Placidia that even
members of the imperial house were unsafe in the current political climate. Under these
circumstances, the senate would have found Placidia quite susceptible to intimidation or
coercion. Her agreement to the execution of Serena would therefore owe little to her own
initiative.
While we ultimately cannot know Placidia’s motivations for this action, it is far more
probable to assume that she merely gave her consent to the senate’s decision. Zosimus is clear
that the senators were acting on their own beliefs regarding Serena’s collusion with Alaric.
Placidia is only mentioned in the decision to execute her cousin. Zosimus’ account therefore
cannot support the arguments of some scholars who suggest that Placidia was a formidable and
independent political actor at this time. While Zosimus’ text does suggest that the senate
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acknowledged her authority as a member of the imperial house, there is good reason to suspect
that Placidia merely gave her assent to the senatorial decision.
The real threat to Placidia’s safety, however, came late in 409. In December of this year, the
starved and weary citizens of Rome decided to reject the apparently incompetent rule of
Honorius and ally themselves with Alaric. After two successive sieges, Alaric had accomplished
nothing in his negotiations with Ravenna. He therefore chose a different tactic. Alaric raised the
prestigious urban prefect Priscus Attalus to the purple with the consent of the Roman Senate,
some of whom filled the ranks of the usurper’s new regime. Alaric himself assumed Stilicho’s
former office as MVM praesentalis. 89 Together, general and usurper moved to wrench the
chaotic government of the western empire from the feeble hands of Honorius.
Unfortunately, Alaric quickly found that Attalus had a mind of his own. The usurper refused
to take Alaric’s advice on the conquest of Africa. Instead of a troop of non-Romans, Attalus
believed that a mere embassy would bring Africa under his control. In this assumption, he was
sorely mistaken. The comes Africae, Heraclian, remained faithful to Honorius. He put Attalus’
messenger and new comes Africae, Constans, to death. 90 The count then placed an embargo on
the African grain shipments to Rome, causing a more devastating famine than even Alaric had
managed. Attalus, however, still opposed sending barbarian troops to Africa. 91
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Negotiations with Honorius proved no more successful. Attalus led his troops against Ravenna
in order to secure his position as emperor of the west. Honorius now realized the futility of his
position. He offered to recognize Attalus as his co-regent, a delaying action that had previously
worked with the usurper, Constantine III. Attalus, however, refused to accept anything less than
Honorius’ complete deposition. 92 The situation changed dramatically, however, through the
unexpected arrival of four thousand eastern troops at Ravenna sent from Honorius’ nephew,
Theodosius II. Honorius now felt himself strong enough to reject further negotiations with the
usurper. 93 Once again, Alaric found himself blocked from realizing his goals.
In early summer of 410, either as a good faith measure or as the price of reopening
negotiations, Alaric formally demoted Attalus and once again recognized the authority of
Honorius. 94 Both sides now prepared to return to the bargaining table. Unfortunately for all,
Sarus, a Goth in Honorius’ service, launched an independent attack that almost succeeded in
killing or capturing Alaric. 95 This attack marked the end of over two years of talks and the
ultimate failure of the barbarian general. Rome was besieged for a third time at the beginning of
summer, 410. On August 24, the city fell. After three days of looting, Alaric led his army south
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in possession of massive amounts of wealth as well as important hostages. One of these was the
emperor’s sister, Galla Placidia. 96
With the Roman rebellion against Honorius in December of 409, Placidia’s situation became
far more dangerous. Regardless of the futility of Attalus’ rule in hindsight, there is little reason to
doubt that Alaric, Attalus, and the Roman Senate were deadly serious in their imperial
pretensions. Attalus’ refusal to accept anything less than the deposition of Honorius speaks to the
overwhelming confidence of the new regime. As such, Galla Placidia necessarily found herself
in a precarious position.
The uncertainty of Galla Placidia’s situation is reflected in the writings of Zosimus. Most
sources associate Alaric’s capture of Galla Placidia with the fall and sack of Rome in August of
410. 97 Zosimus, however, suggests that Placidia was already in Alaric’s custody in the early
summer of 410. After describing the incidents surrounding the deposition of Attalus, the author
notes that Alaric nevertheless retained the usurper and his son, Ampelius, for their own safety
until a peace agreement could be established with Honorius. Along with these men, Alaric also
held Galla Placidia in the manner of a hostage. Zosimus assures his readers, however, that the
sister of the emperor continued to enjoy all of the honors of her imperial rank. 98
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While Zosimus’ testimony stands in stark contrast to every other source that records the
captivity of Galla Placidia, there are reasons to see it as the most reliable reconstruction of
events, not least the fact that in the last surviving chapter of his work, Zosimus draws on the
reliable, and almost contemporary, historian Olympiodorus. Zosimus presents our most detailed
account of the plight of Rome from 408-410, though his work ends before Alaric’s sack of the
imperial city. The numerous other sources that record Placidia’s captivity offer generalized
overviews of these years. 99 The authors may therefore have simply telescoped separate, but close
chronological events into the single, momentous incident of 410, the sack of Rome.
In light of the political vicissitudes of these years, Zosimus’ account also offers the most
historically plausible reconstruction of Placidia’s captivity. Neither Alaric nor the Roman Senate
could have failed to recognize the advantage that the possession of Placidia offered to their
endeavors. Honorius remained secure behind the marshes and walls of Ravenna. His sister had
no such protection. Though the negotiations had turned towards the deposition of Honorius after
409, Placidia’s person would still have remained a valuable bargaining chip with the imperial
court. As Placidia was present in Rome, it is difficult to believe that Alaric and/or the Senate
would have failed to exploit this obvious asset. 100
The captivity of Placidia need not have meant that she was a resident in Alaric’s camp from
December, 409. The alliance between Alaric and the Roman Senate meant that the two were
acting as one in their negotiations with Ravenna, until the failure of Attalus’ rule became
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apparent. Placidia may therefore have remained under “house arrest” after the usurpation of
Attalus, a practice sometimes allowed for high status prisoners. 101 As Zosimus suggests, only
when the alliance between Alaric and the Senate broke down in the summer of 410 was it
necessary to transfer Placidia into Alaric’s direct control.
What effect, if any, the captivity of Placidia had on Alaric’s negotiations with Honorius is
unknown. Though the imperial court would make demands for her return after the sack of Rome
in August of 410, the sources make no mention of her in the negotiations before this incident.
Nevertheless, some trace may remain beneath the surface of events. In his commentary on
Zosimus, François Paschoud argues that the emperor became much more conciliatory to Alaric
following the rise of Attalus in December, 409. In his opinion, this change came because Alaric
now held Galla Placidia as a hostage. 102 Unfortunately, Paschoud provides no extended argument
or examples to support his thesis, and any change in negotiation tactics on the part of Honorius is
debatable. Though Honorius initially offered Attalus co-regency, the demands of Attalus and
Alaric for the emperor’s deposition and possible mutilation effectively ended negotiations for the
duration of the usurper’s rule. When the unexpected arrival of four thousand eastern troops
restored equilibrium to the power struggle, Honorius felt strong enough (or was deemed strong
enough) to require Alaric to abandon his usurper in order to return to the bargaining table. 103
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There is therefore little reason to suggest that Honorius became more amenable to Alaric over
the long term.
Nevertheless, Honorius’ initial offer of co-rule with Attalus may suggest something more than
a weakened political and military standing. In 409, the emperor had reached a similar agreement
extending the offer of shared dominion with the Gallic usurper, Constantine III. Not only did he
recognize Constantine as co-emperor; he also provided the usurper with imperial vestments.
Though military weakness was probably a factor in his decision, Honorius was also reacting to
the fact that Constantine held members of his family captive, or so Zosimus tells us. What
Honorius did not realize, however, was that the usurper had already put these relatives to
death. 104
In 410, the emperor sent high-status envoys and made the same offer of co-rule to Priscus
Attalus. 105 The fact that Honorius took the initiative in this action may suggest that the emperor
was applying a previous solution to similar circumstances. Military weakness was certainly a
factor in 410, as it had been in 409. In the latter case, however, it was the captivity of relatives
that pushed Honorius to recognize a usurper. Alaric’s captivity of Galla Placidia would therefore
explain why he jumped to the same dramatic concession in attempted to placate the usurper
Attalus in 410.
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Regardless of when her captivity began, Galla Placidia was certainly among the prominent
individuals in Alaric’s army when this force left Rome on August 27, 410, and moved into
Campania. After a failed attempt to invade Sicily, Alaric fell ill and died near the city of
Consentia. Athaulf, Alaric’s lieutenant and brother-in-law, now took command of the motley
force. 106
This army remained in southern Italy for the following two years, uncertain of its future,
unsettled, and raiding for necessary supplies. 107 The sources, however, record no military or
diplomatic action between Athaulf and the imperial court during this period. Nevertheless, it
might be safe to assume that negotiations of some sort took place. In addition to extensive
material wealth, the army had also taken hostages of high birth from the city of Rome. The
presence of these captives would have placed Athaulf and his officers in contact with many of
the great Italian families, who would have wished to negotiate ransoms for their unfortunate kin.
In addition, they still possessed their most valuable captive, Galla Placidia. Fear for the safety of
these people among the barbarian army may have caused some hesitation on the part of the
imperial court. If Athaulf gained some advantage from this situation, however, the details are lost
to history.
In truth, the problem of Athaulf and his army had moved to the back of Ravenna’s priorities
by 411. The imperial court may have feared for the safety of the emperor’s sister in an attack or
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simply decided that the barbarians were incapable of doing more damage to the Italian peninsula
than they already had. A more probable explanation, however, is the fact that emperors
traditionally placed the dynastic challenge of a usurper on a higher level of importance than
foreign and domestic threats to the Roman citizenry. The imperial court of Honorius was no
different. The retreat of the barbarian army from the vicinity of Ravenna meant that the emperor
now had breathing room to deal with the usurpers in Gaul. It is also possible that Honorius’ new
magister militum Constantius, following the vision of his predecessor, Stilicho, was already
entertaining the notion of recruiting Athaulf and his forces for Ravenna’s benefit in the
immediate future. In any case, the imperial court in 411 had apparently decided that the problem
of Athaulf and his barbarians could wait for the time being.
Galla Placidia would remain a hostage among Athaulf’s forces for the next three years.
Zosimus assures us that she received all of the respect due her station while among the forces of
Alaric, and this good treatment probably continued under the rule of Athaulf. 108 Nevertheless, we
can hardly doubt that these years of wandering captivity were at least initially traumatic for the
Roman princess. At some point during this period, however, Placidia came to realize or was
convinced of the inherent opportunities such a situation afforded her own ambitions. As we will
see in Chapter 3, her conscious decision to embrace these opportunities would have dramatic
consequences for her own future as well as the political life of the western Roman empire.
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Chapter 2: Usurpers in Gaul

The Gallic provinces faced their own challenges in the first decade of the fifth century. Severe
threats to Italy under Stilicho’s regime, specifically the invasions of Alaric (401-402) and of an
otherwise unknown Gothic leader named Radagaisus (405-406), forced the magister utriusque
militiae (MVM) to severely reduce the military forces of Gaul in order to supply men for the
defense of the Italian peninsula. This action resulted in both the invasion of non-Roman groups
from beyond the Rhine limes and the usurpation of imperial authority within Gaul.
In 406, groups of Alans, Vandals, and Suebi crossed the Rhine and spread devastation in
northern Gallic provinces. This event coincided with the rise of a series of usurpers in Britain.
Constantine III, the last of these British usurpers, crossed into Gaul in early 407, confined the
trans-Rhenish raiders in the northern provinces of Belgica Prima and Belgica Secunda, and
quickly succeeded in establishing his control over almost the entire Gallic prefecture. From his
headquarters at Arles, he also attempted to extend his influence into the Italian sphere. In return
for Constantine’s promise of aid against Alaric, who was then occupying Italy, Honorius
recognized the usurper as an imperial colleague early in the year 409.
Constantine’s fortunes began to decline, however, just after he obtained Honorius’
recognition. In Spain, Constantine’s general Gerontius rebelled from his master’s control and
raised his own usurper, Maximus, to the purple. The general also encouraged the 406 invaders to
once again take up their depredations. Gerontius’ actions and the repeated failure of
Constantine’s son and co-Augustus, Constans, in bringing the general to heel fundamentally
weakened Constantine’s regime. Britain and Armorica withdrew their support for the Gallic
emperor in 409. Constantine’s fruitless attempt to intervene militarily in Italian affairs in 410
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also ended his efforts to establish control over Honorius and the imperial court at Ravenna. By
the spring of 411, two consecutive armies besieged Constantine at Arles. Gerontius first
succeeded in killing Constans and trapping Constantine inside his Gallic stronghold. Gerontius’
forces withdrew, however, at the approach of a small force from Italy led by Honorius’ new
general Constantius. Constantius took up the siege abandoned by Gerontius and ultimately
managed to capture the Gallic emperor. The Honorian army itself was then forced to retreat
when word arrived of a new Gallic usurper in the north, Jovinus, and the imminent approach of
his forces. Once safely back in Italy, Constantius executed Constantine III and his youngest son,
Julian, thirty miles outside of Ravenna.
Within this overall narrative context, this chapter locates the origin of much of the subsequent
political turmoil that came to characterize the Honorian regime from 407-423 in both the failure
of Stilicho’s management of imperial affairs in the western provinces and in the resulting career
of the Gallic usurper Constantine III. In terms of both the territorial extent of his regime and the
length of his rule (407-411), Constantine was arguably the most successful of the numerous
usurpers who rose to challenge the emperor Honorius’ control over the western empire from 406420. While Constantine’s regime certainly benefited from Ravenna’s preoccupation with the
eastern empire until 408 and the problem of Alaric from 408-410, the usurper’s overwhelming
initial success in securing the loyalty of the Gallic prefecture reveals both the fundamental
insecurity of the recently established Theodosian dynasty as well as a widespread dissatisfaction
with the politics and leadership of Honorius’ regent, the MVM Stilicho. Ultimately, however,
Constantine proved no better at guiding political affairs or controlling his own imperial officers
than his dynastically legitimate counterpart at Ravenna. Once Constantine’s initial success had
established the practice of usurpation as a viable expression of political discord, the Gallic
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emperor proved incapable of preventing similar movements within his own sphere of influence.
The result was the devastation of the Gallic provinces through both civil war and barbarian raids
as well as the further fragmentation of the political integrity of the western empire. As such,
Constantine III’s tumultuous career laid the foundation for much of the subsequent political
discord in the western empire under the Honorian regime.
In addition to providing a narrative of Constantine’s usurpation, this chapter argues several
key points. First, this chapter links the rise of political usurpation during this period to Gallic
discontent with the policies of the newly established Honorian regime. This chapter also offers a
new interpretation of Zosimus’ controversial claims on the cause/effect relationship between the
406 Rhine invasion and the contemporary British usurpations. Contrary to much earlier
scholarship which sees this passage of Zosimus as an accurate reflection of the earlier work of
Olympiodorus, this chapter argues that Zosimus derived his information for this section from a
far less reliable historical source. We must therefore consider the author’s claims in this section
of doubtful historical veracity, especially in light of evidence from other primary sources that
present contrary views of these events. Finally, this chapter argues that Constantine’s embassies
to the emperor Honorius played a definite and visible role in the imperial court’s shifting
approaches to the problem of Alaric in 409.

In the early years of the fifth century, the Honorian regime under the regency of Stilicho was
forced to deal with two invasions of the Italian peninsula. The first concerned the movement of
Alaric into the western sphere of influence. Since his rebellion in 395, Alaric had managed to use
the conflict between the eastern and western courts to his advantage. As we have seen, eastern
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hostility to Stilicho’ intervention in eastern affairs had effectively ended the western regent’s
pursuit of Alaric in 395 and 397. 109 The latter occasion resulted not only in the eastern court
branding Stilicho an enemy of the state, but also the incorporation of Alaric into the eastern
military establishment. 110 For unknown reasons, however, Alaric seems to have abandoned this
position and moved into the western empire, launching an invasion of Italy in the autumn of 401.
After close battles at Pollentia and Verona, however, Stilicho succeeded in forcing Alaric out of
Italy and into Noricum in 402. 111
The second invasion of the Italian peninsula occurred under the leadership of a Gothic king
named Radagaisus. According to our limited sources for this event, Radagaisus led a motley
assortment of barbarian groups from beyond the Danube into Italy in 405. After the army had
spent months ravaging northern Italy, Stilicho was finally able to drive these forces into the
mountains of Fiesole, where he starved them into submission. Radagaisus himself was executed
in the late summer of 406 while his followers were either recruited into the Roman army or sold
into slavery. 112
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The causes for both these invasions are obscure in our sources. Stilicho’s court panegyricist
Claudian, whose De bello Gothico and De sexto consulatu Honorii Augusti are our main sources
for Alaric’s 401-402 invasion, provides no indication for why Alaric chose to abandon his
official position in the eastern Roman military establishment to return to the uncertainty of
rebellion. In Claudian’s poem, Alaric is portrayed as the typical barbarian of Roman literature,
skin-clad and motivated by greed and want of destruction. 113 Modern scholarship, however, has
more plausibly suggested that Alaric’s motivation came from a breakdown of relations with the
eastern court. 114 As a result, the general, once again in rebellion, sought to establish his power in
defeated Radagaisus beyond the Danube. Zosimus therefore never mentions Radagaisus’ Italian invasion. On the
other hand, arguably the best source for Radagaisus’ campaign is the Historiarum adversum paganos libri VII of the
contemporary ecclesiastical historian and theologian Orosius. While preserving many relevant details of this
campaign, the thesis of Orosius’ history severely affects his depiction of Radagaisus. Orosius composed his work as
a universal history extending from creation down to his own times, ending in the year 417. The express purpose of
this history, which apparently began as a mere source collection for the composition of Augustine of Hippo’s De
civitate dei, was to combat the anti-Christian rhetoric of some Hellenes who attributed the recent troubles in the
empire, particularly Alaric’s sack of Rome in 410, to the imperial rejection of the traditional gods of Rome. The vast
bulk of Orosius’ history therefore recounts the various calamities and horrors of ancient history in order to present
the troubles of the Roman Empire following the advent of Christianity in a comparatively favorable light. While
Orosius’ Historiae can be used as a contemporary witness to the political events of his own day, his thesis on the
optimism of Christian times often severely strains his presentation of these events. This general tendency in Orosius’
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between the 405 invasion of the “pagan” Radagaisus and the fateful second invasion of the Christian Alaric from
408-410, arguing that God actually intervened in secular affairs to prevent Radagaisus’ sack of the imperial city, an
event that would have been much more devastating due to the Gothic king’s paganism. This thesis forces Orosius to
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the western sphere using the same violent negotiation tactics that he had previously used in the
East. 115 While these tactics were not successful in the short term, Alaric ultimately succeeded in
acquiring his coveted place in the western military. In 405, we find him stationed at Epirus under
the command of Stilicho. 116
In much the same way as Alaric’s motivations in 401, Radagaisus’ objective in invading the
Italian peninsula in 405 is unknown. 117 The relative obscurity of Radagaisus in our sources as
well as his origins beyond the Danube, a political sphere that was largely opaque to Roman
authors, prevents any clear understanding of the circumstances that brought him to power, or the
events that led to his incursion into Roman territory. The dominant hypothesis in modern
scholarship sees Radagaisus and his followers as refugees, fleeing the expanding power of the
Huns beyond the Danube. 118 While this is possible, there is no evidence to suggest that Hunnic
activity pushed Radagaisus and his followers into Roman territory or that the Huns represented
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some type of growing, collective power beyond the Danube in this period. 119 More promising is
the notion that Radagaisus and his followers were seeking accommodation in the Roman Empire
for their own reasons, using tactics that had forced such concessions from the imperial
government in the past. 120 Our lack of sources, however, prevents any definite conclusions on
Radagaisus’ motivations.
In response to these threats to the Italian peninsula, Stilicho was forced to take drastic
actions. Claudian tells us that Alaric’s invasion in 401 came as a surprise to the imperial court.
Stilicho therefore quickly traveled to Raetia to gather sufficient forces to meet this threat. In
addition to recruiting heavily among the non-Roman population along the Danube, Stilicho also
recalled several legions stationed in the western provinces. These included at least one legion
from Britain and, most significantly, all of those guarding the Rhine limes. In fact, Claudian tells
us that the frontier was so denuded of troops that the barbarian peoples beyond the Rhine were
kept from invasion solely due to the threat of future Roman reprisals. 121
While Claudian probably exaggerates the extent of Stilicho’s removal of the Rhine legions, it
is reasonable to assume that the MVM recalled the veteran, mobile legions (comitatenses) for the
defense of Italy, leaving a bare minimum of the regular frontier troops (limitanei) to oversee
affairs in the region. 122 Though the evidence is lacking, it is also probable that Stilicho either
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As argued by Goffart, Barbarian Tides, 78-80. The idea that Radagaisus and his followers were seeking entry
into the Roman political sphere is implicit in Wolfram’s “Hunnic Alternative” model. See Wolfram, Roman Empire,
123-144. Goffart’s suggestion simply removes the Huns as the ultimate cause for Radagaisus’ actions, allowing the
Gothic leader his own agency. While generally following Wolfram, Halsall also suggests that Radagaisus was using
aggressive negotiation tactics in his 405 invasion. See Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 208.

121

122
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The barbarian fear of Stilicho’s military prowess and their willing submission to his authority is a constant
feature in Claudian’s works. In addition to the present passage under consideration, see, for example, Panegyricus
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maintained these veteran legions in Italy after Alaric’s retreat or that he followed a similar
strategy when faced with Radagaisus invasion in 405. 123 Alan Cameron has persuasively argued
that the imperial court at Ravenna was concerned with the possibility of Alaric’s return until at
least 404. 124 Furthermore, while the sources attest to some Roman presence on the Rhine during
the barbarian incursions of 406, the general success of the invaders in entering Gaul would
suggest that the Rhine defenses were operating at minimal levels. 125
Stilicho’s depletion of the Gallic defenses was arguably a necessary response to the threats of
the period and ultimately proved successful against the forces of Alaric and Radagaisus.

de quarto consulate Honorii Augusti 439-459, concerning Stilicho’s visit to the Rhine frontier in 396, and In
Eutropium 377-383, which depicts Stilicho and Honorius receiving voluntary peace embassies from various frontier
groups in c.399. It is therefore possible that Claudian’s statement regarding a completely denuded Rhine frontier,
defended by the fear of the barbarians alone (sola terrore) owes more to the poet’s desire to praise Stilicho’s
military prowess than to general’s actual policies in reality. Nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt the basic truth
of Claudian’s claims, which suggest that Stilicho drew heavily from the Gallic legions to meet the threat of Alaric’
invasion in 401. Stilicho’s withdrawal of the Rhine legions is therefore generally accepted in scholarship. See, for
example, Bury, Later Roman Empire, 161; Stein, Histoire, 248; Pierre Courcelle, Histoire littéraire des grandes
invasions germaniques (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1964), 79-80; Drinkwater, “Usurpers”, 275; Kulikowski,
“Barbarians in Gaul”, 326; Goffart, Barbarian Tides, 95. Halsall has shown that Stilicho’s actions were perfectly in
keeping with previous military expedients under the usurpers Magnus Maximus in 388 and Eugenius in 394. See
Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 199-200.
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199-200. Kulikowski demonstrates that Codex Theodosianus VII.13.16 and VII.13.17 (dating to April 17 and 19,
406, respectively) shows Stilicho’s desperation in raising troops to deal with Radagaisus’ invasion. Both laws allow
for the recruitment of slaves into the Roman army, overturning previous legislation against this practice. See
Kulikowski, “Barbarians in Gaul”, 330. Considering such dire circumstances, it is perfectly reasonable to suggest
that Stilicho again recalled Gallic forces to deal with Radagaisus, in much the same way as he had in against Alaric
in 401.
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Cameron shows that Honorius waited a over year after Alaric’s defeat at Verona and expulsion from Italy in 402
to celebrate his imperial triumph, plausibly arguing that the delay was due to fears of Alaric’s return. See Cameron,
Claudian, 180-181.
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Scholars generally attribute the successful Rhine crossing of 406 to Stilicho’s depletion of the Gallic legions. See,
for example, Bury, Later Roman Empire, 169; Courcelle, Histoire, 79-80; Goffart, Barbarian Tides, 95.
Furthermore, our primary sources provide no evidence of Roman military intervention against these invaders until
the rise of the usurper Constantine III in 407. On this point see, Kulikowski, “Barbarians in Gaul”, 333; Halsall,
Barbarian Migrations, 211-212.
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Nevertheless, when combined with the general eastern orientation of Stilicho’s politics, such
action amounted to a fundamental neglect of the imperial management of the Gallic provinces.
Under the circumstances, it is perhaps inevitable that this neglect would result in problems for
the Honorian regime. The usurpations of Maximus and Eugenius remained a part of living
memory and the extension of the control of the Theodosian dynasty into the western empire was
a relatively new development. 126 The potential for the abuse or rejection of Italian authority was
therefore quite real, though it was perhaps an unavoidable risk given the circumstances
prevailing in Italy during the first half of the decade.
Stilicho’s policies, however, did have one unforeseeable consequence that served to
jeopardize the apparently tenuous hold of the Honorian regime over this region. In late 406,
groups of Alans, Vandals, and Suebi crossed the Rhine frontier and caused widespread panic in
the northern Gallic provinces. Contrary to many modern perceptions, there is nothing to suggest
that this crossing was somehow a consequence of problems elsewhere in the Roman Empire or
beyond the Roman limes. 127 Occasional barbarian raids were part and parcel of frontier life in the
Roman Empire, especially when the imperial government was otherwise distracted with internal
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As noted by both Stevens and Drinkwater. See C. E. Stevens, “Marcus, Gratian, Constantine”, Athenaeum 35
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Scholars have long attributed the 406 raids to Hunnic conquests beyond the Danube frontier. See, for example, E.
A. Thompson, The Huns (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1996; originally published as A History
of Attila and the Huns, 1948), 32-33; Demougeot, De l'unité, 376; Christian Courtois, Les Vandals et l’Afrique
(Paris: Arts et métiers graphiques, 1955), 39-40; Courcelle, Histoire littéraire, 81; Peter Heather, “The Huns”, 4-41.
More recently, some scholars have attempted to tie the 406 incursion to the defeat of Radagaisus’ army at Faesulae
earlier in the same year. See Paschoud, Zosime, III. 2, 28-31; Drinkwater, “Usurpers” 273; Anthony R. Birley, The
Roman Government of Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 457-460. Unfortunately, there is no
evidence to associate the Rhine crossing of 406 with either the Huns or Radagaisus. This fact is argued by Walter
Goffart, Barbarians and Romans, A.D. 418-584: The Techniques of Accommodation (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1980), 17; Kulikowski, “Barbarians in Gaul”, 326; Goffart, Barbarian Tides, 73-118.
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concerns or problems elsewhere. 128 On normal occasions, the imperial administration would
eventually deal with the raiders as soon as time and resources permitted. Unfortunately for the
northern Gallic provinces, the incursions of 406 coincided both with a new series of Gallic
usurpations and with the divided priorities of the central administration at Ravenna in the final
phase of Stilicho’s regime, effectively rendering the raids of minor concern to the imperial
government.
Our understanding of the 406 invaders, the events surrounding their entry into Gaul, and their
subsequent history is complicated by the nature of our surviving source material. Generally, this
consists of brief chronicle accounts, a single letter of Jerome, and short fragments of the work of
the fifth-century historian Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus as preserved in the later history of
Gregory of Tours. While the sixth-century historian Zosimus does allude to these invaders as the
cause of the British usurpations, this reference occurs in the notoriously unedited and unfinished
Book VI of his Historia nova and, as we will see, there is good reason to believe that he derived
this information from an unreliable earlier source. For the purposes of this study, what our
meager sources do suggest is that the invaders were operating independently when they arrived
at the Rhine frontier in 406 and that they displayed an early tendency to fragment into smaller
units along obscure internal divisions when faced with politically advantageous circumstances.
These tendencies would come to characterize the later history of these groups, especially after
their entry into the Spanish provinces in 409.
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In a short entry to his chronicle for the year 406, the contemporary Gallic theologian Prosper
of Aquitane tells us that on December 31, groups of Vandals and Alans crossed the Rhine and
entered Gaul. 129 The fragments of the fifth-century historian Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus,
preserved in Gregory of Tours’ Historia, provide further narrative glimpses of this crossing,
showing the political complexity and confusion hidden behind Prosper’s simple notice. 130 Civil
discord seems to have fractured the Alan contingent on the Rhine frontier. Frigeridus tells us that
the Alans divided their forces between their king, Respendial, and another commander, Goar.
Rather than fight against the Romans, Goar and a large number of his followers broke with their
king and decided to enter Roman service. This division among the Alan troops caused
129

Prosper of Aquitaine, Chronicon s.a. 406. Prosper was a Gallic theologian from the region of Aquitania, who
lived during the first half of the fifth century (c. 390 – post 455). As a supporter and correspondent with Augustine
of Hippo, Prosper was deeply involved in the contemporary ecclesiastical controversies concerning the teachings of
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Kingdoms,” in Greek and Roman Historiography in Late Antiquity: Fourth to Sixth Century A.D. ed. Gabriele
Marasco (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 349-389. Concerning the Historia of Frigeridus, very little can be said with certainty
as his work survives solely in a series of fragments quoted at length in Book II of Gregory of Tours’ Historia. He
wrote in the first half of the fifth century and was apparently of Gallo-Roman extraction. His history comprised at
least twelve books and may have ended with the rise of Valentinian III in 425. In the fragments of his work which
Gregory preserves, Frigeridus offers deeper insight into the obscure political events in Gaul during this period. As
the historian was a contemporary to the events he describes and his fragments generally augment the information
provided by more well-known authors from this period, modern scholars have generally accepted Frigeridus as a
reliable witness for early fifth-century history. For the work of Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus, see Zecchini, “Latin
Historiography: Jerome, Orosius and the Western Chronicles”, 317-345.

58

Respendial to change his plans and withdraw from the Rhine for a time. Meanwhile, some group
of Franks inflicted a great slaughter on the Vandal contingent, even killing their king,
Godigisel. 131 Only the arrival of the Alans (presumably those under Respendial) saved the
Vandals from being wiped out completely. 132
Frigeridus’ account is as tantalizing as it is brief. Though Goar is frequently designated a king
of the Alans in secondary literature, Frigeridus does not suggest that this was the case during the
Rhine crossing. His specificity concerning Respendial’s rank as king may suggest that Goar was
simply an influential commander in Respendial’s Alan host. In 414, an unnamed Alan king,
possibly Goar, aided Paulinus of Pella against other hostile non-Roman forces at Bordeaux. 133
Nevertheless, the only source that specifically cites Goar as a king of the Alans is Constantius of
Lyons’ Vita Sancti Germani, written sometime around 480 C. E. 134 This may suggest that like
Alaric’s assumption of the title, Goar’s kingship was a development that occurred over time, a
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testimony to the changing nature of the political structures among the non-Roman groups during
this period. 135
Goar’s decision to join the Romans suggests there still remained at least a minimal Roman
presence on the Rhine frontier at this period. After securing Goar’s aid, this Roman opposition
apparently became sizable enough to deter Respendial from crossing the Rhine in the spot he had
initially chosen. Meanwhile, the Vandals had apparently attempted to cross at a different point,
one which brought them up against a group of Franks. Scholars have almost universally accepted
that these Franks were acting as allies or federates of the Romans. 136 However, Frigeridus and
the Spanish historian Orosius, both of whom mention this episode with the Franks, are not
specific on that point. 137 Nevertheless, it is evident that the Alans and the Vandals were acting
independently at least initially, attacking frontier defenses in different areas. It seems that
Respendial only came to aid the Vandals when he realized that he could not stand against the
Roman forces in his area alone. Presumably the two groups then crossed the Rhine together.
Though the Suebi go unmentioned in the work of Prosper and Frigeridus, other authors
suggest that they formed a third major division among the barbarians who entered Gaul in the
winter of 406. 138 The Suebi are traditionally listed as one of the groups making up the Alamannic
confederation. In his letter 123 to the Gallic noblewoman Ageruchia, dated to around 409,
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Jerome mentions the Alamanni as one of the tribes who crossed the Rhine. 139 Unfortunately,
Jerome’s letter is an artful display of his own literary education, and his ethnographic list of
barbarian groups includes many unmentioned in any other contemporary source, such as the
Quadi, Sarmatians, Gepids, Herules, Saxones, and even the Pannonians. The Alamanni reference
may therefore owe more to his desire to pad an apocalyptic description with antagonists than to
provide accurate information on the perpetrators of the Rhine crossing. 140
Hydatius alone records another change in the political structure of the barbarian groups after
their entry into Spain in 409. 141 In his entry concerning the division of Spanish provinces among
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the barbarians in 411, he specifies that the Vandals were composed of at least two groups. The
dominant Vandal group was the Siling Vandals who received the province of Baetica for
settlement. The second group was apparently of lesser number if the size of their settlement
allotment is any indication. These Vandals shared the small province of Gallaecia with the
Suebi. 142 In Frigeridus’ description of the Rhine crossing, however, he mentions only one Vandal
king, Godigisel, who died in battle with the Franks. As with the Alan civil discord under Goar,
the division (and reunion after 416) of the Vandals provide a testimony to the fluidity of political
and cultural identity among these groups across time and distance.
The sixth-century historian Zosimus also claims that the Rhine invasion in 406 directly led to
the contemporary British usurpations. In VI.3.1 of his Historia nova, Zosimus tells us that the
invaders’ depredations in the Gallic provinces roused the fear of the soldiers stationed in Britain.
The British army now turned to self-help, preferring to support the usurpation of imperial power
rather than risk an invasion from across the channel. 143 In an earlier section of his history
(VI.2.1-2), Zosimus details the sequence of these usurpers. The army first raised a man named
Marcus to the purple. When he failed to meet their needs, they chose a man named Gratian. After
four months, he too fell from favor. Finally, in early 407, they chose a man with the propitious
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name Constantine, believing that he would conquer the empire just as his namesake had one
hundred years before. 144
Zosimus’ information on the sequence of British usurpers in VI.2.1-2 finds confirmation in
the work of the ecclesiastical historian Sozomen, as well as in a surviving fragment of both
authors’ collective source for this event, the lost history of Olympiodorus. 145 Unfortunately for
our understanding of the British usurpations, however, Zosimus’ attribution of a cause-effect
relationship between the Rhine crossing of the Vandals, Alans, and Suebi, and the rise of the
usurpers comes from a different section of his history (VI.3.1) and has no parallel in the
surviving source tradition. Furthermore, his testimony to this connection is, in fact,
chronologically at odds with what we know of these events from other authors.
In his chronicle, Prosper of Aquitaine states specifically that in the sixth consulship of
Arcadius and the first of Probus, Wandali et Halani Gallias traiecto Rheno ingressi II k. Ian. In
modern dating, this translates to December 31, 406. In the surviving fragment of Olympiodorus
that Zosimus used as a source for the sequence of British usurpers in VI.2.1-2, however,
Olympiodorus tells us that the British usurpations began before the seventh consulship of
Honorius on January 1, 407. 146 As we know that Constantine was proclaimed and crossed from
Britain to the continent in early 407, Olympiodorus’ account would suggest that Gratian was
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raised to the purple sometime in autumn, 406, and Marcus a short time earlier. 147 Therefore, the
Rhine crossing of the Vandals, Alans, and Suebi could not have caused the sequence of British
usurpations. According to the testimonies of Prosper and Olympiodorus, the British rebellion had
to have been already well underway before the raiders broke through the Roman limes.
Over the years, scholars have offered a variety of more or less plausible solutions for
navigating the contradiction between Prosper’s date for the Rhine crossing and Zosimus’ claims
in VI.3.1 concerning the cause/effect relationship of the Gallic invasion and the British
usurpations. In the commentary to his critical edition of Zosimus, François Paschoud argues that
the commonly accepted source for this section of Zosimus’ history, the now lost work of
Olympiodorus, originally detailed two barbarian invasions of the Gallic provinces in 406. The
first invasion caused the British usurpations, while the second was the more famous Rhine
crossing of Alans, Vandals, and Suebi on December 31, 406. 148 Michael Kulikowski, on the
other hand, has offered a different approach. Kulikowski, following an earlier theory put forth by
Norman Baynes and drawing on recent work on the chronicle tradition, argues that Prosper’s
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date for the Rhine crossing should be read as referring to the last day of 405 rather than 406. 149
The theories of Paschoud and Kulikowski both have their merits and as such, have each gained
supporters in the scholarly community. 150
The key to the problem, however, seems to lie in the commonly accepted notion that
Zosimus’ narrative for the events after 404 more or less faithfully follows the lost work of
Olympiodorus, a historian of proven reliability. 151 Unfortunately, there is good evidence to think
that Zosimus was using another, less precise historian for Book VI, Chapter 3, precisely the point
at which he makes his controversial claims. 152 A variety of evidence supports this view. Chapters
2 and 4 of Zosimus’ sixth book of the Historia nova form a continuous narrative of the rise and
progress of Constantine III’s rebellion, beginning with an account of the British usurpers (VI.2)
and continuing to detail the expansion of Constantine’s power into Spain (VI.4). Both chapters
also contain detailed information that can be corroborated from parallel passages in the earlier
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André Dupont (1897-1972): Études Médiévales Languedociennes, Montpellier: 1974), 171-213. Demougeot,
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ecclesiastica of Sozomen at those points where their information coincides, rather than assuming a common source,
Olympiodorus, for both accounts, which is much more probable. For this reason, she also attributes much of
Zosimus’ account of Constantine III to the work of an unknown source. In her view, this unknown author was
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which there is little reason to doubt Olympiodoran source material.
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Ecclesiastical History of Sozomen, who also used the lost work of Olympiodorus as a source. 153
Zosimus VI.3, however, represents a visible narrative and chronological break in the author’s
main account.
In addition to the narrative break, Book VI, Chapter 3 of Zosimus contains a variety of vague
and obviously incorrect statements that are unlikely to have derived from Olympiodorus. In
terms of narrative, the chapter details the reasons for the usurper Constantine III’s decision to
garrison the Alpine passes. In order to explain this, Zosimus drops back in time from the main
narrative to discuss the entry of the Alans, Vandals, and Suebi into Gaul in 406. Unfortunately,
Zosimus claims that these groups entered Gaul through the Alpine passes, a contention that
stands at odds with every other source we possess, which all testify to a Rhine crossing. 154 VI.3.2
contains a vague description of a battle between Roman and barbarian troops that lacks all of the
detail, including location, date, and Roman leaders, that a similar passage from Olympiodorus
would usually include. Finally, VI.3.3 mentions that Constantine III also restored the Rhine
limes, which Zosimus incorrectly claims had been ignored since the reign of the emperor Julian.
Zosimus then returns to the main narrative derived from Olympiodorus with Chapter 4.
All of the textual evidence would therefore suggest that Zosimus broke from his
Olympiodorian source material with Chapter 3, and chose to include material from the work of a
far less reliable historian, whose account possessed patently vague and incorrect information.
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VI.4.1.
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Zosimus, Historia nova VI.3.1. For the Rhine crossing, we possess contemporary and textually independent
witnesses, including Orosius, Historiae VII.40; Prosper, Chronicon s. a. 406; and Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus as
preserved in Gregory of Tours, Historia II.9. As we have seen, the barbarian groups that each author lists also tend
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While the identity of this historian must remain speculative, there is textual evidence that would
suggest that Chapter 3 represents a previously unidentified fragment of the historian Eunapius.
Eunapius’ history, like that of Olympiodorus, only survives through fragments contained in the
work of later authors. The ninth-century Byzantine scholar and patriarch Photius claims that
Eunapius’ history began after the reign of the Emperor Claudius II (d. 270) and ended with the
death of Eudoxia, the wife of the emperor Arcadius, and the rise of the bishop Acacius to the
episcopal seat at Constantinople. 155 As both of these events occurred in 404, scholars have
generally accepted this year as the end date for Eunapius’ work. 156 As a historian, however,
Eunapius was averse to chronology, as he himself tells us in a surviving fragment, preferring to
arrange his history according to the reigns of emperors and discuss events as didactic and moral
lessons. 157 It is therefore entirely possible that Eunapius’ history referred to events later than the
year 404. 158 Furthermore, though we can date the last events in Eunapius’ history (according to
Photius) to this year, we should note that these are both events are associated with the eastern
empire. It is therefore possible that his coverage of western events extended slightly beyond the
year 404.
Zosimus’ debt to Eunapius for the years 270-404 is a long-established truism of scholarship.
Photius himself claims that Zosimus merely copied and condensed Eunapius’ history for use in
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Barnes has shown that the first edition of Eunapius’ history, which he argues ended with the Battle of Adrianople
in 378, contained references to events from the later reign of Theodosius. These references had previously led
scholars to assume that this first edition extended through 404, the probable end date for the second edition. See T.
D. Barnes, The Sources of the Historia Augusta (Bruxelles: Latomus, 1978), 114-123.
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his own work. 159 With the year 407, Zosimus turned to Olympiodorus’ history as his main
source, resulting in the loss of most narrative content for 405/406. As we have seen, however, the
evident peculiarities of Zosimus VI.3 would suggest that the author deviated from Olympiodorus
in this chapter, and it is possible that he went back to his Eunapian source material to provide
information. In addition to the vague description of events and the overt, though factually
incorrect, praise of the emperor Julian, the best evidence for this thesis is a telltale verbal parallel
between the description of the mysterious battle between Romans and barbarians that appears in
VI.3.2 and two previous battle descriptions in Zosimus’ history, one of which definitely derives
from Eunapius’s account of the Battle of Adrianople. 160 While not conclusive evidence, this
verbal parallel would suggest that Eunapius’ history of western events extended beyond the end
date of 404 for eastern events, and that Zosimus decided to incorporate some of this information
into an overarching narrative concerning Constantine III that ultimately derived from
Olympiodorus.
Zosimus’ use of Eunapius or another, unknown source for his information in Chapter 3 does
not automatically negate his assertion of a cause/effect relationship between the Rhine crossing
of 406 and the rise of the usurpers in Britain. It does, however, remove the presumptive authority
of an Olympiodoran source from the information. Without this support, the purported
relationship between these events appears suspect, especially alongside the obviously incorrect
159

Photius, Bibliotheca, Codex 98, II. 66. See Blockley, Classicising Historians, II. 5.

The words in question (ἅπαντας πανωλεθρίᾳ διέφθειραν) are used to describe the complete destruction of an
army in battle and appear in the present passage under discussion, Zosimus, Historia nova VI.3.2 (ἢ γὰρ ἂν ἅπαντας
πανωλεθρίᾳ διέφθειραν) as well as Zosimus’ description of the battle of Adrianople derived from Eunapius
(IV.24.2: Οἷς ἀπαντήσαντες ἀπροφασίστως οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ παρὰ πολὺ τῇ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες, μικροῦ μὲν ἅπαντας
πανωλεθρίᾳ διέφθειραν·) and Zosimus’ erroneous account of Stilicho’s battle with Radagaisus (V.26.5: Καὶ τοῖς
βαρβάροις ἀπροσδοκήτοις ἐπιπεσὼν ἅπαν τὸ πολέμιον πανωλεθρίᾳ διέφθειρεν…). At least one scholar has argued
that Zosimus’ account of Radagaisus’ defeat in 406 does not derive from Olympiodorus. See J. Rosenstein,
“Kritische Untersuchungen über das Verhältnis zwischen Olympiodor, Zosimus und Sozomenus”, Forschungen zur
Deutschen Geschichte 1 (1862), 165-204. Rosenstein’s conclusions, however, was not taken up in later generations.
Given the verbal parallel, Zosimus’ Radagaisus account may also derive from Eunapius.
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statements also contained in Chapter 3. It therefore seems best to favor the dates of Prosper for
the Rhine crossing and the authentic fragments of Olympiodorus for the British usurpations,
rather than accept the spurious testimony of Zosimus in this section. The British usurpations
were probably already in motion when the Alans, Vandals, and Suebi breached the Rhine frontier
on December 31, 406.
While the reasons for the British usurpations remain speculative, recent scholarship,
particularly articles by John Drinkwater and Michael Kulikowski, has shed much light on the
progress of Constantine’s revolt in Gaul. After claiming the purple, Constantine crossed to the
continent at Bononia (Boulogne) in early 407 and quickly received the allegiance of most of the
Gallic army as well as many prominent Gallic senators. 161 He seems to have contained the Alans,
Vandals, and Suebi in the two Belgicas in the north of Gaul for three years using both military
and diplomatic means, possibly combined with some military recruitment. 162 He also refortified
the Rhine frontier, and gained easy recognition as emperor in southeastern Gaul as well as
Spain. 163 His first coins were minted at Lyons, suggesting that this city may have been the goal
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of the first phase of his invasion. 164 Following his usurpation, Constantine’s correspondence with
the imperial court contained the traditional claim of innocence and request for recognition.
Unlike previous usurpers, however, Constantine did not rule out the prospect of conciliation and
alliance upon an initial rebuff. 165 Instead, it became a permanent (though at times, poorly
managed) feature of his public policy. These first coins from Lyons as well as later issues from
Trier and Arles each bear inscriptions that place Constantine within the legitimate imperial
college, clearly displaying his political aspirations towards compromise. 166
This policy may also have slowed the progress of his invasion. Constantine paused in the
winter of 407/408 before taking Arles. If the city was not yet the capital of the Gallic Prefecture,
it may have served as a temporary capital for the remnants of the Honorian regime. As the
sources suggest that Constantine was recognized in northern and southeastern Gaul soon after his
arrival, this pause may have served as a further peace overture to the imperial court. 167
Regardless, this decision almost ended his revolt in the first year. Through military tenacity and
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In the sources, the first mention of Constantine’s correspondence and protests of innocence occurs in early 409,
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intrigue, Stilicho’s general Sarus managed to attack and besiege the usurper in the city of
Valence for seven days. Only the arrival of a substantial relief force under the generals Edobich
and Gerontius forced Sarus to withdraw from the siege and retreat into Italy. 168 In the spring of
408, Constantine corrected his earlier mistake and took Arles, forcing the Honorian loyalists to
flee to Ravenna. 169
In Spain, Didymus and Verinianus, relatives of the Theodosian house, organized a make-shift
army of slaves and dependents and launched a revolt in the province of Lusitania. Constantine
raised his eldest son, Constans, to the rank of Caesar and sent him to deal with the threat along
with the MVM Gerontius, the newly appointed praefectus praetorio per Gallias (PPO),
Apollinaris. 170 After an initial defeat, the forces of the usurper crushed the rebellion. 171 In the
late summer or autumn of 408, Constans delivered Didymus and Verinianus, along with their
wives, to his father at Arles. Rather than keeping the men as valuable bargaining chips,
Constantine unwisely chose to put them to death, an action that strained his later negotiations
with Honorius for imperial recognition. 172
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At the beginning of the year 409, Constantine therefore controlled all of Gaul and Spain and
had no viable enemies of which to speak. The death of Stilicho in the summer of 408 had left an
imperial administration in Italy crippled by court intrigue, and thoroughly unable to deal with
events in Gaul. Furthermore, Ravenna’s consistent indecisiveness over the correct approach to
the problem of Alaric had left the Gothic general and his army free to apply pressure directly to
the city of Rome. Under these conditions, Constantine now began to exert his influence in Italian
affairs.
As we have seen, the magister officiorum Olympius had assumed control of the Honorian
administration following the collapse of Stilicho’s regime. In addition to launching an on-going
and vicious persecution of Stilicho’s former partisans, the new regime of Olympius rejected
Stilicho’s conciliatory approach to the problem of Alaric and adopted a hostile stance. This
political line caused the imperial court to reject Alaric’s initial attempts at peaceful negotiation,
which directly led to Alaric’s invasion of the Italian peninsula and the first siege of Rome. 173
This overwhelming disaster seems to have temporarily weakened Olympius’ control over the
emperor. Late in 408, the Roman Senate succeeded in reaching a temporary accord with Alaric,
which laid the foundations for a permanent peace treaty. After collecting the necessary funds to
meet Alaric’s demands, which included 5,000 pounds of gold and 30,000 pounds of silver, the
Senate sent an embassy to Honorius both seeking his sanction for the peace and to inform him
that Alaric still required noble hostages to establish a lasting treaty. Zosimus tells us that
Honorius wholly agreed to all of these stipulations. The senate therefore turned over the money
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to Alaric and the general withdrew the bulk of his forces to Etruria as a good faith measure in
anticipation of the treaty. 174
This political situation changed abruptly in early 409. At his time, Constantine sent an
embassy of eunuchs to Ravenna which sought Honorius’ recognition for the usurper as a member
of the imperial college. Honorius knew that Constantine had captured his Spanish relatives
Didymus and Verinianus, but did not yet know that Constantine had already executed these men.
In Zosimus’ account, fear for the safety of his relatives as well as the present threat of Alaric, led
Honorius to recognize the usurper. He agreed to share power over the western empire and sent an
imperial robe to Constantine as a token of acceptance. 175
This agreement between Honorius and Constantine in early 409, regardless of the fact that it
was made under duress, seems to have prompted the imperial court to return to Olympius’
previously hostile stance towards Alaric. Initially, Honorius simply delayed fulfilling the terms
of treaty. The emperor’s hesitation resulted in a new embassy from the Roman Senate in order to
174
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encourage Honorius to recognize the accord and reopen negotiations with Alaric. This embassy,
however, faced a negative reception at Ravenna. According to Zosimus, Olympius actively
disputed the senators’ arguments and dismissed their pleas for peace. The emperor then sent
soldiers from Dalmatia to guard the city of Rome, an act that violated the truce and directly led
to new outbreaks of violence with Alaric. 176 With these conflicts, the senatorial initiative to
establish a working peace with Alaric effectively collapsed. 177
In Zosimus’ account, the shift in Honorius’ approach to the problem of Alaric, from his
support for the Roman Senate’s peaceful overtures in 408 to the renewed outbreak of violence in
409, seems to hinge on the embassy of Constantine. Zosimus suggests that Honorius’s decision
to recognize Constantine III as a member of the imperial college was based solely on the
emperor’s concern for the safety of Didymus and Verinianus as well as his preoccupation with
the present threat of Alaric. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that Constantine’s embassy
in early 409 also offered the more positive incentive of the usurper’s assistance against Alaric,
and that this promise encouraged Olympius and Honorius to return to their previously hostile
stance against the renegade general in Italy. 178 Indeed, Zosimus explicitly mentions
Constantine’s offer of assistance against Alaric in his account of the negotiations surrounding the
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second embassy of Constantine to Ravenna in the spring or early summer of 409. 179 While there
is no indication that Olympius was a partisan of Constantine, the magister officiorum was
apparently willing to accept the dangerous offer of help from the usurper to pursue his own
political agenda. We must therefore see Constantine’s influence in Italian affairs as pivotal to
understanding the fluctuating policies of the imperial court at this time.
Nevertheless, the issue of the execution of Didymus and Verinianus still required resolution
before any real alliance between Constantine and Honorius could exist. According to Zosimus,
Constantine therefore sent a second embassy to Honorius, under the leadership of a Gallic
aristocrat named Jovius in 409. Jovius sought confirmation of the peace that Honorius had
previously established with the usurper. He also expressed regret for the deaths of Didymus and
Verinianus, claiming that their executions had taken place without the knowledge of Constantine.
The news of the death of his relatives troubled Honorius. Jovius, however, urged the emperor to
accept the agreement with Constantine, due to his current problems with Alaric. Furthermore,
Jovius stated that if he were allowed to return, he would inform Constantine of the troubles in
Italy and the usurper would bring the combined armies of Britain, Gaul, and Spain to his aid.
With these promises, Honorius again confirmed Constantine’s standing as co-emperor and
allowed Jovius and the Gallic embassy to depart. 180
Unlike Constantine’s previous embassy, it is difficult to determine what, if any, effect the
second embassy had on contemporary Italian politics. In the interim months between embassies,
Olympius had fallen to court intrigue and the praetorian prefect of Italy, Jovius (not to be
confused with the homonymous leader of Constantine’s second embassy), had taken control of
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the imperial court at Ravenna. As we have seen, the PPO Jovius had followed the Roman
Senate’s lead in seeking peace with Alaric. His diplomatic misstep at a critical juncture in the
resulting negotiations, however, led to Alaric’s second siege of Rome in the spring of 409. 181
Zosimus places Constantine’s second embassy as occurring after this breakdown of Jovius’
negotiations with Alaric. If the placement of this episode is correct, then it is reasonable to
assume that Honorius might have continued to hold out hope for the intervention of
Constantine’s Gallic army. 182 Nevertheless, Zosimus’ depiction of the second embassy suggests
that the negotiations were tense. Honorius’ anger over the execution of his relatives apparently
caused Constantine’s ambassador to fear that the emperor would not allow him to return to Gaul.
While an imperial alliance was eventually confirmed, Constantine’s decision to execute Didymus
and Verinianus seems to have ensured that any pact between the emperors would remain
unsteady. 183 Perhaps for this reason, when Constantine did finally march his army to intervene
directly in Italian affairs in the summer of 410, he found his help unwanted.
Shortly after Constantine’s second embassy to Italy, however, his fortunes began to unravel.
After breaking the Spanish rebellion of Didymus and Verinianus, the Caesar Constans had left
his court in Caesaraugusta (Zaragoza) under the control of Gerontius and escorted his prisoners
to Arles. 184 Once these had been handed over, he seems to have remained with his father at Arles
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until spring or summer 409. 185 Unfortunately, in an obscure sequence of events, the MVM
Gerontius, still stationed in Spain, chose this time to revolt. The circumstances surrounding this
rebellion are open to debate, though Zosimus clearly ties Gerontius’ actions to the return of
Constans to Spain in the company of a new MVM, Justus. 186 Gerontius raised a member of his
household, an otherwise unknown Maximus, to Augustus, and in an action that was to have
longstanding consequences for the western empire at large, stirred the 406 invaders, hitherto
settled in northern Gaul, into open revolt once again. 187 Over the course of the next few months,
these groups of Alans, Vandals, and Suebi, moved south into the provinces of Aquitania and
Narbonensis, pillaging towns and estates along the way. 188 In autumn of 409, they crossed the
Pyrenees and entered Spain, where they would eventually divide the provinces amongst
themselves. 189
Even beyond the loss of Spain, Gerontius’ revolt and the new barbarian devastations seem to
have fatally weakened the integrity of Constantine’s Gallic empire. Zosimus connects
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Constantine’s failure to deal with the renewed threat of the 406 invaders, as well as new
incursions from beyond the Rhine, with the collapse of Roman rule in Britain, Armorica, and
other provinces, as each turned to local self-help measures. Zosimus claims that these areas
expelled their Roman magistrates and refused to submit any longer to Roman laws. 190 While
many earlier scholars, particularly E. A. Thompson, interpreted Zosimus to mean that these areas
either descended into lawlessness or experienced massive political reorganizations, recent
scholarship has shown that inhabitants of these regions continued to view themselves as
“Roman” and that their subsequent political administration still operated on Roman
administrative models. 191 The revolts that Zosimus describes therefore seem to have consisted of
a rejection of the imperial locus of power and authority, as situated in Ravenna or in
Constantine’s court at Arles, as opposed to the overall form of Roman governance. Anthony
Birley notes evidence for the continuity of Roman office-holders in Britain as recorded in the
late fifth-century vita of Germanus of Auxerre. 192 Raymond Van Dam also argues convincingly
that the inhabitants of Britain and Armorica simply turned to localized rule, while maintaining
Roman political and administrative structures. 193 For these reasons, contrary to Zosimus’
depiction of lawlessness, it is best to understand Britain and Armorica’s rejection of Roman
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euphemism for Roman identity. Zosimus’ statement that the inhabitants of these regions rejected Roman laws is
therefore a reflection of the author’s cultural bias, suggesting that these regions had reverted to “barbarism” when
they rejected the imperial authority in favor of self-rule. As such, Zosimus’ statement cannot be read to suggest
some drastic change in the political administration of these regions at the provincial level. See Raymond Van Dam,
Leadership and Community in Late Antique Gaul (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985),
25-56.

78

control at this time as simply a rejection of Constantine’s regime and the expelled magistrates as
representatives of the usurper’s administration. 194 As such, these events show not only the
continued fracturing of political authority under Constantine’s regime, but also an early
representation of the tendency of some Roman communities to favor regional, non-imperial
centers of power over the political authority of a geographically distant emperor in later
decades. 195
After the revolt of Gerontius in the spring or summer of 409, the sources become even more
muddled than usual about the sequence of events. The scholarly narrative therefore varies
according to which primary source an individual scholar tends to favor. This narrative divide is
most evident in the period assigned to Gerontius’ raising a member of his household, the
domesticus Maximus, to the purple. Paschoud, followed by Drinkwater, would delay this event
to the summer of 410, leaving Gerontius in an ambiguous position for perhaps a full year. 196
Matthews and Kulikowski associate this event with the beginning of Gerontius’ revolt in 409. 197
Likewise, the raising of Constans to Augustus, which is likely to have been either the cause or
the effect of the rise of Maximus, is variously dated to 409 or 410. Unfortunately, the sources
provide ample evidence for either interpretation, leaving any narrative of these events in the
realm of speculation.
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Zosimus tells us that the return of Constans and his new general Justus to Spain initiated
Gerontius’ rebellion. 198 In keeping with the views of Matthews and Kulikowski, it is far more
likely that Gerontius raised Maximus immediately following his revolt, rather than at some later
date. Revolting from an entrenched regime, even if it was arguably illegitimate like that of
Constantine, would require Gerontius to offer a new imperial focus for his troops. Such had been
the case only recently with Constantine’s own rise in Britain, an event in which Gerontius,
himself a Briton, had probably played a part. After driving Constans and the Constantinian
loyalists from the peninsula, he proceeded to make peace with the non-Roman groups who had
crossed the Pyrenees in autumn of 409. 199
Late 409 or early 410 found Constans and his administration back with his father at Arles. As
we have seen, during the spring or early summer of 409, Jovius’ embassy had secured
Constantine’s place alongside Honorius and Theodosius II in the imperial college in return for
aid against Alaric. Constantine himself was therefore in the process of gathering his army for his
ill-fated Italian campaign. The Gallic emperor also reorganized his administration as part of these
preparations. He raised his son Constans from Caesar to full Augustus. 200 According to Zosimus,
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Constantine also demoted Apollinaris, the grandfather of the famous poet and epistolographer
Sidonius, as praetorian prefect and selected another man to replace him. 201 From the evidence of
Frigeridus, and later of Sidonius himself, this was Decimius Rusticus, the former magister
officiorum. 202
While his father set out for Italy in the summer of 410, Constans may have departed for a
third assault against Gerontius in Spain. The possibility of this event, however, is open to
debate. 203 Sozomen can be read to suggest it, claiming that Constantine, after his abortive Italian
campaign in the summer of 410, met his son at Arles, who was fleeing from Spain. Photius, in
his summary of Olympiodorus, suggests that Gerontius pursued Constans as he fled Spain. Both
accounts are, however, compressions of the years 409-411 taken from the same original source,
and both are therefore misleading on several counts. Nevertheless, the sources do at least suggest
that Constans set out against Gerontius yet again in the spring of 410.
201
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In the meantime, Constantine proceeded to uphold his part of the arrangement with Honorius.
Constantine marched from Arles into northern Italy at some time during the summer of 410.
Unfortunately for the usurper, his faction at the court of Honorius suffered a blow from which it
could not recover. Honorius’ magister equitum Allobich, the apparent leader of a Constantinian
faction, had previously murdered Eusebius, the recently appointed praepositus sacri cubiculi. 204
While the specific reasons for this crime are now unknown to us, the murder itself reflects the
chaotic state of the factional conflict in the imperial court during this period. Allobich apparently
considered that the time was ripe for yet another overthrow of the ruling faction, to correspond
with the arrival of his master. Unfortunately, he overestimated his strength. Under obscure
circumstances, Allobich was apprehended and put to death with Honorius’ consent and in the
imperial presence. 205 With the death of Allobich, Constantine apparently reconsidered his Italian
campaign. He halted his progress in Liguria and retraced his steps to his residence at Arles. 206
Now back in Gaul in late summer or early autumn 410, Constantine met his son, Constans,
who was returning from his Spanish defeat at the hands of Gerontius. 207 Whatever peace they
enjoyed, however, was short lived, as Constantine’s empire continued to crumble around them.
After beating back two failed invasions, Gerontius now went on the offensive, launching a
campaign into Gaul against his former patrons. Constantine sent his loyal MVM Edobich beyond
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the Rhine to raise reinforcements, and assigned the organization of the Gallic defenses to
Constans. 208 Constans, however, fared no better against Gerontius than he had on previous
occasions. In the civil war that followed, Constans was forced to retreat to his headquarters at
Vienne. In this city, he was besieged and killed in late 410 or early 411. 209 Gerontius then turned
his army against Constantine, beginning a siege of Arles that would ultimately cost both men
their lives.
In the meantime, events in Italy had improved. Since Constantine’s ignominious retreat,
Honorius’ meager realm had suffered the shock of Alaric’s sack of Rome in late August. By the
autumn of 410, however, a new, aggressive faction had emerged at Ravenna that did not favor
peace with either the usurpers in Gaul or Alaric’s marauding army. At the apparent head of this
new faction was an Illyrian officer named Constantius. Constantius was originally from the city
of Naissus (Niš) in Dacia, a birthplace he shared with the early fourth-century emperor
Constantine. According to Olympiodorus, he had joined the army in the reign of Theodosius. 210
This would suggest that he was among the officers who had accompanied the eastern army of
Theodosius to the west in the civil war against Eugenius in 395 and had remained there under
Stilicho to form the core of Honorius’ regime.
Attempts to deal with Alaric and his motley army had largely dominated the activities of the
various court factions since the death of Stilicho. The faction of Constantius, however, saw this
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pressure relieved. Following the sack of Rome and the subsequent retreat of Alaric’s forces in
August 410, however, imperial politics returned to their normal footing. That is, dealing first and
foremost with challenges to the legitimate imperial dynasty once again became the order of the
day. This meant that for the first time in two years, Constantine and his Gallic regime became
Ravenna’s priority. In the autumn of 410, the imperial government gathered a small army in
Italy. In the following spring, it crossed the Alps and launched an attack on Arles under the
command of Constantius as magister peditum and another previously unknown officer, Ulfilas,
as magister equitum. 211 In doing so, Constantius was almost certainly aware that they were
entering a politically contentious region.
When the Italian army entered Gaul, Gerontius and his Spanish army had already succeeded
in destroying Constantine’s defenses in the autumn of 410 and were then in the process of
besieging the usurper in his capital city of Arles. News of the unexpected arrival of Constantius
and Ulfilas seems to have a caused a major defection of Gerontius’ forces to the army of the
legitimate regime. Thus weakened, Gerontius had no choice but to withdraw from the siege and
retreat back to his stronghold in Spain. Gerontius’ remaining troops, however, did not approve of
this decision and turned on him. In a scene that Sozomen paints in heroic colors, Gerontius was
besieged in his house with his wife and a few loyal retainers. After killing three hundred of his
former troops, Gerontius, his wife, and a loyal Alan follower chose suicide over falling into the
hands of their enemies. 212
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Back at Arles, the army of Constantius and Ulfilas took up the siege of Constantine and his
forces, but soon experienced a surprise of their own. When Gerontius had first invaded Gaul,
Constantine had sent his loyal general Edobich to recruit relief forces among the barbarians
beyond the Rhine. Constantius and Ulfilas now learned that this relief army was approaching
from the north. Upon receiving this news, the Honorian generals were alarmed and like
Gerontius before them, initially decided to retreat rather than face the expected forces. The
imminent arrival of Edobich, however, seems to have forced their hand towards combat.
Constantius and Ulfilas therefore crossed the Rhone that bordered ancient Arles on the north, and
took up positions. 213
Sozomen provides an uncharacteristically detailed account of the ensuing battle, which almost
certainly draws on the lost work of Olympiodorus. Constantius with the infantry awaited
Edobich’s relief army, while Ulfilas with the cavalry hid in ambush. Once Edobich’s forces
began to engage those of Constantius, Ulfilas fell on the northern army from behind, leading to a
thorough rout. The vast majority of Edobich’s army surrendered, while the general himself fled
the battlefield and sought refuge with Ecdicius, a man whom he considered to be a loyal friend.
Rather than provide refuge, however, Ecdicius killed Edobich and delivered his head to
Constantius, seeking reward and honors as recompense. Constantius, however, was disgusted
with this violation of the guest/host relationship as well as the general betrayal of a friend.
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Apparently believing that the presence of Ecdicius was a curse upon both himself and the army,
Constantius dismissed the man with nothing but the thanks of the state. 214
Having defeated Edobich’s army, Constantius and Ulfilas returned to the siege of Arles.
Soon, however, they were made aware of a further threat from the north, the rise of a new
usurper, the Gallic aristocrat Jovinus. 215 Jovinus is an obscure figure in the surviving sources,
usually little more than a name. The fragments of the lost histories of Olympiodorus and
Frigeridus alone provide any real details concerning the nature and events of his regime.
Nevertheless, the duration of his rule from 411 to 413 and the strong support he enjoyed among
discontented groups within the fractured empire, including both Gallic aristocrats and leaders of
non-Roman ethnicity such as Athaulf and Sarus, suggest that his significance far outweighs the
scant treatment that he receives in the surviving sources. 216
Possibly even before Constantius and Ulfilas entered Gaul in the spring of 411, Jovinus
gathered some remnants of the collapsed regime of Constantine and launched a new usurpation
in northern Gaul. Olympiodorus claims that he was raised to the purple at Mundiacum in
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Germania Secunda. 217 He also gained with the support of Goar and Guntiarius, leaders of groups
of Alans and Burgundians, respectively. While Guntiarius is otherwise unknown, Goar was the
leader of that group of Alans that had chosen to ally themselves with the Romans during the
fateful Rhine crossing in the winter of 406. 218 It is therefore probably safe to assume that both
men were seeking recognition and favorable treatment for their followers within the Roman
Empire. 219
By late spring 411, Jovinus was apparently strong enough to threaten the Italian army
besieging Constantine at Arles. Frigeridus tells us that news arrived from northern Gaul that
Jovinus had been proclaimed and that an army of Burgundians, Franks, Alamanni, and Alans
were marching against the besiegers. 220 This information seems to have caused concern for both
the Italian army and Constantine himself. Realizing that all was lost, Constantine now renounced
217
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his imperial title and had himself ordained as a priest, apparently hoping to reinforce the
promises of safety that he received from Constantius with clerical membership. 221 After
receiving their own assurances, the citizens of Arles opened their gates to the besiegers.
Constantine and his surviving son, Julian, whom he had previously named nobilissimus, were
sent to Honorius in Italy. Unfortunately for him, neither the oaths of the besiegers nor the
priesthood was enough to save Constantine’s life. Honorius had both the usurper and his son put
to death thirty miles outside Ravenna. 222 The Consularia Constantinopolitana records the arrival
of Constantine’s head on a spear at Ravenna on September 18, 411. 223
Sozomen’s narrative suggests that after the capitulation of Arles and the capture of
Constantine III, Gaul returned to the control of Ravenna. He ends his account of these events
with a brief notice of the deaths of the usurpers Jovinus and Maximus, and other figures who had
previously rebelled against the rule of Honorius. He thus maintains his theme of the divine favor
accorded to the legitimate emperors of the Theodosian house. 224
In reality, Gaul still had years of conflict left to endure. Previously, the news of the arrival of
Edobich’s relief army had alarmed Constantius and Ulfilas, briefly causing them to consider a
withdrawal to Italy. 225 Apparently, only the proximity of the army caused them to stand their
ground, a gamble that had ended in their favor. Now, with the army of Jovinus on the march,
Constantius and Ulfilas faced either the uncertainty of a second battle or the prospect of finding
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themselves besieged within the city of Arles. As they had achieved their immediate objective in
the capture of Constantine, they reasonably opted to avoid this trap and withdraw once again to
Italy. The fall of a troublesome usurper was more than enough to prove the viability of
Constantius’ faction at Ravenna, and there was no need to risk undermining this success.
For the moment, Jovinus was therefore allowed to consolidate his gains and establish his new
regime in the Gallic provinces. However, this respite was short lived. As we will see in Chapter
3, the year 412 would mark the entry of Alaric’s successor, Athaulf, and his army into the Gallic
political sphere. In a manner similar to Alaric’s relationship with the eastern and western empires
from 395-408, Athaulf’s forces would prove a vital third party in the contest between the Gallic
regime of Jovinus and the central court at Ravenna. Ultimately, Athaulf’s actions would lead to
the fall of the usurper’s administration and the rise of something new: the establishment of an
alternate Theodosian regime in the western empire.
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Chapter 3: Athaulf and Placidia’s Narbonese Regime

After the defeat and execution of Constantine III in the spring of 411, the usurper Jovinus was
left to consolidate his power in the Gallic political sphere. The following year saw the movement
of Athaulf’s forces out of Italy and into the Gallic provinces. Athaulf initially formed an alliance
with Jovinus. When relations between the two men became strained, however, officials of the
emperor Honorius convinced Athaulf to turn against the usurper in return for supplies of grain
for his followers. While Athaulf succeeded in destroying the usurper’s regime in 413, Ravenna
failed to deliver the promised grain, leading to a new breakdown of peace negotiations.
Athaulf and his followers then moved south, entering the southern Gallic provinces of
Aquitania Secunda and Narbonensis Prima in the autumn of 413. The Gallic aristocrats of these
provinces welcomed Athaulf’s forces and allowed him to billet his troops on towns and estates
along the Via Aquitania from Narbonne to Bordeaux. Athaulf also raised Attalus to the purple
for the second time, establishing an imperial court in the city of Narbonne. Finally, in January
414, an event occurred that would have lasting consequences for the subsequent history of
western Roman empire: the marriage of Athaulf and Galla Placidia.
While examining many points within this overall narrative, this chapter primarily focuses on
events in southern Gaul in these years and offers new interpretations of the political significance
of the marriage of Athaulf and Placidia. First, contrary to much earlier scholarship, it argues that
the southern Gallic aristocrats who welcomed Athaulf and his followers in 413 were still in
rebellion against the Honorian regime. This fact caused them both to view an alliance with
Athaulf as a viable alternative to imperial reprisals, as well as to support his subsequent political
initiatives, including the second usurpation of Attalus. This chapter also situates the usurpation
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of Attalus in late 413, before the marriage of Athaulf and Placidia in January 414. This new
sequence of events necessarily complicates traditional scholarly narratives of the marriage of
Athaulf and Placidia, and offers new interpretive approaches to our primary sources for this
period, such as Olympiodorus and Orosius. Finally, this chapter argues that the marriage of
Athaulf and Galla Placidia represented the foundation of an alternative, yet potentially legitimate
Theodosian regime in the western empire in direct conflict with the imperial administration of
Honorius. While the usurper Attalus nominally held the imperial seat, the true strength of this
new regime resided in the dynastic legitimacy inherent in Placidia’s person as the offspring of
the imperial houses of Valentinian and Theodosius. As such, the Narbonese regime of Attalus,
Athaulf, and Placidia arguably represented to the most potent threat to Honorius’ control of
western empire during the period from 407 to 420.

With the retreat of the imperial army of Constantius and Ulfila in the late summer of 411,
Gaul was left under the new regime of Jovinus. Coins bearing the usurper’s name were struck at
Arles, Trier, and Lyons. Gold emissions at each of these locations, as well as silver coins struck
at Lyons, bear the legend Restitutor Rei P, suggesting that Jovinus, like Constantine III, claimed
to have restored order to the chaotic political situation in Gaul. 226 Apart from these cities and
their surrounding territories, the fragmentary state of the source tradition renders any attempt to
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establish the precise extent of Jovinus’ effective control of the Gallic provinces purely
speculative. 227
In early 412, mere months after his arrival on the historical stage, Jovinus was already forced
to deal with the threat that would later cause his fall. Possibly as early as the autumn of 411, as
Constantius laid siege to Arles, the army of Athaulf began to move once again. 228 A surviving
fragment of Olympiodorus suggests that this initiative came from Attalus, who still resided with
the army in an advisory position after his deposition in 409. Attalus, having learned of the
usurpation of Jovinus, encouraged Athaulf to move his people into Gaul in order to lend his
weight to the new usurper’s regime. 229 It was furthermore reckless to remain in southern Italy.
Athaulf’s presence in this region left his motley army vulnerable either to the exhaustion of the
food supply or the eventual retaliation of Ravenna. The victory of Constantius and Ulfilas over
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Sirago suggests that Jovinus’ power was confined to northern Gaul, and that Constantius remained in control of
the southern provinces. See Sirago, Galla Placidia, 152-153. Sirago’s interpretation, however, fails to take account
of the numismatic evidence for Jovinus’ control of Arles. Scharf, “Jovinus”, 8-9, assumes that Jovinus failed to
establish control over the Alpine provinces, on the grounds that Althaulf seems to have encountered no resistance
upon his entry into Gaul in 412. Our sources for Athaulf’s Alpine crossing, however, are meager and we cannot be
sure of what resistance he may or may not have encountered. Finally, scholars such as Jones and Halsall maintain
that Jovinus’ regime did not include the region of Armorica, which according to Zosimus VI.5.3, had expelled its
Roman officials during the reign of Constantine III. See Jones, Later Roman Empire, 187; Halsall, Barbarian
Migrations, 218. As we have seen, however, Zosimus’ account describes the collapse of Constantine’s regime. The
“Roman magistrates” must therefore have been officials of this usurper. For this reason, Zosimus’ testimony does
not rule out the possibility that the citizens of this region may have recognized a usurper more to their liking in the
person of Jovinus. For commentary on this passage of Zosimus, see Paschoud , Zosime, III. 2, 38.
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Sirago claims this as a reason for Constantius’ decision to return to Italy. See Sirago, Galla Placidia, 128. This is
possible. As discussed in Chapter 2, however, the approach of Jovinus’ relief army provides sufficient reason for
Constantius’ retreat into Italy.
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Constantine III, although due to luck and timing as much as skill, may have warned Athaulf of
the latter potential outcome. 230
Sometime in the spring of 412, Athaulf and his followers crossed the Alps and entered the
Gallic provinces. 231 Our sources for subsequent events are few and fragmentary, allowing only
glimpses of what were obviously complex political maneuverings between Jovinus, Athaulf,
Ravenna, and their multiple officials. 232 It seems unlikely that Attalus had conducted any
negotiations with Jovinus’ regime before Athaulf set out for Gaul. 233 If such negotiations did
take place, they could hardly have amounted to more than an invitation. In either case, any
concord between the two parties quickly broke down into a purely nominal alliance.

230

Halsall reaches similar conclusions. See Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 223.
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For the date, see Drinkwater, “Usurpers”, 290.
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Sirago implausibly suggests that Athaulf and Honorius reached an alliance after the death of Alaric, which was
sealed by the emperor’s consent to the marriage of Athaulf and Placidia sometime in 411. Athaulf therefore entered
Gaul as an ally of the imperial court. See Sirago, Galla Placidia, 125-128. Sirago’s hypothesis, however, is marred
by his uncritical acceptance of the testimony of the sixth-century historian Jordanes which suggests that Athaulf and
Placidia were married in Italy before the move of Athaulf’s forces into Gaul. See Jordanes, Getica 159-161.
Jordanes’ narrative is untenable, however, as all contemporary sources place this marriage in January 414. (For a
discussion of the marriage of Athaulf and Placidia at Narbonne in 414, see below.) Furthermore, Olympiodorus is
clear that Athaulf entered Gaul in order to ally with the usurper Jovinus. See Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 18 =
Müller-Dindorf 17. As a historical author, Jordanes is generally unreliable for events, particularly in the West,
before the sixth century. He composed two histories, commonly known as the Romana and the Getica, in
Constantinople sometime around the year 551. The Getica has generally received the most attention in scholarly
circles due to Jordanes’ claim in his prologue that he based his history on what he remembers from the now lost
Gothic History of Cassiodorus. As Cassiodorus was the praetorian prefect of the late fifth/early sixth-century
Ostrogothic king Theodoric, and therefore well placed to gather information, Jordanes’ brief allusion has caused
some scholars to consider the Getica an accurate representation of this earlier, presumably more reliable, work. For
this reason, several of Jordanes’ more controversial claims, particularly on the subject of Gothic pre-history, are
accepted in some scholarly narratives. See, for instance, Wolfram, Goths, 1-18; Heather, Goths, 34-67. The
relationship between Cassiodorus and Jordanes, however, is hotly contested in modern scholarship, as is Jordanes
value as a historical source before the sixth century. See, for instance, Kulikowski, Gothic Wars, 49-56; Walter
Goffart, “Jordanes's Getica and the Disputed Authenticity of Gothic Origins from Scandinavia.” Speculum 80. 2
(2005), 379-398. With regard to political events in the early fifth-century western empire, Jordanes’ narrative is
generally both fanciful and often demonstrably false, as in the present case. As such, his value as a historical source
for this period is questionable. For an excellent general study of Jordanes and his works, see in particular, Croke,
“Latin Historiography and the Barbarian Kingdoms”, 358-375.
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Olympiodorus tells us that the arrival of Athaulf was unwelcome to Jovinus and that the latter
blamed Attalus for advising the barbarian to come. 234
As Scharf has suggested, Athaulf may very well have been acting on his previous experience
of imperial politics, especially with regard to usurpers. As we have seen, Alaric had promoted
Attalus to the purple and attempted to use him as an emperor who would support his ambitions
and, failing that, as potential leverage with which to impose his demands on Honorius. When
both options failed, he simply demoted his puppet outside the walls of Rome. Even at the
imperial court in Ravenna, courtiers from Stilicho to Constantius were notorious for controlling
the weak-willed legitimate emperor, Honorius. It is therefore plausible that Athaulf sought to
fulfill the same role with the usurper Jovinus. 235
Regardless, both parties displayed their intention of continuing to follow their own priorities.
Athaulf, for his part, removed a potentially valuable ally for Jovinus when he attacked and killed
the Gothic general Sarus. Sarus had served in the Roman army since the time of Stilicho, but his
constant failure to find favor at the court of Honorius led to his frequently adopting the position
of independent agent in the struggles between the court and Alaric. 236 In 412, he again broke
relations with the court of Honorius and now sought to join Jovinus. Unfortunately, a
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Scharf, “Jovinus”, 4-5. Scharf’s conclusion is also accepted by Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 223-224.
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As we have seen in Chapters 1 and 2, Sarus played a pivotal role in the events of the first decade of the fifthcentury. Under Stilicho’s command, he had almost succeeded in capturing Constantine III at the siege of Valence in
407 and thus ending the latter’s usurpation at an early stage. See Zosimus, Historia nova VI.2.3-4. He had also taken
the side of the imperial court in fall of Stilicho in 408, killing the MVM’s bodyguards and forcing him to flee to
Ravenna. See Zosimus, Historia nova V.34.1-2. Sometime after this incident, he broke with the imperial court, yet
remained in Italy as an independent agent with a small group of followers. Zosimus tells us that he was forced to
rejoin Honorius’ ranks when Athaulf attacked him in 409. See Zosimus, Historia nova VI.13.2. Finally, Sozomen
states that Sarus launched an unprovoked attack on Alaric’s peace embassy to the imperial court in 410, which
directly led to Alaric’s third siege of the Rome and the eventual sack of the imperial city. See Sozomen, Historia
ecclesiastica IX.9.3. For the relevant references to Sarus in the primary sources, see PLRE II: Sarus.
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longstanding hatred with unknown causes existed between Athaulf and Sarus. Olympiodorus
tells us that when Athaulf heard that Sarus was approaching with a meager force of no more than
twenty men, he went out to meet him with a force of ten thousand. After fighting heroically,
Sarus was captured and later killed. 237
The end to Jovinus’ and Althaulf’s alliance came with the usurper’s own display of
independent action. At some time in 412, he raised his brother, Sebastianus, as co-emperor,
against the will of Athaulf. 238 Athaulf may have wished Attalus to fill this position or he may
have seen this action as a threat against his perceived role as the power behind the throne. 239 In
any case, the rise of Sebastianus seems to have shown Athaulf that his new emperor would not
be so easily controlled.
Athaulf’s frustrations with Jovinus now found their vent through the overtures of Claudius
Postumus Dardanus. Dardanus was probably a successful career bureaucrat, rather than a
member of an aristocratic family. After serving in several legal and administrative posts, he held
the office of praetorian prefect (PPO) of Gaul at some time in the first decade of the fifth
century. 240 Dardanus, who possessed estates in Narbonensis Secunda, a province under Jovinus’
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Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 18 = Müller-Dindorf 17. Burns and Halsall have suggested that the later
attested presence of Sarus’ brother, Singeric, among Athaulf’s forces in Spain in 415 shows that Athaulf recruited
from the survivors of Sarus’ band on this occasion. See Burns, Barbarians, 256; Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 226.
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As argued by Scharf, “Jovinus”, 5; Drinkwater, “Usurpers”, 290.
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The exact date of Dardanus’ first tenure as PPO Galliarum is uncertain. A letter of Jerome dated to 414 states that
he held this office twice. See Jerome, Epistula 129.8. Codex Theodosianus XII.1.171, dated December 7, 412, attests
to his possession of the praetorian prefecture in this year. Combined with the evidence of Jerome, this would suggest
his first time in this office must have occurred earlier. Martindale suggests either 401-404 or 406-407 as we do not
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control, also seems to have been among the few Gallic notables who remained loyal to Honorius
during the disruptions of the first decade of the fifth century. 241 Either as a private citizen on his
estates or with the full administrative support of Ravenna through the second grant of the office
of PPO Galliarum, Dardanus entered into negotiations with Athaulf at some time in 412. Athaulf
promised Dardanus the heads of the usurpers and a peace treaty with Ravenna. 242 The sources do
not tell us what was offered in return for Athaulf’s efforts against Jovinus, but we may assume
that the supply of grain for his followers was the baseline clause, as this demand would continue
to echo throughout all future negotiations, in the same way that it had under the rule of Alaric.
With the alliance concluded, Athaulf openly broke with Jovinus’ regime and set about its
destruction. The precise order of events is unclear. 243 Sebastianus seems to have fallen into
Athaulf’s hands first. Olympiodorus reports that Athaulf sent his head to the legitimate emperor

know who held the office in these years and by 408 Gaul was under the control of Constantine III. See PLRE II:
Claudius Postumus Dardanus. Demougeot, however, suggests that Honorius’ acceptance of Constantine III into the
imperial college in 409 led to more administrative interaction between these emperors. She therefore proposes that
Honorius appointed Dardanus to serve as PPO Galliarum under Constantine’ regime. See Demougeot, “Constantine
III”, 115. While an interesting proposition, her argument relies on a misdating of the aforementioned Codex
Theodosianus XII.1.171 to the year 409 rather than 412. Furthermore, Zosimus and Frigeridus provide the names of
the men who held the praetorian prefecture under Constantine: Apollinarus and Decimius Rusticus. See Zosimus,
Historia nova VI.13.1; Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus, as contained in Gregory of Tours, Historia II.9. For this
reason, Martindale’s suggested dates are to be preferred.
241

The Gallic Chronicle of 452, entry 69, states this specifically: “Through the activity of the strenuous man,
Dardanus, who alone did not submit to the tyrant, Athaulf, who commanded the Goths after Alaric, was turned from
the alliance of Jovinus.” (Industria viri strenui, qui solus tyranno non cessit, Dardani Atauulphus, qui post Alaricum
Gothis imperitabat, a societate Iovini avertitur.) Contrary to this testimony, Drinkwater suggests the possibility that
Dardanus may have served for a time under Jovinus. This hypothesis would account for his ease of access to Athaulf
in 412 as well as the hatred he earned from later Gallic aristocrats, as attested by Sidonius Apollinaris, Epistula
V.9.1. See Drinkwater, “Usurpers”, 291-292. Drinkwater’s suggestion is interesting, but the sources provide no
support for this hypothesis.
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at Ravenna. 244 Jovinus took refuge in the city of Valence. Only after a period of siege did
Jovinus capitulate and enter into Athaulf’s custody as a captive. 245 Some sources also mention
the execution of a third brother, Sallustius, whose place in Jovinus’ regime is unknown. 246
The fall of Jovinus’ regime was a particularly bloody affair, perhaps as much an indication of
internal tensions among the Gallic aristocracy themselves as a visible warning against future
rebellion. Frigeridus reports the death of Decimus Rusticius, who seems to have maintained his
position as PPO Galliarum under Constantine III and Jovinus, and Agroetius, who served as
primicerius notariorum under Jovinus. The generals of Honorius murdered these men along with
many nobles (multique nobiles) of the Auvergne. 247 Apollinaris, the grandfather of the later
Gallic poet Sidonius and one time PPO Galliarum under Constantine III, quite possibly shared
this fate. 248
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Gallic Chronicle of 452, 71.
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PLRE II: Sallustius 2. Unlike Sebastianus, we possess no coinage that attests to the regency of Sallustius. This
fact makes it almost certain that he did not share the imperium with his brothers. For the essential links between
usurpation and the minting of coinage, see John Drinkwater, "Silvanus, Ursicinus, and Ammianus: Fact or Fiction?",
in Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History 7. ed. Carl Deroux (Bruxelles: Latomus, 1994), 568-576.
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Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus as preserved in Gregory of Tours, Historia II.9. Scharf makes the case that
Frigeridus, in specifying the highest and lowest office holders in the usurper’s administration, actually implies the
murder of Jovinus’ entire civil regime. See Scharf, “Jovinus”, 9-11. This is an interesting, though improbable,
argument. While there is every indication that the Gallic purge was both vicious and terrifying to the region’s
prominent inhabitants, Scharf’s hypothesis probably overstates the number of those who were actually executed by
the Honorian regime in 413. For comparison, Codex Theodosianus IX.40.21, which was issued in the African
provinces after Heraclianus’ failed usurpation attempt in 412, calls for the execution of Heraclianus’ accomplices.
Nevertheless, it pardons soldiers and private individuals, as well as those who were compelled or forced to follow
the usurpers’ regime. Furthermore, Orosius tells us that Sabinus, the son-in-law of Heraclianus and an official in his
administration, was merely exiled following his capture by Honorius’ officials. See Orosius, Historiae VII.42.14.
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As argued by Jill Harries, Sidonius Apollinaris and the Fall of Rome AD 407-485 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1994), 28-29.

97

The death of Jovinus himself was peculiar. After being passed from the custody of Athaulf to
Dardanus, Honorius’ praetorian prefect escorted him to Narbonne, rather than to the emperor at
Ravenna, and executed him. 249 The significance of the city of Narbonne in this affair is obscure.
In 1948, K. F. Stroheker argued that Jovinus had familial ties to this city, basing his conclusion
on a passage from Sidonius Apollinaris’ Carmen XXIII to his friend Consentius. 250 In this
passage, Sidonius describes Consentius’ mother “who, bearing the honors of ancient Jovinus to
her husband’s house, filled the home of a sophist with a magistrate’s robes. Thus, within your
own home, Consentius, proud glory of the fatherland, your grandfather lives through the calendar
and your father through books.” 251 Consentius and his family were native to Narbonne. If the
Jovinus mentioned in Sidonius’ poem as his friend’s grandfather was actually the usurper, then
the connection with Narbonne would be clear. Dardanus wished to punish Jovinus in the area of
his strongest support, his native city.
This identification of the usurper Jovinus with the grandfather of Consentius, however, seems
unlikely. Sidonius was a politically cautious writer. Even if the usurper Jovinus was the ancestor
of a friend, it is improbable that he would speak of the man in such glowing terms, especially in
a public document. When, in his writings, Sidonius has occasion to speak of his own family’s
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See K. F. Stroheker, Der senatorische Adel im spätantiken Gallien (Tübingen und Reutlingen: Alma Mater
Verlag, 1948), prosopography, 204. Stroheker was the first scholar to offer a study of the intertwining connections
among the Gallic aristocracy. John Matthews further expanded this approach to include the aristocracies of Spain,
Italy, and Africa in Western Aristocracies and the Imperial Court, AD 364-425. Matthews himself also maintains
Stroheker’s argument on the connections between Jovinus and Narbonne. See Matthews, Western Aristocracies,
315. This hypothesis also appears in more recent works, such as Scharf, “Jovinus”, 6-7; Sivan, Galla Placidia, 20.
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Sidonius Apollinaris, Carmen XXIII.172-176: quae domum ad mariti / prisci insignia transferens Iovini /
implevit trabeis larem sophistae. / sic intra proprios tibi penates, / Consenti, patriae decus superbum, / fastis vivit
avus paterque libris.
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past involvement with the civil discord of this period, the poet praises his ancestor, Apollinaris,
while being sure to condemn the usurper, Constantine III. 252 Furthermore, Sidonius’ mention of
the fasti almost certainly indicates that the Jovinus in question was still recognized as the holder
of a previous consulship. While it is probable that the usurper Jovinus claimed the consulship
within his own realm for the year 411 or 412, his fall would have erased the name from even
regional consular lists. Sidonius’ statement, made at least fifty years after the death of Jovinus,
would therefore make little sense if applied to the usurper. For this reason, it is best to follow the
suggestion of the PLRE, which identifies the ancestor of Consentius as Flavius Jovinus, a Gallic
officer who had a distinguished career as magister equitum under the successive emperors Julian,
Jovian, and Valentinian, and was honored with the consulship for the year 367. 253
Unfortunately, this identification leaves the significance of Jovinus’ execution at Narbonne in
the realm of speculation. Though we have no positive evidence, it is possible that Jovinus did
indeed have relatives in the city. At the very least, we are probably safe in assuming that
aristocrats of the city had supported the regime of Constantine III, and possibly that of Jovinus.
Narbonne was the last major Gallic city along the Via Domitia, the Republican road that
connected Rome with her Spanish provinces. In the fifth century, this road remained the primary
military and commercial land route into Spain, making Narbonne an important communications
hub for the empire at large. The extension of Constantine’s power into the Spanish provinces in
407/408 would have required the collusion or forced subjection of Narbonne and her resident
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As shown by Harries, Sidonius Apollinaris, 28-29. Harries notes the famous passage from Sidonius’ letter to his
friend Aquilinus (a descendant of Decimus Rusticus, who had served as PPO Galliarum under both Constantine III
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aristocracy to the usurper’s regime. 254 With the fall of Constantine, it is possible that the
Narbonese aristocrats shifted their support to Jovinus in fear of reprisals from the newly
aggressive administration of Constantius at Ravenna. Even if this were not the case, Constantius
certainly seems to have intended the execution of Jovinus to serve, on some level, as a visceral
lesson to the southern Gallic aristocrats on the dangers of supporting a usurper and as a sign of
the reestablishment of Honorian control over Gaul. 255
The execution of Jovinus at Narbonne may also have served a secondary purpose, closely
related to the functional ties of this city to the Spanish provinces. With the forces of Athaulf in
momentary alliance with Ravenna and the last usurper removed from Gaul, Honorius’ court must
have felt optimistic in 413, as one by one their previous troubles seemed to fall away. Borne
along by this optimism, their next logical step in the reestablishment of imperial authority over
the West would have been to move military activity into Spain in the near future. Indeed, it is
reasonable to assume that this was the next intended stop for Athaulf and his forces in their
service to the imperial government. Rome had a long tradition of using barbarians against
barbarians in securing their frontiers and, in fact, would resort to this exact method in 416 in
order to bring Spain back under imperial control. 256 With Athaulf and his forces having proven
their worth in overthrowing Jovinus’ regime in Gaul, there was every reason for Constantius and
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See, for instance, Constantius II’s use of the Taifali and the so-called “free” Sarmatians against the Limigantes in
Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae XVII.13.19-20; Valentinian’s use of the Burgundians against the Alamanni of
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Warfare in Roman Europe, 188-192; Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 149-150.

100

the imperial court to have already begun formulating a plan to use them in Spain in 413. In this
climate, and without the knowledge of the imminent revolt of Athaulf, one could easily imagine
Dardanus receiving orders from Ravenna to issue a symbolic warning to the Spanish provinces
which were still in rebellion, though now apparently leaderless after the deposition of the usurper
Maximus in 412. The fact that a Spanish source, the chronicle of Hydatius, is our only surviving
testimony to the location of Jovinus’ execution certainly suggests that this warning was received
and understood. 257
Either simultaneously with the last stages of Jovinus’ usurpation or closely following its
suppression, Ravenna also faced a more direct threat from Africa. The comes Africae Heraclian
launched his own revolt in the spring of 413, first withholding the grain supply, then launching a
full invasion of the Italian peninsula. Before these events, however, Heraclian had possessed a
long history of loyalty to the Honorian regime. He had received the control of Africa as a reward
for the execution of Stilicho, an act he carried out personally in August of 408. 258 He had
remained loyal to Honorius during the usurpation of Attalus, both withholding the grain supply
to put pressure on the usurper’s regime and disposing of the small force sent to unseat him.
Incidentally, these actions played a large role in the withdrawal of Alaric’s support from Attalus
and the consequent collapse of the usurper’s regime. 259 In recognition of his services, Honorius
had made Heraclian consul elect for 413.
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Nevertheless, perhaps fearing the growing power of Constantius, Heraclian chose to revolt in
the spring of his own consulship. 260 Orosius tells us that after withholding the grain supply for a
time, he launched an invasion of Italy in the late spring of 413 with 3,700 ships. 261 A previously
unknown comes Marinus met the forces of Heraclian near the town of Utriculum. The result was
an unmitigated disaster for the usurper. According to Hydatius, 50,000 men lost their lives and
Heraclian himself fled back to Carthage. 262 Marinus and the forces of Honorius pursued and
executed the usurper, afterwards launching a purge of his suspected followers. 263 Heraclian’s
consulship was stricken from the consular fasti and the meager value of his estates was awarded
to the man who had obviously overseen the operations in defense of Italy, the MVM
Constantius. 264
With the African threat removed, Constantius could now focus his energies once again on
events in Gaul. It is precisely at this point, however, that the accord between Athaulf’s forces and
the court of Ravenna began to unravel. The surviving fragments of Olympiodorus suggest an ongoing negotiation between the two parties. Athaulf, having fulfilled his half of the bargain with
the destruction of Jovinus’ regime, now demanded the promised grain from his partners in
Ravenna. Ravenna, however, failed to deliver. 265 Oost has plausibly suggested that this failure
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was linked to Heraclian’s actions in withholding the African grain fleet. The Honorian regime
simply could not fulfill its oaths to Athaulf without risking a revolt or urban riots closer to home.
The Italian peninsula was after all still recovering from the devastations of Athaulf’s own forces
and the walls of Rome were once again filling with new and returning inhabitants. The grain in
question, especially after Heraclian’s deprivations, was needed for Roman citizens, not a
sometime enemy. 266
Halsall has also suggested that Ravenna or Constantius may have deliberately withheld the
promised grain in order to force Athaulf to hand over Galla Placidia. 267 Halsall’s solution,
however, is far less probable as a cause of the initial break between Athaulf and the imperial
court. Any agreement made with Athaulf in 412 would necessarily have included the return of
Honorius’ sister as a primary clause. 268 Even if Placidia somehow did not enter into the
discussion between Athaulf and Dardanus in 412, both men must have known that any lasting
treaty with Ravenna would have to include her return as a consequence. Regardless of the plans
or feelings of Honorius, Constantius, Athaulf, or Placidia herself, she was simply too important
as a member of the imperial house, and her hostage status too representative of the empire’s
recent woes, to remain among Athaulf’s forces. For this reason, it is far more reasonable to
envision the 412 agreement between Athaulf and the imperial court as consisting of a mutual
exchange. Upon the overthrow of Jovinus, Athaulf would hand over Galla Placidia and Ravenna
would provide the necessary grain to feed his followers. Only when Ravenna reneged on this
agreement, yet continued to demand the release of Placidia, was the accord broken. Athaulf then
began to entertain new possibilities.
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Though still operating under the pretext of peace, Athaulf moved his forces south in late 413
and attempted to take the city of Marseilles in a surprise attack. The city was defended, however,
by a soldier named Boniface, a man who was fated to play a large role in the political struggles
of 420’s and early 430’s. Acting in an unknown capacity, Boniface quickly organized the city’s
defenses and managed to drive off the hostile forces, allegedly wounding Athaulf in the
process. 269 His later promotion through the ranks in Constantius’ regime probably hinged on the
fame that he acquired in this engagement. 270
Now in open revolt, Athaulf and his forces seem to have continued to follow the Via Domitia
along the coast. According to Hydatius, they entered Narbonne in the time of the vintage,
therefore sometime in the autumn of 413. 271 After the violence at Marseilles, the apparently
peaceful reception that Athaulf’s followers received in various cities of Narbonensis I and
Aquitania II is noteworthy. There may have been some confusion over the semi-official status of
Athaulf and his followers. Though he was now in revolt, lines of negotiation remained open
between Athaulf and Ravenna, through the person of Constantius.
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such as Paulinus of Pella and Orosius maintain that Athaulf desired peace at this juncture. 273
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As argued by J. L. M de Lepper, De rebus gestis Bonifatii, comitis Africae et magistri militum (Tilburg: W.
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Sirago, Galla Placidia, 159-160. Sirago notes that the presence of Galla Placidia among Alaric’s forces may have
played a role in the capitulation of Narbonne. The aristocrats of this city could simply claim that they were offering
refuge to the sister of the Emperor Honorius.
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Paulinus of Pella, Eucharisticus 302-303; Orosius, Historiae VII.43.3. Paulinus served as comes largitionum
privatarum in the usurper Attalus’ administration from 413-414. In his later autobiographical poem, Eucharisticus,
probably written in 459, Paulinus disparages both Attalus as well as his own participation in the usurper’s regime,
claiming that he was appointed to his office in absentia. Several scholars have plausibly argued that Paulinus’
statements actually reflect the author’s attempts to distance himself from his earlier affiliation with civil discord.
See, for example, Paulinus de Pella, Poème d'action de grâces et Prière. trans. Claude Moussy (Paris: Éditions du

104

Though both of these authors may have had ulterior motives in making such claims, surviving
fragments of Olympiodorus seem to confirm that Athaulf was actively attempting to promote a
positive public image of his actions for Roman contemporaries. Olympiodorus tells us that
Athaulf increased his demands on the imperial court, so that when they were not met, he might
seem reasonable in refusing to hand over Galla Placidia. 274 Athaulf may therefore have
convinced the southern Gallic aristocrats of Narbonensis Prima and Aquitania Secunda that he
was a peaceful and reasonable man who had suffered from the dishonesty of imperial officials,
yet was still operating within the regular processes of the imperial system. If the testimonies of
Paulinus and Orosius are any indication, he was successful in this endeavor.
The most probable solution, however, is that the cities of these regions were still in quasirevolt against Ravenna and saw the arrival of Athaulf’s forces as a means of defense against the
imperial government. 275 The end of the revolts of both Jovinus and Heraclian saw terrifying state
purges of their supporters or perceived supporters. 276 Frigeridus’ account of the Gallic purge
provides a succinct notice of what must have been a process lasting months, as the imperial
government slowly reestablished control over the provinces. 277 Even if Dardanus’ execution of
Jovinus at Narbonne was intended more as a threat to the Spanish provinces than to the cities of

Cerf, 1974), 25; N. B. McLynn, “Paulinus the Impenitent: A Study of the ‘Eucharisticos’”, Journal of Early
Christian Studies 3 (1995), 461-486. It is therefore possible that his claim regarding Athaulf’s desire for peace at
this time is a further example of Paulinus’ desire to justify his past actions in choosing to ally with Athaulf. See
chapter 4 for a discussion of Paulinus’ Eucharisticus as a historical source for this period. For an evaluation of
Orosius’ testimony on Athaulf and Placidia, see below.
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southern Gaul, it nevertheless carried a powerful message to any aristocrat who may have had
connections to either Constantine or Jovinus. It therefore must have aggravated whatever climate
of paranoia already existed. While it is reasonable to assume that these actions made some Gallic
aristocrats averse to further antagonizing the Honorian regime, the peaceful entry of Athaulf and
his followers into southern Gaul in 413 suggests that the majority of the inhabitants in these
provinces were willing to make an alliance with the rebellious Gothic leader. As we have seen,
the city of Narbonne was pivotal to the control of Spain, and therefore must have formed an
essential part of the regime of Constantine III. This fact made the leading men of the provincial
capital particularly susceptible to accusations of collusion with the usurper, regardless of whether
or not their participation in his regime was voluntary. As such, they may have chosen to ally
with Athaulf as an alternative to the very real possibility of imperial repression.
Whatever their reasons, the cities of southern Gaul seem to have welcomed Athaulf and his
followers in the autumn of 413 and provided for their maintenance. The main court was situated
at Narbonne, while aristocratic estates and cities along the Via Aquitania, including Bordeaux
(Burdigala) and probably Toulouse (Tolosa), billeted various contingents of his troops. 278
Negotiations with the imperial court also seem to have continued, though according to

278

In his De reditu suo, lines 493-496, Rutilius Namatianus mentions Victorinus, a former vicarius Britanniarum,
who was forced to live in Etruria after the capture of his native city, Toulouse. Though Rutilius does not mention the
perpetrators of this attack, scholarship has generally assigned it to the retreat of Athaulf’s forces in late 414/415.
See, for example, Seeck, Untergang, VI. 54-57; Bury, Later Roman Empire, 196-198; Courcelle, Histoire littéraire,
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collaboration with Attalus’ regime and sought the safety of his Italian estates. For Rutilius Namatianus, see
Matthews, Western Aristocracies, 325-328.
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Olympiodorus, Athaulf now entertained new designs: marriage to the sister of the emperor, Galla
Placidia. 279
Contemporary works present both positive and negative views of the wedding of Athaulf and
Placidia. Philostorgius and Hydatius, writers from opposite sides of the empire as well as the
“Arian” / “Nicene” theological divide, both describe the marriage as nothing less than the
fulfillment of biblical prophecies signaling tragedy for the Roman state. 280 Orosius, however,
writing closer to the events, presents a more optimistic image in accordance with the theme of
his work. Rome handed over Placidia as a hostage, by divine judgment, and “she, having been
joined to the most powerful of barbarian kings in marriage, was a great benefit to the
republic.” 281 For Orosius, the marriage signaled the beginning of a new period of peace between
279

Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 22. 3 = Müller-Dindorf 22. As we have seen, Jordanes claims that Athaulf
married Placidia at Forum Julii (Forli) in Amelia before his departure from Italy in 412, apparently with the consent
of Honorius. See Jordanes, Getica 160. Many scholars have either accepted the veracity of this passage or at least
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Placidia”, in L'Empire Romain et Les Barbares d'Occident (IVe-VIIe siècle), Scripta Varia (Paris: Sorbonne, 1988;
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in 412. In my narrative, I therefore follow far more reliable, contemporary sources, such as Olympiodorus, in
suggesting that Athaulf’s decision to marry Placidia was formulated only after the breakdown of negotiations
between Athaulf and Ravenna following the destruction of Jovinus’ regime in 413.
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Philostorgius, Historia ecclesiastica VII.4, though fragmentary, contains a reference to Daniel 2:31-45, wherein
the prophet interprets Nebuchadnezzar’s dream of a statue with feet of iron and clay. Hydatius, Chronicon 49 [57]
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the once savage barbarians and the Roman state, as Placidia influenced her husband to avoid
war, to seek peace, and to govern well. 282 Finally, a sixth-century writer, Jordanes, describes the
growing love of Athaulf for Placidia during their wanderings, as the barbarian king was attracted
to the nobility, beauty, and chastity of the captured Roman princess. 283
A famous fragment of Olympiodorus provides a vivid, though sadly brief, description of the
wedding itself. In the decision to marry Placidia, Athaulf acted on the advice of a Roman citizen
named Candidianus. 284 The ceremony took place in January 414, at the house of one Ingenius, a
leading citizen of Narbonne. 285 Though both Romans and barbarians attended the festivities, the
ceremony was conducted in a decidedly Roman fashion. Placidia was clothed in royal attire as
befitted her status as a member of the imperial house, while Athaulf himself donned the garb of a
Roman general. Athaulf then presented his new bride with a series of gifts. Among these were
fifty young men dressed in silk, each bearing two bowls, one filled with gold, the other filled
with precious gems, all taken from the sack of Rome. Attalus, followed by two otherwise
unknown individuals, Rusticius and Phoebadius, then performed epithalamia, traditional
wedding songs or poetic recitations for the couple. 286 The ceremony was then concluded amid
much celebration among the Romans and barbarians in attendance. 287
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Some scholars have suggested that this Candidianus may be identical with the eastern general of the same name
who, together with Ardabur and Aspar, overcame the forces of the usurper John and installed Valentinian III on the
western throne in 425. See Oost, Galla Placidia, 188, Sivan, Galla Placidia, 91 n. 111. I can find no reason,
however, to support this view, especially as the name “Candidianus” is neither obscure nor unusual. I therefore
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Frye argues for an emendation of Olympiodorus’ text from “Rusticius” to “Rusticus”, thereby suggesting that the
poet who performed the epithalamium for Athaulf and Placidia was related to Decimus Rusticus, PPO of
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Olympiodorus’ account contains hints of both a functioning court in the Roman style as well
as the official stance of this court with regard to the Honorian regime in Ravenna. The χλανίς
that Athaulf wore on this occasion, equivalent to the χλαμύς or paludamentum, was the mantel of
a Roman general. 288 While it is possible that Athaulf donned this clothing in order to advertise
his pro-Roman sentiments, a more probable suggestion is that the χλανίς signified the fact that he
held an actual Roman office.
Our sources on the events of the second reign of Attalus are few and fragmentary. We
therefore have no real information on the exact date or the circumstances under which Athaulf
chose to raise his client to the purple for the second time. Traditional narratives of this period
place the rise of Attalus after the wedding of Athaulf and Placidia, seeing the action as Athaulf’s
response to either Ravenna’s rejection of the marriage or as a consequence of Constantius’
blockade of Narbonne. 289 More recently, however, Werner Lütkenhaus has argued that the
second rise of Attalus actually preceded the wedding of Athaulf and Placidia. In his
reconstruction, Athaulf raised Attalus to the purple in order to fill his puppet administration with
the Gallic aristocrats of Aquitania Secunda and Narbonensis Prima, thereby cementing their

Constantine III and possibly Jovinus. See David Frye, “A Mutual Friend of Athaulf and Jerome” Historia:
Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 40. 4 (1991), 507-508. His further argument for the identification of this “Rusticus”
as the source for Orosius’ famous story of Athaulf’s political change of heart is less than convincing.
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See, for example, Bury, Later Roman Empire, 197-198; Sirago, Galla Placidia, 162-163; Oost, Galla Placidia,
130; Demougeot, “Galla Placidia”, 280; Matthews, Western Aristocracies, 317.
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alliance against Ravenna. According to this view, Attalus may therefore have claimed the purple
as early as the winter of 413. 290
Olympiodorus’ account seems to support Lütkenhaus’ sequence of events. If Attalus were
already emperor at the time of the wedding, then Athaulf’s military mantel would have reflected
his status as Attalus’ MVM, the same office that Alaric had held during the usurper’s first
administration. 291 It also suggests that like his predecessor, Athaulf chose, whenever possible, to
define his leadership position in the terms of the Roman administrative hierarchy. Recent work
on the idea of “kingship” among the heterogeneous groups that followed Alaric and Athaulf
suggests that this was an initially ambiguous position that emerged gradually over time and in
response to specific political problems. Contemporary sources are inconclusive about the titles
that these leaders assumed, though with regard to Alaric, they generally refer to his position in
terms of the Roman hierarchy. As Athaulf, as far as we know, never held office in the legitimate
administration, it is more probable that he used the title of king to define his position with regard
to his followers. 292 Nevertheless, Olympiodorus’ passage would suggest that when given the
opportunity, he chose to shed the ambiguous title of “king” for the imperially recognized office
of MVM, demonstratively trading a title that defined his position over a specific group of
followers for one that signified his authority over both Romans and barbarians.
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See Lütkenhaus, Constantius III, 79-80.

291

Sundwall first made the logical suggestion that Athaulf held the MVM position in Attalus’ second regime, an
idea that Oost also adopts. See Johannes Sundwall, Weströmische Studien (Berlin: Mayer and Müller, 1915), 204;
Oost, Galla Placidia, 130. Both scholars, however, see the second rise of Attalus as following the marriage of
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As argued by Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 202-206. Halsall shows that a leader’s assumption of the title rex
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The active participation of no fewer than four named Roman citizens in the ceremony in
addition to Attalus, also suggests that Athaulf had already formed a close alliance with the
southern Gallic aristocrats against the Honorian regime. Ravenna had made its desire for the
return of Placidia quite clear. Any individual participating in the ceremony therefore must have
known that they were acting in violation of the imperial will. Even in a calm political
atmosphere, such an action would have been considered dangerous. In the midst of the intrigue
and state persecutions of 413/414, this action could have been nothing less than suicidal. For this
reason, it best to see the Gallo-Roman aristocrats of Aquitania Secunda and Narbonensis Prima
as already in full rebellion against Ravenna by January 414. It is simply not possible to assume
that individuals who believed themselves answerable to Ravenna would have taken such a risk in
the contemporary climate of paranoia and state persecution.
Finally, we should note that the marriage of Athaulf and Placidia itself represented a threat to
the dynastic security of Honorius’ regime. As discussed in Chapter 1, the female descendants of
the dynasties of Valentinian and Theodosius typically remained unwed during their lifetimes. 293
While the Christian practice of celibacy certainly provided these women with new opportunities
for the exercise of political influence, this dynastic tradition of chastity for women of the
imperial family also served both to ensure the succession of imperial power through the male
line of descent and to prevent the rise of cadet branches of the imperial family that would
implicitly threaten the regimes of reigning emperors. Placidia’s marriage to Athaulf directly
293

In general, see PLRE I: Iusta 1, Grata, and Galla 2; PLRE II: Aelia Pulcheria; Arcadia 1; Marina 1; Iusta Grata
Honoria. Of these women, Galla, the mother of Galla Placidia, married the reigning emperor Theodosius in 387/388
at a time of crisis in order to seal the alliance between Theodosius and her brother, Valentinian II. See Zosimus,
Historia nova IV.44.1-4. Aelia Pulcheria married the emperor Marcian in 450, only after her brother, the emperor
Theodosius II, had died without male issue. See Evagrius, Historia ecclesiastica II.1. Finally, Placidia’s daughter,
Iusta Grata Honoria, was married to a senator after an affair with her chamberlain provoked a court scandal. See
Priscus, Blockley fragment 17 = John of Antioch, fragment 199.2. By all accounts, the rest of these women
remained unwed during their lifetimes. See chapter 1 for discussion.
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violated this tradition, opening the possibility of descendants who might challenge the Honorius’
control over the imperial throne. As such, it constituted a very real act of rebellion against the
Honorian regime.
Collectively, these factors complicate the traditional scholarly interpretations of the marriage
of Athaulf and Placidia. Scholars such Sirago and Oost paint romantic portraits of the growing
love affair of the barbarian king and the captured Roman princess. 294 Furthermore, Oost depicts
Placidia operating in an advisory capacity to Athaulf, educating him in Roman law and culture
and steering him towards peace with Ravenna. 295 Indeed, even the most sober scholarly
narratives generally present the Narbonese regime as a tragedy, resulting from the failure of
Ravenna to acknowledge or accept the marriage of Athaulf and Placidia. In this scenario, the
hostility of Ravenna forced the couple into rebellion, leading to the second rise of Attalus as the
head of this new regime. 296
Ultimately, this traditional narrative seems to derive from a rather uncritical approach to the
work of Orosius, an author whose presentation of the marriage of Athaulf and Placidia is heavily
laden with traditional Roman stereotypes and prejudices as well as filtered through an entrenched
thesis on the optimism of his own Christian era. In a famous passage, he relates the testimony of
a citizen of Narbonne and former intimate of Athaulf whom he claims to have met while visiting
Jerome in Bethlehem. According to this friend, Athaulf had once hoped to destroy the Roman
Empire and build a new Gothic state, thereby replacing Romania with Gothia. He soon
294
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112

discovered, however, that their barbarism made the Goths incapable of following the laws
required by a state structure. He therefore decided to use his forces to support and augment the
Roman state, thereby becoming the author of a restoration of Roman power. 297
Halsall has recently argued that Athaulf’s statement (if it is not a pure invention of Orosius)
actually amounts to a joke on stereotypical Roman perceptions of “barbarians”. 298 Nevertheless,
Orosius presents this statement of Athaulf as a sincere change of heart on the part of an
uncivilized barbarian, who came to recognize the inherent limitations of both himself and his
people when faced with the majesty of Roman society and government. Orosius further presents
Galla Placidia as the catalyst of this change. Earlier in his text, he describes Placidia’s initial
abduction and later marriage to Athaulf as parts of a divinely inspired plan, wherein Rome
handed her over to the barbarians as a hostage for the benefit of the state. 299 For Orosius,
Placidia was a civilizing principle, exerting Roman influence over the uncivilized, barbarian
impulses of her husband, Athaulf, and turning him towards peace with Rome. While not grounds
for completely discarding Orosius’ testimony, these obvious rhetorical features at play in his text
suggest caution in taking his depiction of the relationship of Athaulf and Placidia at face value.
For our purposes, perhaps the most questionable and misleading aspect of Orosius’ text is his
presentation of a simple Roman/barbarian political dichotomy as operating during a period of
numerous usurpations, civil wars, and state purges of actual or suspected enemies. In this
political atmosphere, Orosius’ designation of “Roman” as automatically referring to the
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Honorian regime at Ravenna can have had very little meaning in reality. As we have seen, there
is every reason to assume that the southern Gallic aristocrats who welcomed Athaulf’s forces
into the cities of Aquitania Secunda and Narbonensis Prima were still in quasi-rebellion from the
Honorian regime. It is also probable that Attalus had already taken up the purple for the second
time in late 413. Finally, the marriage of Athaulf and Placidia constituted a direct dynastic threat
to the regime of Honorius. For these reasons, it seems best to assume that Orosius’ portrait of
Athaulf and Placidia actually represents his attempt to smooth over the rough political realities of
the Narbonnese regime for the purposes of his overall, optimistic thesis. 300 According to Orosius,
Athaulf frequently claimed that he had decided to use his forces to restore the Roman state. We
would be correct, however, to question which “Roman state” he was referring to: that of
Honorius or something else altogether.
Recently, Werner Lütkenhaus has offered a more radical portrait of both Placidia and her
marriage to Athaulf. Far from the idea of Placidia as the “helpless hostage”, Lütkenhaus sees her
as the center of a Roman senatorial faction working in alliance with Alaric and Athaulf against
the prerogatives of the imperial court of Honorius. In his view, Placidia came into her own power
during the turbulent Italian conflicts from 408-410. Though she was raised in the “Nicene”
Christian tradition of the Theodosian line, Lütkenhaus suggests that Placidia came to lead a pro“Arian” senatorial faction during these years. This faction favored the political policies and
homoean Christian creed of her grandmother, Justina, and her uncle, Valentinian II, rather than
the rule of the newly established Theodosian dynasty. Placidia and her faction also came to
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support the regime of Attalus, over that of her brother, Honorius. After the failure of Attalus’
regime, Placidia willingly joined Alaric and his followers, seeking both to maintain her power
and to avoid Honorius’ reprisals. Thereafter, she became an advisor to Athaulf as well as a
legitimizing figure, helping the barbarian leader to gain advantages and alliances with the Gallic
aristocrats. Their marriage in 414 was nothing less than a common achievement for two
ambitious individuals. While Athaulf once again raised Attalus to the purple, the strength of this
new Gallic regime lay in the union of Athaulf’s barbarian forces and Roman legitimacy through
Placidia’s membership in the reigning imperial dynasty. Placidia’s participation was therefore an
active attempt on her part to maintain homoean power outside the control of the regime in
Ravenna. 301
Lütkenhaus’ reinterpretation of Placidia as an active political figure in the vicissitudes of
imperial fortune in this period adds a welcome complexity to the standard scholarly trope of
Roman/barbarian conflict. Unfortunately, there is absolutely no support in the sources for his
suggestions that Placidia actively worked against Honorius during Alaric’s successive sieges of
Rome from 408-410 or that she ever adopted the homoean creed of Christianity.
Placidia’s life is largely opaque for the years 408-410. As far as the sources tell us, she was
involved in only one political action during this time: giving her approval to the senatorial
decision to execute Serena, the widow of Stilicho and Placidia’s cousin. 302 As we have seen,
however, it is impossible to determine how much agency Placidia actually had in this decision.
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Even if we assume, as do scholars such as Demougeot and Oost, that Placidia actively promoted
the death of her cousin, this action was still perfectly in keeping with the political policies of
Honorius, who had previously given orders for the execution of Stilicho and Eucherius. 303
Contrary to Lütkenhaus’ narrative of familial antagonism, the execution of Serena may therefore
serve as evidence of Placidia’s solidarity with her brother’s regime in a time of crisis. Similarly,
there is no evidence to suggest that Placidia joined Attalus’ faction at Rome or that she willingly
joined the forces of Alaric. While the dates of her transfer into Alaric’s control vary, the sources
unanimously declare that she was captured and served as a hostage among the forces of Alaric
and Athaulf. 304
Similarly, while it is tempting to assume that Placidia may have leaned towards homoean
Christianity, especially after her marriage to Athaulf, the sources provide no evidence of her
conversion to homoean Christianity at this, or any other time in her life. In fact, Placidia
possesses an impeccable reputation for “Nicene” Christianity. She was a great patron of the
church following her rise to the status of regent for her young son, the emperor Valentinian III,
in 425, and her name is associated with a variety of “Nicene” ecclesiastical foundations in both
Rome and Ravenna. 305 Just before her death in 450, she also directly intervened in the eastern
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For Placidia’s church building projects, see Deborah Mauskopf Deliyannis, Ravenna in Late Antiquity
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dogmatic dispute concerning the teachings of Eutyches, whose Christological views would
ultimately lead to the Council of Chalcedon in 451. 306 For this reason, Lütkenhaus’ suggestion
that she adopted homoean Christianity in her early life is untenable without the support of
positive evidence.
Nevertheless, while his narrative of Placidia’s actions during the events of 408-410 is
probably incorrect, Lütkenhaus’ assessment of her political role in the Narbonese regime of
Athaulf and Attalus in the years 413/414-415 possesses the support of our primary sources and
deserves real scholarly consideration. There is every reason to believe that the Narbonese
regime, theoretically headed by Attalus, but grounded in the marriage of Athaulf and Placidia,
represented a far more potent threat to the security and stability of the Honorian regime than did
the administrations of any of the other usurpers of the period. We must therefore see the
marriage at Narbonne in 414 as the moment of Placidia’s emergence as a political actor in her
own right, working for her own power by establishing an independent, yet dynastically
legitimate imperial regime. With regard to Placidia’s political actions, the main problem with
Lütkenhaus’ reconstruction of events lies in his assumption that the political motivations of
Placidia in 413/414 represented continuity with her previous life at Rome rather than something

See Deliyannis, Ravenna, 63-70. See also Sivan, Galla Placidia, 165, who reaches similar conclusions. For the
inscription, see CIL XI 276 = ILS 818, with Rebenich, “Gratian, a Son of Theodosius”, 372-385.
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For a full discussion of Eutyches’ Christological views and the political motivations of many of his supporters
and detractors, see W.H.C Frend, The Rise of Christianity (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 764-773. In brief,
Eutyches was an eastern archimandrite who taught that Christ’s being consisted of a single nature composed of both
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altogether new. The primary sources, however, cannot support such an interpretation. Placidia’s
political goals had changed dramatically in the years since her capture in 410. The question
therefore becomes how and why this change had emerged. While any answer to this question
must remain speculative, a comparison of Placidia’s experience with the traditional tactics and
assumptions of Roman hostage diplomacy provides enough grounds for a legitimate hypothesis
to make the exercise worthwhile.
Along with her brother, Placidia had spent the majority of her life under the control of
Stilicho and her cousin, Serena. The fall of Stilicho in 408 had offered a brief respite to the
siblings, before Placidia again found herself a pawn in the power plays of others following her
capture and subsequent tenure as a hostage among the forces of Alaric and Athaulf from
409/410-414. Zosimus claims that while in Alaric’s camp, she received all of the honors due to
her imperial rank. 307 We know nothing, however, of her experience among Athaulf’s forces.
Even if she was afforded the same consideration that she received from Alaric, she must also
have shared in the difficulties and the material scarcity associated with their wanderings.
Furthermore, her status as a captive among a group hostile to Ravenna, as well as a pawn in the
negotiations between Athaulf and the imperial court, meant that she endured three years in a
constant state of uncertainty and potential danger with regard to her ultimate fate.
During her long period as a hostage, she may also have come to see the inability of Ravenna
to retrieve her as a sign of careless or willful neglect on the part of her brother. Indeed, some
modern scholars have put forth a similar interpretation. 308 As the years passed and she shared the
307
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See, for example, Oost, Placidia, 105 n. 68, 118, and Sivan, Placidia, 24. The scholars who support this view
seem to see Olympiodorus’ mention of Galla Placidia in the negotiations of 413 as the first time the imperial court
took any notice of her situation. This is almost certainly a fallacious assumption. Though no source mentions earlier
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pains and sufferings of continuous travel, she may have come to see herself as a part of this new
community, perhaps more valued among Athaulf’s forces than by her own family. We know
from her later life that she made friends and secured strong loyalties among this group, and there
is no reason to think that they all came from the single year of her marriage to Athaulf. 309
Collectively, Galla Placidia’s experiences during this period share many features with the
traditional Roman hostage diplomacy. We might therefore look to the general assumptions
underlying Roman practice to explain Placidia’s own subsequent change of perspective. Since
the Republican era, hostage taking had formed an essential part of Roman treaty negotiations
with foreign peoples. 310 Romans generally demanded hostages who were young, preferably
male, and related to a prominent aristocratic family. 311 Roman hostage tenures were also of long
duration, so that hostages could expect to spend years among their captors. As living assurances
of their peoples’ adherence to a treaty, these hostages lived under at least the potential threat of
violence, though in practice, they were usually fully integrated into Roman life. Though it is

negotiations with Alaric and Athaulf’s forces, we should remember that there is significant break in our surviving
narrative histories of this period after Zosimus’ Historia nova ends in 409. Our remaining sources are either
fragmentary or minimal, such as Olympiodorus and the chronicle tradition, or more concerned with theological
issues than with providing a coherent narrative of political events, such as Orosius and Sozomen. Given this state of
our source material, it is therefore difficult to maintain that Ravenna only attempted to negotiate for Placidia’s return
in 413.
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nowhere directly stated in the sources, the collective evidence suggests that the Romans were
pursuing an active policy of assimilation with their hostage diplomacy. 312 The youth of the
hostage would ensure that his or her identity was more malleable and open to new influences.
Further, the kind treatment they usually received, coupled with the constant threat of violence
inherent in their hostage status, provided a strong psychological formula for identifying more
with their captors than their own native culture. If successful, this practice had the potential to
offer the Romans a strong advantage in foreign policy. As a male member of a prominent noble
family, the returning hostage could be expected to take part in the governance of his home state.
His newly forged Roman sympathies, however, might also make him more susceptible to Roman
policy initiatives. 313
With regard to the experience of Galla Placidia, it may be worthwhile to ask whether this
Roman assimilation process could work in reverse. As previously discussed, Orosius presents the
relationship of Placidia and Athaulf as one of superior Roman civilization “taming” the savagery
of barbarian culture, a view informed by traditional Roman prejudices. In reality, there is nothing
inherent in Roman culture that would prevent Placidia from assimilating to the culture of her
captors. As we have seen, her relative youth, the trauma of her circumstances, and the long
duration of her captivity closely reflects the formula the Romans themselves used in their own
hostage assimilation policies. Furthermore, one can see in later events how closely another child
hostage, the general Flavius Aëtius, identified with his former Hunnic captors during his early
312
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career. 314 With all of these influences, it is probable that she came to realize the inherent
potential she possessed for securing and maintaining her own power. Even if she somehow failed
to see the advantages, there were surely those among Athaulf’s forces who could have suggested
them. Attalus, already a leading member of the senate before his usurpation, was obviously quite
skilled in the difficult and sometimes devious methods of Roman political maneuvering.
Olympiodorus also credits an otherwise unknown man named Candidianus with providing the
necessary push to ensure that the marriage of Athaulf and Placidia took place. 315
Thus far in her life, others had used her status as the daughter of Emperor Theodosius for
their own gain. The senatorial delegation that asked her permission to murder Serena gave her a
taste of what was possible. Now, seemingly abandoned by her own people, a captive among a
wandering army whose size and strength were significant enough to threaten Ravenna, Placidia
must have realized that she could wield power in her own right. After all, she was the offspring
of two imperial families. While Honorius’ dynastic legitimacy came solely from Theodosius, she
could also claim descent from the Valentinianic line, which had supplied the west with legitimate
emperors for almost forty years. In comparison, the Theodosian line had probably arisen from
usurpation in the east, while their direct control over the western empire was a relative novelty.
Furthermore, she may have reflected that it was the marriage of her mother, Galla, to the
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A fragment of the lost work of the fifth-century historian Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus tells us that Aëtius’
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Emperor Theodosius that helped to smooth over the rough edges of this tenuous claim to the
eastern empire. Finally, she had the example of her grandmother, Justina, who, though a woman,
had effectively controlled imperial politics for over a decade as regent for her son, Valentinian II
– Placidia’s uncle. 316
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Placidia ever disparaged her father or his dynasty. It
would, in fact, have worked against her own claims to power to sacrifice one branch of her
lineage. It is in comparison to Honorius that her claims to legitimacy proved stronger, but not in
stark contrast. In fact, Placidia named her first child Theodosius after her father, rather than
Valentinian after her uncle or grandfather. 317
Furthermore, her decision to ally herself to the forces of Athaulf may owe something to a
famous policy decision of Theodosius. 318 After failing to defeat the barbarian peoples who had
taken to marauding after the disastrous Battle of Adrianople in 378, he chose to extend peace to
these same groups in 382, incorporating them into the empire in an obscure treaty. 319 In many
ways, Alaric’s demands to the imperial court from 408-410, certainly his request for lands for his
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followers, suggest that he expected a similar policy decision from Honorius. Honorius and his
changing cast of handlers, however, repeatedly failed to follow Theodosius’ example. As
previously discussed, we know little of the details of Constantius’ negotiations with Athaulf in
413. It is probable, however, that Constantius was already planning to use Athaulf’s forces to
bring Spain back under imperial control. If, as Oost has suggested, settlement was also discussed,
it was at best a distant possibility contingent on continued service to the Roman state. 320
In Placidia’s alliance with Athaulf, we may see some kernel of the Theodosian model of
rapprochement. Athaulf’s public statements concerning his desire for peace and his wish to use
the forces at his disposal to support the Roman state certainly suggest the spirit of the 382
agreement, as does the apparent hope of a permanent settlement in the provinces of Narbonensis
Prima and Aquitania Secunda. Placidia’s consent to seal this alliance with marriage to Athaulf
suggests that she supported these plans, possibly acting as their co-author. In her desire to use the
forces of Athaulf to support the Roman state and helping to provide a permanent settlement,
Placidia could reasonably call on the example of her father Theodosius. 321 Nevertheless, the
power she acquired with this agreement clearly supported her own dynastic claims over those of
Ravenna.
As we have seen, Orosius presents Athaulf as a man who, under Placidia’s influence, desired
peace and wished to use the forces of his uncivilized barbarians to support and restore the Roman
Empire. For the purposes of his thesis on Roman/barbarian concord under Christian auspices,
however, he deliberately obscures the full extent of the rebellion in which Athaulf and Placidia
were then engaged. The wedding of Placidia and Athaulf signaled nothing less than the
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establishment of a Roman court in direct conflict with Ravenna. Athaulf had probably already
raised Attalus to the purple for the second time at least by January of 414, the date of Athaulf’s
wedding to Placidia. He had secured the allegiance of the southern Gallic aristocrats and had
billeted his troops for the defense of this new regime on cities throughout the region. The true
strength of the new regime, however, lay with the marriage of Placidia and Athaulf.
Even without the second usurpation of Attalus, the fact that Placidia took a husband at all,
much less such a powerful figure as Athaulf, represented a serious act of treason against
Honorius’ regime. As we have seen, since the time of Valentinian, the daughters of the reigning
imperial dynasty traditionally remained unwed, which ensured the security of the male line of
descent. Placidia’s decision to marry in itself therefore constituted a breach with imperial
tradition and a very real threat to her brother’s regime. The fact that Honorius was childless only
served to increase the likelihood that the progeny of Placidia’s union would one day threaten his
hold over the imperial throne. The fact that she had married a powerful man, at that time in
rebellion against Ravenna and in possession of his own strong, independent forces brought this
threat into the present. In this light, the second rise of Attalus to the purple was simply a veneer
over the rebellion’s true locus of power. The usurper was a point around which to build an
alternative Roman regime that would one day come to fruition with the birth of Placidia’s son.
As previously discussed, Orosius claims that Athaulf, in residence at Narbonne, often expressed
the desire to use his forces to support and rebuild the Roman state. 322 If any real policy lies
behind Athaulf’s famous statement, it must refer to the new Roman regime that the barbarian
king was then building with Placidia, not to Roman power in general, as Orosius suggests.
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Returning to Olympiodorus’ account of the wedding of Athaulf and Placidia, these
conclusions may also provide some explanation for the exorbitant wedding gifts that Athaulf
presented to Placidia during the ceremony. Olympiodorus clearly tells us that Athaulf acquired
these slaves and valuables during the sack of Rome. Scholars who delay the second rise of
Attalus to sometime after the wedding frequently note the irony that a barbarian leader presented
these gifts to an abducted Roman princess in the midst of a celebration that included a Roman
audience. 323 If we consider, however, the likelihood that Attalus, Athaulf, and Placidia were then
in the process of building an alternative imperial regime with their Gallo-Roman allies, then it is
possible to interpret the gifts as a political statement, rather than simply the uncouth gesture of a
barbarian groom. In this context, the gifts would have served as a visible display of the regime’s
power and wealth to their new allies. The fifty young men did not carry gold and jewels stolen
from fellow Roman citizens, but the spoils obtained from the defeat of a common enemy. We
can see the entire display as Athaulf’s representation of the military strength of his followers, a
strength that Ravenna had repeatedly failed to defeat or even effectively control. Such a display
could only have served to reassure the Gallic aristocrats of the strength of Attalus’ regime and
the safety that Athaulf’s protection offered against potential imperial reprisals.
Unfortunately for all involved, the Narbonese regime of Attalus, Athaulf, and Placidia, raised
with such promise, did not survive the year. It is possible that the regime faced problems from
the outset because of the hesitant participation or active dissociation of some southern Gallic
aristocrats. Paulinus of Pella claims that he was drafted into Attalus’ service in absentia, while
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Rutilius Namatianus briefly mentions a friend named Victorinus, who had sought refuge in
Etruria following the capture of his native Toulouse. 324
The more pressing problem for Attalus’ regime, however, was neither new nor easily
remedied. Even those aristocrats who willingly supported the new regime faced the persistent
problem of victualling Athaulf’s immense host. 325 Supplying an army even in the best of times
required both careful preparation and access to abundant stores. Attalus’ regime, so recently
established, possessed neither. Further, there is evidence that Gaul faced scarcity resulting in
famine during these years. 326 If the southern provinces were among those affected, the presence
of a large army could only have compounded local problems, leading to general unrest.
Finally, as we will see in Chapter 4, the regime faced a new threat from Constantius and the
forces of Honorius. Swift and decisive action on the part of Ravenna was required to prevent the
Narbonne regime from gaining momentum through gradual aristocratic acceptance. In addition,
it is probable that Constantius saw the marriage of Athaulf and Placidia as a potent threat to his
standing at the court of Honorius. This threat, however, seems to have ignited the general’s
ambition. By late 415, Constantius may already have been working to solidify arrangements for
his own marriage to the sister of Honorius.
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Chapter 4: Failure of Narbonne and Barcelona

The marriage of Athaulf and Placidia, which provided Attalus’ regime at Narbonne with a
Theodosian dynastic foundation, presented a more potent ideological and political threat to the
security of Honorius’ throne than any other usurpation of this period. Consequently, Ravenna
moved quickly to meet this challenge. The military action of Honorius’ general Constantius
caused the collapse of Attalus’ Narbonese regime in late 414/415, forcing Athaulf, Placidia, and
their followers to move south across the Pyrenees into Spain. Reestablished at Barcelona in 415,
Athaulf and Placidia’s dynastic hopes were strengthened with the birth of a son. Unfortunately,
the child, whom they named Theodosius after Placidia’s father, did not survive infancy. With
Athaulf’s own death at the hands of an assassin later in the same year, the threat to the Honorian
regime was effectively nullified. After a brief, but bloody, period of political discord in the wake
of Athaulf’s murder, the dire situation of his followers forced them into alliance with Ravenna.
One consequence of this new treaty was the return of Placidia to her brother’s control in late 415.
This chapter examines several subjects within this overall narrative of the failure of Athaulf
and Placidia’s regimes at Narbonne and Barcelona. First, it offers a new interpretation of the
Eucharisticus of Paulinus of Pella, our sole surviving source on the withdrawal of Athaulf’s
troops from southern Gaul in late 414/415. Traditional scholarly narratives have used the scenes
of violence in Paulinus’ poem to depict the withdrawal of Athaulf’s forces as a chaotic event,
complete with barbarians roaming throughout southern Gaul, looting and burning the homes of
their former Roman allies. Against such notions, this chapter argues that Athaulf maintained
peace with his Roman allies during the withdrawal, and that a critical reading of Paulinus’ work
indicates that the violence the author describes was a result of factions among Athaulf’s troops
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who were stationed in those areas furthest from the imperial court at Narbonne. Second, this
chapter examines the evidence surrounding the assassination of Athaulf at Barcelona in 415, and
the subsequent political discord amongst his followers, to conclude that the murder was the work
of a single individual with a specific motive. Against the work of many scholars, this chapter
therefore argues that the murder did not represent general discontent with Athaulf’s leadership
and that the eventual rise of Wallia as Athaulf’s successor was predicated on his loyalty to his
former king’s regime. Finally, this chapter situates Placidia herself in the midst of the political
discord following Athaulf’s assassination. This chapter argues that, far from the traditional
portrayal of Placidia as the captured Roman princess, she maintained her status as a Gothic
queen amongst her deceased husband’s followers, serving as a locus of power in her own right.
We must therefore see Placidia’s return to Honorius’ control with treaty of late 415/416 as a
consequence of the needs of her new community, rather than representative of her own
individual desires.
As we have seen, the second usurpation of Attalus seems to have garnered support among
many southern Gallic aristocrats in late 413. The subsequent marriage of Athaulf and Placidia on
January 1, 414, further strengthened this regime, granting the aura of Theodosian dynastic
legitimacy. In the climate of usurpation and Honorian imperial repression that pervaded the
Gallic provinces from 410-414, these events were an ominous sign to the central government for
the potential spread of Narbonese authority to other discontented regions.
Ravenna therefore moved swiftly against this new threat. Rather than risk his army in an
uncertain engagement against Athaulf’s numerous followers, Honorius’ general Constantius
chose a more effective, logistical method to combat the Narbonese regime. Athaulf’s forces had
faced problems of supply since their first appearance in the Gallic provinces in 412. Now billeted
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on the cities and aristocratic estates of Narbonensis Prima and Aquitania Secunda, the burden of
victualling Athaulf’s immense host fell on the ministers and allies of Attalus’ regime.
Unfortunately for all involved, however, this task was poorly managed. Whether due to local
scarcity or, more probably, to the fragile structures of a regime still in its nascent stages,
Athaulf’s troops required the importation of supplies from outside the region. 327 Constantius
therefore imposed a complete naval blockade on Narbonne which prevented the importation of
outside goods. 328 This act only served to aggravate the scarcity that Athaulf’s forces were
probably already facing in their new homes, making their continued residence in the region
untenable. By the end of 414, Attalus’ regime seems to have collapsed under this pressure.
The Eucharisticus of Paulinus of Pella provides our only detailed information concerning the
withdrawal of Athaulf’s forces from Narbonensis Prima and Aquitania Secunda. Paulinus
composed this work late in life, probably in the year 459, while in residence at Marseilles. 329
Ostensibly, the Eucharisiticus is an autobiographical poem that describes the author’s
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Courcelle, following the text and commentary of Brandes, previously argued for a composition date of 455 for
the main body of the poem and a date of 459 for the prologue and conclusion. His argument is based on a textual
discrepancy in the Eucharisticus, in which Paulinus states his age as 83 at the time of the composition (lines 12-15),
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well as speculative outside evidence, suggesting that the poet was born precisely in August 377. Coşkun’s argument
is plausible, though I am uncertain if Paulinus’ text lends itself to such chronological precision.
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tumultuous path to salvation. In particular, Paulinus details the course of his life from the high
expectations of his youth as the grandson of the Gallic poet and consul Ausonius to the variety of
misfortunes that continued to plague him after the death of his father in 407 and the gradual loss
of effective control of his property in southern Gaul due to a series of obscure events.
Unfortunately, the poem is a problematic source, heavily laden with notable silences and
apparently deliberate obfuscations. Furthermore, Paulinus’ purpose in composing the poem
remains open to debate. 330 Such features warrant far more caution than historians have typically
used in approaching the information that Paulinus provides. Finally, much as we have seen in the
scholarly use of Orosius, there is marked tendency to read preconceived notions of a strict
“barbarian”/“Roman” dichotomy into the text of Paulinus. Such notions simplify the obvious
complexities of a period of civil discord and inevitably color our understanding of Paulinus’
account of historical events.
Paulinus served as comes largitionum privatarum in Attalus’ administration, a position that he
claims he received in absentia on the basis of his noble status. Unfortunately for our
understanding of Attalus’ regime, Paulinus devotes only a few, disparaging lines to his time at
the Narbonese court, depicting his office as foolish and Attalus himself as disillusioned with his
imperial prospects. 331 Such sentiments, however, may owe more to Paulinus’ overall attempt in
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later life to distance himself from his earlier affiliation with the usurper’s regime, rather than
providing an accurate depiction of his sentiments in 413/414. 332
While his account of Attalus’ administration is sparse and pointedly obscure, Paulinus
devotes many lines to his experience during the withdrawal of Athaulf’s troops from southern
Gaul following the collapse the Narbonese regime in late 414/415. Indeed, Paulinus’ scenes of
destruction and barbarian violence directly relate to the primary theme of the Eucharisticus as a
narrative account of the collective misfortunes of his life. As McLynn has aptly shown in a
recent article on the Eucharisticus, however, this theme causes Paulinus both to exaggerate as
well as occasionally repeat individual incidents of destruction for narrative effect. 333
Paulinus tells us in the Eucharisticus that he first witnessed the looting and burning of his
rural estate, followed quickly by the destruction of his native city of Bordeaux. 334 He then fled
with his family and dependents to the neighboring city of Bazas, where they soon found
themselves in the midst of a Gothic siege as well as a local uprising inside the city walls. In
vague terms, Paulinus says that a few wicked, yet freeborn young men stirred up a faction of
slaves for the purpose of killing certain members of the aristocracy. Paulinus himself was
apparently targeted before the conspiracy was finally quelled. 335 Afterwards, Paulinus ventured
out from the city and through his friendship with an unnamed king of the Alans, managed to gain
332
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their protection. In a formal negotiation with the leading citizens of Bazas, the king gave his wife
and son as hostages. The Alan forces along with their wives then surrounded the walls of the
city, prepared to drive back their former allies. The threat of conflict, however, seems to have
prevented further violence and the rest of the besieging force melted away, soon followed by the
Alan defenders themselves. 336
Scholars have traditionally allowed the episodes of destruction and violence in Paulinus’
poetic narrative to color their accounts of the withdrawal of Athaulf’s forces. The student of the
period is therefore greeted to chaotic images of barbarian forces wandering throughout the
southern Gallic provinces, sacking the cities and aristocratic estates of their former Roman
allies. 337 Some scholars depict Athaulf himself leading these actions, while others suggest that
the devastation represented a failure of Athaulf’s leadership, foreshadowing his assassination in
Barcelona in 415. 338 Such interpretations however rely on a rather casual acceptance of Paulinus’
testimony as well as traditional scholarly stereotypes of “barbarian”/“Roman” conflict. A very
different image of this period emerges if we combine a close reading of the Eucharisticus with
the known political complexities of this period. Far from the image of wandering barbarian
hordes, this reading situates Paulinus’ episodes of destruction as the work of a few factions
336
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operating without approval at the furthest geographical distance from Athaulf’s political control.
Even in these regions, however, the consequent destruction was mitigated by the presence of
other factions who remained loyal to Athaulf’s orders for a peaceful withdrawal.
Paulinus’ testimony of the devastation associated with the withdrawal of Athaulf’s forces
shares many similarities with Orosius’ account of the sack of Rome. Both narratives betray the
factional nature of the forces under the command of Athaulf and Alaric, which could result in
independent and sometimes protective action. 339 Paulinus’ account in particular suggests the
wide variety of personal experience in dealing with Athaulf’s troops. He notes that many
members of the Gallic aristocracy received protection for themselves and their estates from their
barbarian “guests”, citing his own failure to billet Athaulf’s troops as the reason for the
subsequent destruction of his property. 340 Even so, his oppressors on this occasion allowed both
him and his dependents to withdraw without injury. 341 He seems to suggest that later, during the
siege of Bazas, certain members of the attacking army wished to harm him directly, and only a
secret alliance with his friend, the unnamed Alan king, spared him from their ill intent. 342
Many scholars have suggested that Paulinus’ account of the unnamed Alan king indicates that
some political breakdown within the ranks of Athaulf’s military accompanied the failure of the
Narbonese regime. 343 Paulinus tells us that his Alan friend suggested their alliance “obviously
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knowing that the Goths again threatened me with terrible things, and desiring to free himself
from the law of these same people.” 344 After the threat to Bazas had passed, the king and his
followers departed “prepared to protect the promise of peace with the Romans, wherever fortune,
having been presented, might have born them.” 345
Scholarship has generally taken these statements to mean that this Alan king broke his
alliance with Athaulf and went on to ally with the Roman army of Constantius, receiving
settlements in Aquitania. 346 This interpretation is sometimes buttressed by the identification of
the king as Goar, a leader of the Alans who chose to ally with the Romans during the Rhine
crossing of 406 and later appears in the sources as a king of the Alans under the command of
Aёtius in the 440s. 347 There are no grounds for the identification of Paulinus’ Alan king as Goar,
however, and few modern scholars still accept this notion. 348 Nevertheless, this earlier, erroneous
identification still seems to exert an influence on interpretations of this event, specifically the
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assumption that this group of Alans broke with Athaulf’s forces and joined the Roman army of
Constantius, receiving settlements in southern Gaul as a consequence. While this hypothesis
requires a basic, and in some ways, strained reading of Paulinus’ text, it still possesses some
merit with regard to military history. The loyalty and numbers of any ancient army were
contingent on the success of their endeavors and their prospects for future gain. This was
particularly true for coalitions such as those of Alaric and Athaulf, though Roman armies could
prove no less fickle on occasion, as the recent history of usurpations had shown. 349 The failure of
the Narbonese regime and the uncertainty of the immediate future may have damaged Athaulf’s
reputation among some of his followers. Undoubtedly, the political situation seems to have led to
some breakdown of public order as well as at least the potential for large-scale desertions.
Nevertheless, this interpretation of the Alan incident at Bazas ignores both the political
complexities of 414 and also the sometimes misleading language of Paulinus’ text. In particular,
neither of Paulinus’ statements concerning the objectives of the unnamed Alan king serves as an
indication of political action. Paulinus exhibits a literary feature common to many fifth-century
writers in repeatedly referring to all of the followers of Athaulf as “Goths”. This collective term,
however, presents the illusion of a political and military monolith, thereby obscuring the evident
presence of factions among Athaulf’s followers and their widely divergent actions in dealing
with former allies in the Roman aristocracy. 350 As previously discussed, factions among these
“Goths” variously protected the estates of their Roman hosts; sacked Paulinus’ own estate, but
allowed him to leave with his life; and then threatened his life at Bazas. The soldiers who protect
349
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the city of Bazas only become “Alans” in Paulinus’ text when they remove themselves from the
general horde of “Goths” and ally themselves with the author and the city of Bazas. This fact
indicates that we cannot take his use of the generic word “Goths” as precise or technical term at
all.
In fact, Paulinus’ literary trope of the “Gothic” monolith, which acts in contradiction to his
narrative of independent action among these “Gothic” factions, suggests a more specific reading
of his statement regarding the Alan king’s desire to break with the Goths. The Latin reads gnarus
quippe Gothos rursus mihi dira minari / seque ab ipsorum cupiens absolvere iure. (The Alan
king, “obviously knowing that the Goths again threatened me with terrible things, and wishing to
free himself from the law of these same people.”). 351 Thus far in his narrative, Paulinus has
described two other groups of “Goths”, some that had protected their Roman hosts, and others
that had guaranteed his safe passage. The “Goths” in this line must refer to a different group,
specifically to the faction besieging Bazas, who (unlike the previously mentioned groups) wished
him personal harm. The use of ipsorum in the following line links the Alan king’s desire for
independence from the “Goths” to this same faction operating at Bazas, rather than to the
collective military following of Athaulf. In this more nuanced reading, the actions of the Alan
king would differ from Paulinus’ other examples of independent, protective action only in scale,
not in type. The Alan king and his following protected Bazas until they were sure that the
besiegers had departed. Then, they themselves withdrew to rejoin the rest of Athaulf’s forces.
The traditional interpretation of the Alan king’s desire for peace with the Romans, still
unconsciously colored by the old and false identification of him with Goar, suggests that he
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wanted to join the ranks of Constantius’ army. That interpretation, however, requires a far more
strained reading of Paulinus’ text than the one presented here. Paulinus’ actions at Bazas served
as a crowning achievement of his political life as an influential Roman aristocrat. 352 If he could
claim that he not only negotiated the deliverance of Bazas, but also influenced a significant body
of troops to transfer their allegiance to the legitimate regime of Ravenna, he surely would have
made this clear. Paulinus composed his text decades after the events of 414, yet he gives us
absolutely no indication of the fate of his barbarian partners in this most famous of his political
enterprises. The final words that he provides on “our auxiliaries” (nostri … auxiliaries) are that
they wandered off “…wherever fortune, having been presented, might have borne them”
(…quoquo ipsos sors oblate tulisset…). 353 These words suggest that he did not know what had
become of his Alan defenders at Bazas or that the details of their fate were irrelevant to the
narrative he was constructing. Although it is an argument from silence, the silence here is
noteworthy, and it should give us pause before we assume any dramatic change in the unnamed
Alan king’s political affiliation.
Scholarship has also made the same assumptions of a monolithic entity behind Paulinus’ term
“Romans”, as they have with his use of the term “Goth”. With the end of the Attalus’ Narbonese
regime, narratives of this period typically devolve into the standard “Romans” versus
“barbarians” trope. 354 Paulinus’ use of the term “Romans” in this case is almost universally read
to mean not simply Roman citizens, but specifically the Honorian regime as led by
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Constantius. 355 This interpretation, however, in no way reflects the realities of 414 or the usage
of the term “Roman” in Paulinus’ text. As we have seen, Athaulf, Placidia, and southern Gallic
aristocrats, including Paulinus, raised an alternate regime in 414 directly opposed to the
Honorian administration at Ravenna. Even after the collapse of this Narbonese regime, there is
no reason to assume an immediate return of southern Gallic support to the Honorius. In fact, the
purges following the collapse of the regimes of Constantine III, Jovinus, and Heraclian would
undoubtedly have caused some hesitation on the part of these aristocrats. The use of the term
“Roman” in Paulinus’ account is therefore better understood as a general indication of ethnic
identity in this context, as opposed to any political allegiance.
Paulinus’ statement that the Alan king was “prepared to protect the promise of peace with the
Romans” (…fidem pacis servare parati / Romanis…) seems simply to confirm the Alan king’s
commitment to avoiding violence with Roman citizens. In the context of the year 414, we should
note that Athaulf himself had been promoting the same public policy since 413, and there is little
reason to suggest that this policy had changed after the fall of the Narbonese regime at the end of
the following year. 356 As we have seen, though Paulinus’ account does supply evidence of
violence associated with the withdrawal of Athaulf’s army, such violence was apparently the
haphazard work of individual factions, as opposed to the coordinated action of troops following
Athaulf’s orders. For this reason, it is significant to note that both Bordeaux and Bazas were
situated at the opposite end of the Via Aquitania from Narbonne, the center of Attalus’
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regime. 357 The safety of distance probably allowed the troops stationed in these areas to indulge
in unsanctioned looting before joining up with the main body of Athaulf’s forces outside
Narbonne and departing for Spain. Conversely, we have no evidence of Narbonne or its environs
suffering any depredations in this period. 358 This evidence would suggest that Athaulf attempted
to maintain peace with his former allies among the southern Gallic aristocracy even after the
collapse of Attalus’ second regime and the forced relocation of his troops beyond the Pyrenees.
A close reading of Paulinus’ text therefore results in a narrative far more in keeping with the
political realities of late 414. After the collapse of Attalus’ regime, Athaulf ordered the troops
billeted on various towns and aristocratic estates along the Via Aquitania to assemble near
Narbonne, without doing harm to the persons or lands of their former allies. All armies of the
period, however, Roman or barbarian, were predatory on civilian populations. 359 These “natural”
depredations probably varied in proportion to the distance from the center of command at
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Narbonne, with the worst enacted at the opposite end of the Via Aquitania around Bordeaux and
Bazas. Nevertheless, Paulinus tells us that even in Bordeaux, some troops protected their hosts
from the ravages of these unsanctioned attacks. Later in the poem, he also describes the fate of
his sons who sought to reclaim some of his property in the city. 360 Both of these points suggest
that we should see some exaggeration in his claim of the destruction of Bordeaux, though the
event itself was no doubt terrifying to the poet and his dependents.
After fleeing to Bazas, Paulinus soon found himself in the midst of a siege at the hands of
some of these rebellious factions. He was able to find a way out of this predicament, however,
through his friendship with one of the subordinate leaders of these troops. This unnamed Alan
king, like the aforementioned “Gothic” guests who protected their hosts, had no desire to assault
his former political allies among the Romans. He therefore worked with Paulinus to separate
from the troops besieging the city. Paulinus specifically states that these Alan troops were not
allowed inside the walls of Bazas. Nevertheless, the threat of conflict was enough to break the
siege and force the besiegers to disperse.
Paulinus tells us that the Alans themselves then departed a short time later “prepared to
protect the promise of peace with the Romans, wherever fortune, having been presented, might
have borne them.” The former phrase (…fidem pacis servare parati / Romanis…) fits well with
Athaulf’s political rhetoric, while the latter (…quoque ipsos sors oblata tulisset…) clearly
suggests that the Alans were about to embark on a journey to an uncertain destination. As such, it
is far better to see Paulinus’ statement as an apt description of the dismal prospects that lay
before all of Athaulf’s followers in late 414, rather than some poetic reference to the uncertainty
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of life in the Roman army. For this reason, the best reading of Paulinus’ text suggests that this
Alan king departed Bazas to rejoin the followers of Athaulf at Narbonne.
Paulinus’ narrative of the Alan king at Bazas is therefore a large-scale example of the
independent, protective actions of Athaulf’s troops in a time of crisis. If we assume, as seems
probable, that Athaulf’s orders for the reconstitution of his forces were in keeping with his
previous policy of peace with the Romans, then the Alan king would scarcely need to worry
about reprisals from Athaulf. The fact that the forces under his command were sizable enough to
ward off a besieging army also suggests that he had little to fear from his previous commanders
at Bazas, now engaged in looting. There is therefore no reason to think that the Alan king would
have faced direct reprisals once he had rejoined Athaulf’s forces at Narbonne.
We have no information on the final days of the Attalus’ Narbonese court. While some
officials, such as Paulinus, seem to have broken their ties to the regime, it is probable that others
accompanied Athaulf’s troops upon their departure from the region in late 414 or early 415.
Though the evidence is lacking, the only alternative for these Gallic aristocrats was to remain in
the region and face the potentially devastating reprisals of the Honorian regime, which were now
all too familiar to the aristocracy of Gaul. 361
Furthermore, there is no reason to suspect that the imperial aspirations of Athaulf and Placidia
ceased with the transfer of their residence further south to Barcelona. Constantius had managed
to successfully manipulate the problem of supply among Athaulf’s army and their southern
Gallic allies. The true strength of Athaulf and Placidia’s alternative imperial regime, and thus the
threat to Ravenna, was nevertheless growing quickly despite the move to Spain. Placidia had
361
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conceived a child sometime during their residence in Narbonne. 362 Now with a pregnant Roman
princess in southern Gaul and a childless emperor on the throne in Ravenna, the couple and their
supporters could seriously envision the culmination of their plans for eventually assuming
control over the Western Roman Empire. We should therefore see the move south of the
Pyrenees as a strategic retreat, rather than an end to Athaulf and Placidia’s alternative imperial
regime.
A clear understanding of the experience of Attalus in late 414 has the potential to shed further
light on the immediate plans of the roaming court. Unfortunately, no fewer than three roughly
contemporary sources offer accounts in complete contradiction of one another. Prosper, who
composed the first edition of his chronicle in 433, claims that the “Goths” abandoned Attalus
when they crossed into Spain. Without their protection, he was captured and delivered to
Constantius. 363 The Spaniard Orosius, however, who finished his providential history in 418 and
was therefore writing closer to the events, claims that the “Goths” carried Attalus into Spain,
from whence he boarded an untrustworthy ship and was captured at sea. 364
Philostorgius, whose Ecclesiastical History only survives in Photius’ ninth-century epitome,
offers a third possibility. He claims that after the murder of Athaulf, the Gothic king’s followers
handed over both Placidia and Attalus to Honorius as part of their peace agreement with
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Ravenna in late 415/416. 365 While Philostorgius published his history shortly after 425, scholars
typically disregard the account due to both the eastern origin of the source and the fragmentary
state of its transmission. It is worth noting, however, that Philostorgius was probably using the
work of Olympiodorus. 366 His testimony is therefore worth considering, even if the geographical
proximity of Orosius and Prosper necessarily give them pride of place on this topic.
Nevertheless, each of the contradictory accounts offers a plausible scenario for the capture of
Attalus. In considering Prosper’s testimony, we should note that Attalus’ capacity for
independent policy had previously caused problems in 409, leading Alaric to finally strip him of
his imperial regalia. 367 A similar sequence of events could have occurred in 414 leading to
conflicts with Athaulf, especially after the pregnancy of Placidia rendered Attalus’ imperial
standing superfluous to the regime. Furthermore, this would explain the fact that the mint at
Barcelona, where Athaulf and his followers settled in the following year, produced no new coins
in Attalus’ name. 368
While there is no clear reason to deny the validity of Prosper’s account, the closer temporal
and geographical proximity of Orosius to the events, as well as the specificity of his details
regarding the capture of Attalus, may collectively suggest a better claim to represent actual
events. As “compromise” solutions to this conundrum, we might suggest two scenarios. In the
first, Athaulf abandoned Attalus as Prosper suggests. In an attempt to flee Constantius’ troops,
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the usurper took to the sea where he was captured by one of Constantius’ patrol ships. This
possibility finds favor in some scholarly narratives of this period. 369
A second scenario incorporates more of Orosius’ account. While Athaulf and the main body
of his troops set out along the Via Domitia to cross the Pyrenees, a second, smaller group which
included Attalus, attempted to take the easier water route. We have no idea of Attalus’ age at this
time. The fact that he seems to have already possessed a distinguished career in the early 390’s,
however, suggests that he may have been of advanced age. 370 Even regardless of age, however,
the wanderings of the past years must have taken their toll on all of Athaulf’s followers and
crossing a mountain range in mid- to late winter with few supplies was no easy prospect. As
such, Attalus along with some of other followers of Athaulf might have preferred to risk the
water route rather than embark on the difficult trek which lay before the bulk of the army. Since
Constantius’ ships enforced a strong blockade on Narbonne, this smaller group would have
claimed whatever vessel they could procure from one of the smaller ports between Narbonne and
the foothills of the mountains, with the intention of rejoining the main body of troops on the
other side of the Pyrenees. The vessel they obtained, however, proved unreliable and they were
easily overtaken by one of Constantius’ patrol ships. Prosper’s assertion that the “Goths” had
abandoned Attalus might therefore simply result from a misinterpretation of the events of late
414/415. 371
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Finally, we might completely accept Orosius’ account. In this interpretation, Attalus entered
Spain with Athaulf and settled with the rest of his followers in Barcelona. The assassination of
Athaulf in 415, however, resulted in swift and harsh reprisals against his family and dependants,
including Galla Placidia. 372 In this hostile climate, Attalus lost his primary protector and any
hope of support. He therefore attempted to flee his former allies by sea, only to fall into the
hands of Constantius. 373 While generally following Orosius’ testimony, this final scenario may
receive some support from both Prosper and Philostorgius. Both of the latter authors suggest that
Athaulf’s followers rejected Attalus. Philostorgius further correlates Ravenna’s acquisition of
Placidia and Attalus to the period after the death of Athaulf. 374
What is certain is that with or without Attalus in tow, Athaulf led his followers along the Via
Domitia, crossing the Pyrenees and arriving in Spain sometime in early 415. From here, they
seem to have followed the Via Augusta along the coast until they reached Barcelona (Barcino).
The inhabitants of Barcelona seem to have accepted them peacefully, in much the same way as
had the cities of southern Gaul, and perhaps for many of the same reasons, including fear – not of
Athaulf, but of the government in Ravenna. 375 As late as 411, the city had served as the mint for
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the usurper Maximus. 376 While soldiers apparently operating in the name of Honorius had
deposed Maximus in 412, the extent of Ravenna’s actual control over the Spanish provinces at
this time is uncertain. 377 It is therefore possible that the citizens of Barcelona were still in quasirevolt from the Honorian regime and welcomed Athaulf’s protection against potential imperial
reprisals. This reaction of citizens of Barcelona also speaks against the common scholarly
interpretations of widespread violence in the southern Gallic cities following the end of the
Narbonese regime. 378 If all of these cities had suffered the alleged fate of Bordeaux and Bazas,
the inhabitants of Barcelona would have had little reason to trust the intentions of their new
“guests”. As the sources stand, however, there is no evidence of resistance or destruction at
Barcelona and Athaulf seems to have maintained peaceful relations between his followers and
the city’s inhabitants. As in southern Gaul, the main body of Athaulf’s troops was probably
billeted on towns and aristocratic estates in the surrounding province of Tarraconensis.
As at Narbonne, the marriage of Athaulf and Galla Placidia formed the foundation of their
claims to imperium. Either before their departure to Barcelona or during their residency, the
potential of this union came to fruition in the birth of a son, whom Athaulf named Theodosius
after Placidia’s father. 379 Some discussion of the name’s significance is commonplace in
scholarship, though given the circumstances of 414/415, one can hardly imagine the couple
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choosing something else. 380 The name served as perfect propaganda for Placidia’s legitimacy as
a member of the Theodosian house and as an articulation of the regime’s political aspirations as
better heirs to the Theodosian regime than was Honorius. 381
Olympiodorus cryptically suggests that Athaulf and Placidia began to act on these aspirations
soon after the birth of their child. He claims that after Theodosius was born, Athaulf became
even more amicable towards the Romans. The couple’s attempt met failure, however, “due to
Constantius and those around Constantius acting in opposition…” 382 The author provides no
indication of what this “effort” or “attempt” (ἡ…ὁρμή) constituted, though the mention of
Constantius’ faction suggests that this was some type of negotiation with the court at Ravenna.
Athaulf and Placidia were probably attempting to use the birth of Theodosius to reach an
independent agreement with Honorius. 383 As previously discussed, such an agreement had the
potential to directly threaten Constantius’ position as the main power behind Honorius’ throne.
Even if Athaulf did not immediately assume this role, the growing influence he would have
assumed as the father of his son, Theodosius, who would probably be Honorius’ successor,
clearly meant that the general’s prospects were dismal. It is therefore little wonder that
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Constantius’ faction at Ravenna moved to block any possibility of peace between the two
imperial regimes.
Fate, it seems, was also on Constantius’ side. Theodosius, the child of Athaulf and Placidia,
and potential heir to the western empire, died at Barcelona sometime during 415. Infant mortality
rates were very high in the pre-modern era, even for those at the highest ranks of society, and no
source provides us with details concerning the cause of his death. 384 The death of Theodosius
was a devastating blow to Athaulf and Placidia. Olympiodorus provides some details regarding
the funeral. The grieving couple placed their son in a silver coffin and buried him at a small
chapel outside Barcelona. 385
As political leaders, the death of Theodosius meant that Athaulf and Placidia now possessed
neither grounds for reconciliation with Ravenna nor anywhere near as solid a foundation for their
own imperial regime. Nevertheless, this need not have signaled the end of Athaulf and Placidia’s
efforts toward imperium. Optimistically, Placidia’s pregnancy and successful childbirth had
shown that their aspirations were quite plausible. Placidia was fertile and the couple could easily
expect more children in the future. Their endeavor simply required time and patience.
In the summer of 415, however, Athaulf was murdered by one of his dependants, a man
named Dubius, during a customary inspection of his horses in the stables. According to
Olympiodorus, Dubius acted to avenge Athaulf’s killing of his former master, an unnamed “king
of part of the Goths” (μοίρας Γοτθικῆς ῥήξ). Though accepted into Athaulf’s service, Dubius
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nevertheless held a secret grudge and waited for the right time to carry out this blood
vengeance. 386
Scholars often assert, or at least suggest, that the unnamed Gothic king of the passage is
Sarus, one of the key players in the events of 406-412, who met his end in Gaul at Athaulf’s
hands. This identification receives some support from the fact that Olympiodorus goes on to
relate that Singeric, the brother of Sarus, both succeeded to Athaulf’s position as leader and
carried out his own blood feud against the latter’s family upon his accession. 387 The image that
emerges is therefore of a larger conspiracy to remove Athaulf from power and claim leadership
over his followers. 388
The identification of the unnamed Gothic king as Sarus, however, is problematic. First,
though Sarus appears relatively frequently in the fragments of Olympiodorus, the author never
refers to him as a “king” (ῥήξ), nor does any other fifth-century source. 389 Sarus only becomes a
“king” in sources from the sixth century, specifically Marcellinus Comes and Jordanes. 390 In the
fragments of Olympiodorus he appears either in the employ of the empire or, at best, leading a
386
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small, independent group of followers. 391 Furthermore, Olympiodorus clearly separates the
murder of Athaulf from the rise of Singeric in his account. The murder of Athaulf is treated as an
isolated incident, the work of a single individual with both independent agency and motive.
While Olympiodorus openly credits the accession of Singeric to a conspiracy that overturns the
proper order of Gothic succession, he in no way connects this conspiracy to back to Athaulf’s
murder. 392
Olympiodorus’ account of the murder of Athaulf finds some confirmation in the roughly
contemporary, though admittedly brief, testimonies of Prosper and Hydatius. Both chroniclers
attribute the murder to a single individual among Athaulf’s men. 393 Only Orosius seems to
suggest a wider conspiracy, claiming that Athaulf was killed “by the treachery of his own
people” (dolo suorum). 394 Orosius makes no attempt to tie the assassination to Singeric or his
faction, however, instead suggesting that Athaulf’s successor obtained the kingship through
popular support. 395
For these reasons, while a larger conspiracy is possible, it seems best to interpret the death of
Athaulf as the result of a private feud. Athaulf killed Dubius’ former master, an unknown Gothic
king, at some shadowy point in the past. 396 Like the origins of the attested feud between Athaulf
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and Sarus, the incident with Dubius’ master probably predates Athaulf’s own appearance on the
historical stage in 408. 397 Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that this unnamed king
was Sarus, and little reason to see Dubius as in some way connected to Singeric’s faction among
the followers of Athaulf. Rather, the evidence suggests that Dubius acted on his own
motivations. Perhaps the recent downturn in Athaulf’s political fortunes, particularly the death of
his son, Theodosius, had created an environment in which Dubius finally believed that he had a
chance to act. While some encouragement from the faction of Singeric is a valid possibility,
there is nothing in Olympiodorus’ text to support the assumption that Singeric was anything
other than the lucky beneficiary of Dubius’ act.
Regardless, the murder of Athaulf left a leadership vacuum at the head of his massive,
multiethnic coalition which resulted in political chaos, as various factions seem to have
competed to assume command. This resultant chaos is perhaps the best evidence that we should
doubt any scholarly narrative that presents Athaulf’s death as somehow inevitable, the result of
his followers’ common discontent with his leadership. 398 Though his political plans had recently
taken a turn for the worse, Athaulf’s previous actions had successfully transformed him from a
mere barbarian leader of group of malcontents into a true late antique statesman, capable of
successfully negotiating on behalf of his people with both Roman aristocrats and the imperial
government. His marriage to Galla Placidia had launched him to the heights of imperial politics,
making him a viable alternative for many Romans to the heavy-handed and often incompetent
rule of Ravenna. While some discontent with his rule may have existed between and among the
397
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various factions under his control, the chaos that followed his death shows that there was simply
no other obvious candidate with both the status and credentials to fill his role. In life, Athaulf had
almost succeeded in meeting the needs of his people by establishing an alternative imperial
regime; with his death, Athaulf’s followers became exactly what their enemies wished them to
be: simply another group of barbarian outsiders infesting the imperial state. Athaulf’s death was
therefore probably seen as a tragedy among his followers, rather than a welcome change of
leadership. No other leader could expect the same level of acceptance on the imperial stage.
Olympiodorus’ account suggests that Athaulf was fully aware of this situation on his
deathbed. The author tells us that Athaulf, in his last moments, instructed his brother to return
Galla Placidia and seek peace with the Romans. Such instructions represent the dying wishes of a
statesman more concerned with the safety and security of his people than the personal desires of
his immediate family. There is little reason to think that Placidia herself would have welcomed
such a course of action. As previously discussed, Placidia faced dismal prospects should she
return to Ravenna. After the events of the past two years, she could expect the scorn of the
imperial court and the possibility of a traitor’s death. Even if she could convince Honorius and
his advisors that she had not been a willing participant in the designs of Athaulf, the best she
could hope for was monastic seclusion, safely imprisoned and forgotten in the walls of a
religious establishment or the women’s quarters of the imperial palace, which as her eastern
cousins could attest, amounted to much the same thing. Nevertheless, such a sacrifice was
required if Athaulf had any hope of his people negotiating the political terrain after his death.
The experiment with an alternative and rival imperial court was officially over. In Athaulf’s
view, his followers’ only option now was to acclimatize themselves to the servitude of Ravenna.
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His own imminent death and the return of Placidia would at least offer some chance of good
terms.
It is also possible that Athaulf had some inkling of the political chaos that would emerge after
his death and sought to protect Placidia. 399 This notion, however, is far less likely as Athaulf
seems to have intended his brother to succeed him as “king” of his wandering forces.
Olympiodorus’ account suggests that the rise of Singeric and his faction came as a result of coup
and conspiracy, subverting the Gothic line of succession. 400 While we may doubt the notion that
any “hard” line of succession existed for a kingship so recently established, Athaulf does appear
to have intended for his rule to remain within his family. 401 The coup of Singeric therefore
probably came as a surprise to everyone in the days following Athaulf’s death.
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We know little of Singeric’s reign except that it was short and extremely bloody. His first
move upon claiming Athaulf’s position was to murder his predecessor’s family. Olympiodorus
tells us that he killed Athaulf’s children by his first wife, going so far as to tear them from the
arms of Bishop Sigesarus who had sought to protect them. He also forced Galla Placidia, along
with other political prisoners, to march twelve miles before him outside Barcelona, a mode of
triumph for Singeric and an act of humiliation for the Roman princess and Athaulf’s
supporters. 402 Athaulf’s brother and chosen successor was probably also killed in Singeric’s
initial purge, as we hear nothing more of him in the primary sources. If as Orosius suggests,
Attalus journeyed to Spain with Athaulf’s followers, his attempt at flight and eventual capture
probably also belong to this period. 403
While Singeric’s immediate purge of Athaulf’s family, and presumably of his most ardent
supporters, is sometimes linked to the death of Sarus, it is better seen as a practical though
ruthless action against a popular regime. Some scholars have assumed that Singeric formed part
of the small group that Sarus led to join Jovinus in 412. After Athaulf killed their leader, this
hypothesis suggests, he took some of Sarus’ followers into his own group. 404 Such a hypothesis,
however, relies closely on the identification of Dubius’ former master as Sarus, an unproven
proposition as we have seen. In fact, no evidence suggests that Athaulf spared any of Sarus’
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followers on this occasion. 405 The small group of eighteen to twenty men that left imperial
service to follow Sarus into exile, and then proceeded to fight a suicidal battle at his side against
Athaulf’s multitude, could only have represented his most loyal retainers. Athaulf could never
have trusted such men or believed that they would one day serve him as loyally. This is
especially true of Singeric, Sarus’ own brother. The only logical conclusion is that Singeric was
already among Athaulf’s followers before the death of Sarus in 412. While his actions clearly
suggest that he had no love for Athaulf, they therefore probably represent a calculated plan to
seize the initiative and eradicate his formidable competition among Athaulf’s family, particularly
Athaulf’s brother, rather than a desire to obtain vengeance for Sarus. We may also interpret
Singeric’s actions as a public display of his political agenda, one which would differ visibly from
Athaulf’s.
Orosius alone provides any indication of the politics behind the succession crisis of 415.
Unfortunately, his account of these events is typically both simplified and strained to
accommodate his thesis of imperial unity under Christian auspices. He reduces the political
complexity of this period to the question of whether or not Athaulf’s followers should make
peace with the Romans. In ignoring both the circumstances and the internal politics at play in
this crisis, his narrative presents a skewed perspective, while often maintaining relevant details.
For his desire to reach an agreement with Ravenna, Singeric receives a far more favorable
treatment in Orosius’ text than he does in Olympiodorus. 406 Orosius makes no mention of the
coup that brought Singeric to power, the bloody purge of Athaulf’s family, or the humiliation of
Galla Placidia. Nevertheless, while Orosius whitewashes Singeric’s rise and abuse of power,
405
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there is little reason to doubt Orosius’ claim that he desired peace with the Romans. In fact, all of
these actions support Orosius’ assertion.
As we have seen, the regime of Athaulf and Placidia had remained a thorn in the side of
Ravenna for the previous two years. Regardless of the couple’s attempt at peaceful negotiations
after the birth of their son, their union represented a real threat to Honorius’ control over the
western empire. The Chronicon Paschale informs us that, for this reason, when the news of
Athaulf’s death reached Constantinople on September 24, 415, it was celebrated with both
chariot races and an imperial procession. 407 Singeric’s actions in wiping out Athaulf’s family
served both to ruthlessly secure his throne, as well as to effectively advertise his plan to make
peace with Ravenna. In the same way, his humiliation of Placidia served to demonstrate his
political platform, signifying a complete break from the agenda formerly promoted under
Athaulf. 408
Contrary to Orosius’ account, however, there is no reason to attribute Singeric’s assassination
to his pro-Ravenna sentiments. His actions upon taking power provide sufficient explanation for
his fall. Olympiodorus tells us that Singeric ruled for a mere seven days, a testament to the
obvious unpopularity of his regime and the collective outrage caused by his political purges. Nor
do we need to accept Orosius’ simplified explanation for the rise of Wallia, as a king “having
been elected to [royal power] by the Goths to break the peace.” 409 Wallia’s initial desire to avoid
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peace with Ravenna is better understood as at least partially the rejection of a political course
that Singeric had sullied with his harsh actions.
We know little about Wallia or the circumstances that brought him to heights of power.
Prosper claims that he conducted a purge of his rivals upon his succession. This is probable,
though as Prosper fails to mention the brief reign of Singeric, the statement may also result from
a confusion of the two. 410 Nevertheless, it is difficult to see Wallia as anything other than a
former supporter of Athaulf and Placidia’s regime, chosen to right the wrongs of a political coup.
Placidia, who had fallen into disgrace under Singeric’s rule, seems to have returned to a position
of respect under Wallia. Orosius tells us that the new king treated Placidia “honorably and
decently” while she remained in his care. 411 Narratives of this period typically continue to treat
Placidia as a captured princess. 412 As the widow of Athaulf, however, and the foundation for the
legitimacy of their failed imperial regime, Placidia had been transformed from a captive to an
active and respected regent in recent years. 413 We therefore must see her as a locus of power in
Wallia’s regime, as much a queen as a Roman princess, and fully capable of garnering her own
support among her deceased husband’s followers.
Wallia’s concern for his former queen may also have informed his initial decision to avoid
peace with Ravenna. Placidia’s return would have to have formed the base term to any
agreement with Honorius’ forces. As we have seen, however, Placidia probably had no desire to
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return to Ravenna, even after the humiliation she was forced to endure under Singeric. From her
perspective in 415, she could probably expect to enjoy greater safety, and vastly more freedom,
among Athaulf’s former supporters than she would as a prisoner in her brother’s court.
Wallia therefore initially sought alternatives to negotiations with Ravenna. Orosius suggests
that he may have briefly toyed with the idea of transporting his people by sea, possibly to Africa.
His reflections on the failed crossing of a different Gothic army in the previous year, however,
caused him to abandon the notion. 414 Wallia and followers therefore remained firmly entrenched
in the province of Tarraconensis. 415
In the meantime, Wallia’s followers continued to suffer from the supply problems that had
plagued them since 412. Even divided across the province, the land simply could not support
such a large host. Constantius may also have moved his Narbonese blockade south to Barcelona,
further aggravating the potential for famine among the wandering host. 416 Olympiodorus offers
an anecdote that probably belongs to this period. He claims that Vandal profiteers exploited the
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hunger of the Goths, selling them grain at the exorbitant rate of one solidus per scoop (trulla).
This arrangement led to the Vandals’ derisive name for the Goths as Trulli. 417
Whatever concern Wallia may have had for Placidia, the needs of his people ultimately forced
him to shed his initial hesitation and re-enter negotiations with the imperial court. Perhaps
Placidia had also come to realize the hopelessness and dire consequences of continued resistance
to Ravenna and agreed to the inevitable result. In any case, Olympiodorus tells us that
negotiations were conducted through an agens in rebus named Euplutius. In exchange for six
hundred modii of grain, Wallia returned Placidia to her brother’s control. 418 In addition, Wallia
offered hostages of the highest rank and agreed to campaign against the other barbarians of Spain
under the imperial aegis. 419
This act began a new phase in the hitherto tumultuous relationship between Ravenna and the
followers of Athaulf and Alaric. The return of Placidia meant that Ravenna once again had
control over the destiny of the western branch of the Theodosian dynasty. Wallia’s concession of
this significant advantage served to both simplify and solidify the relationship between his
followers and the imperial seat. For the immediate future, Wallia’s followers possessed had no
viable course of action other than service to the dictates of Ravenna. As such, they embarked on
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the reconquest of the Spanish provinces as an imperial army. As previously suggested,
Constantius may have already planned to use Athaulf’s army for this purpose in 412. Wallia’s
campaigns, which would require most of the next two years, therefore signified the long-awaited,
final phase of the reestablishment of Ravenna’s authority over the western empire.

160

Chapter 5: Reconquest of Spain to Visigothic Settlement

Following the peace established in 415/416 and the surrender of Galla Placidia to Ravenna,
Wallia’s followers became a Roman army operating under the aegis of Ravenna. Constantius
tasked his new auxiliaries with re-establishment of Honorian authority over the provinces of the
Spanish diocese. For the next two years, Wallia’s forces campaigned tirelessly against the Siling
Vandals of Baetica and the Alans of Lusitania. With these administratively important provinces
returned to Roman control in 418/419, Constantius then recalled Wallia and his forces from
Spain and established them in the Gallic province of Aquitania Secunda. In doing so, Honorius’
general inadvertently planted the seeds of what would eventually become a powerful political
actor in the later fifth century, the Visigothic kingdom of Aquitaine. In the political crises of the
subsequent decades, the Visigothic court at Toulouse would form a viable locus of regional
power for Gallic aristocrats, shifting focus away from the imperial seat at Ravenna.
This chapter examines the historical events and scholarly debates that surround the integration
of Wallia’s followers into the political fabric of the Honorian regime. First, this chapter
constructs a narrative of Wallia’s Spanish campaigns on the basis of the Chronicon of Hydatius
and the Historiae of Orosius. In keeping with the arguments of some scholars, it sees these
campaigns as not launched against the Spanish barbarians per se, but as an attempt to restore a
functioning Roman administration in the diocese. 420 This view directly affects our interpretation
of the seemingly abrupt recall of Wallia’s forces in 418, leaving the Vandals and Suebi in control
of the province of Gallaecia. While maintaining the idea that this province was unnecessary to
Constantius’ goals in 418, this chapter nevertheless argues that some sort of Roman treaty with
420
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the barbarians of this province is plausible, even if not directly attested in the evidence. The
chapter then turns to a discussion of the various theories surrounding the Roman political
motivations for the Aquitanian settlement. After examining the main scholarly arguments, this
chapter argues that the settlement was a response to immediate needs of restoring Honorian
political authority to the Gallic landscape. It also argues that Galla Placidia’s familial ties to the
royal family of Theodoric, as well as her marriage to Constantius in 417, played a major role in
bringing Theodoric’s forces into political union with the Honorian regime. This new political
alignment therefore justified Constantius’ decision to settle Theodoric’s forces in a formerly
rebellious province. Finally, after a brief discussion of the prominent theories of barbarian
settlement in the fifth century, this chapter argues that the nascent Aquitanian settlement was
managed both with the usual billeting of troops on civilians, like any other late Roman army, but
that it also included some instances of landed settlement. Ultimately, the settlement was an ad
hoc affair, relying on the previous pattern of troop distribution established by Athaulf in 413/414.

As discussed in Chapter 2, in the spring or summer of 409, Constantine III’s general
Gerontius rebelled against him. In an effort to weaken his former master’s regime, he stirred up
the barbarians who had crossed the Rhine in 406 and had hitherto been confined to the northern
Gallic provinces into open revolt once more. 421 Over the next few months, these groups of Alans,
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Vandals, and Suebi spread terror and destruction into the provinces of southern Gaul, before
crossing the Pyrenees into Spain in the autumn of 409. 422
The chronicler Hydatius describes in horrific detail both the devastation that these barbarian
groups inflicted on the Spanish provinces and also the resulting famine and plague. 423 Such a
state of affairs lasted just over a year before giving way to peace in 411. In this year, the groups
of barbarians divided the Spanish provinces amongst themselves for settlement. The Vandals and
the Suebi received the northwestern province of Gallaecia. The Siling Vandals took the southern
province of Baetica. Finally, the largest group, the Alans, received the middle provinces of
Lusitania and Carthaginiensis. Hydatius also tells us that after the division, “The Spaniards
remaining from these misfortunes in the cities and forts make themselves subject to the servitude
of the barbarians ruling in the provinces.” 424 While the machinery of the imperial government
continued to function during the pillaging of the previous year, probably under the auspices of
the usurper Maximus, local authority seems to have passed into the hands of the barbarian
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leaders after 411. 425 The reestablishment of the imperial authority of Honorius was contingent on
his government’s breaking the hold of barbarian groups operating in Spain. 426
As with the events of the first half of the decade, Hydatius alone provides any real details on
Wallia’s Spanish campaigns from 416-418. Unfortunately, his statements are few and brief, in
keeping with the strictures of the chronicle genre. Hydatius’ narrative suggests that Wallia’s
campaigns focused on the largest, or perhaps merely the most powerful, of the four barbarian
groups in Spain, the Siling Vandals and the Alans. If the order of Hydatius’ entries is any
indication, Wallia first seems to have marched against the Vandals of Baetica, either passing
through or sailing around the province of Carthaginiensis. Wallia’s forces were completely
successful in this endeavor, virtually exterminating the Siling branch of the Vandals. 427
Wallia next moved north and west into the province of Lusitania to take on the Alans. Earlier
in his chronicle, Hydatius implies that the Alans comprised the largest contingent of Spanish
barbarians. He lists the Alans first in his enumerations of the barbarian peoples who entered
Spain in 409 and he tells us that they received the lion’s share, the provinces of Lusitania and
Carthaginiensis, in the barbarian division of Spain in 411. 428 Nevertheless, Wallia’s campaign
425
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against the Alans was as successful as his previous engagement with the Siling Vandals had
been. The Alan king Addax was killed in the fighting. Those few Alan soldiers who survived
abandoned their own claims to rule and placed themselves under the protection of Gunderic, the
king of the Vandals of Gallaecia. 429 This action may have been responsible for the later
designation of Vandal kings as rex Vandalorum et Alanorum, although the title, first attested in
484, probably owes more to the later political exigencies of the Vandal kingdom in Africa rather
than the circumstances of 416-418. 430
While providing some details for Wallia’s campaigns in the Iberian Peninsula, Hydatius’
chronicle nevertheless raises as many questions as it answers. First, though he clearly states that
the Alans received both Lusitania and Carthaginiensis in the original barbarian division of Spain,
he never mentions fighting in the latter province. Hydatius specifically claims that Wallia’s
campaigns took place in Lusitania and Baetica alone. 431 The omission of Carthageniniensis is
and Suebi into Spain; 52 [60] Hydatius tells us that Wallia, upon making peace with Constantius, moves against the
Alans and Siling Vandals. In his later, more detailed account, however, he reverses this order probably to reflect the
actual course of the campaign, specifying that Wallia attacked the Siling Vandals first. Finally, in his narrative of the
division of Spain (41 [49]), Hydatius changes this order once more, first listing the Vandals and Suebi of Gallaecia,
before again maintaining the regular order of Alans and then Siling Vandals. The fact that Gallaecia was his native
province, however, probably explains this irregularity.
429
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striking if we consider that an overland crossing of Wallia’s forces en route to Baetica would
have carried them through that supposedly Alan territory, and would have been likely to result in
violence. This fact may therefore indicate that Constantius used Roman ships to ferry Wallia’s
forces south for seaborne invasion of Baetica. If, as Matthews and Halsall suggest, Constantius
had already moved his fleet south from Narbonne to impose another blockade on Barcelona, then
he would certainly have had the ready means for such an operation. 432 Furthermore, the faster
sea route would have given Wallia’s forces the element of surprise, providing some additional
reason for the outstanding success that Wallia enjoyed when facing entrenched opponents.
Finally, a southern origin for the campaigns makes some strategic sense if Constantius feared the
possibility of a threat to the much more valuable African provinces.
Since the Diocletianic reforms of the late third century, the vicarius Hispaniarum had
administered the African province of Mauretania Tingitana, just across the Strait of Gibraltar
from Baetica, as one of the six provinces of the new Spanish diocese. 433 This restructuring was
an astute recognition of the close economic, military, and administrative ties between Baetica
and Tingitania, resulting from the ease of passage across the strait. 434 There is no evidence to
suggest the Siling Vandals had taken advantage of this thoroughfare as of 416, or that they ever
intended to do so. A successful attack from the north, however, had the potential to push these
barbarians across the strait and into a previously untouched province. Given these considerations,
Constantius may have decided that the best way to conduct the campaign was from a southern
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point of origin. From a sea-port within the province of Baetica, Wallia’s group could push the
Vandals north towards the provincial capital of Córdoba (Corduba) and away from easy access to
the ports of the strait.
After the destruction of the Siling Vandals, Wallia moved his forces against the Alans of
Lusitania with similar success. 435 Again, however, Hydatius makes no mention of the Alans of
Carthaginiensis. If the Alan king Addax had adopted the administrative structure of the province,
he would probably have focused his defense on the diocesan capital of Mérida. He may therefore
have recalled the Alans settled in the province of Carthaginiensis to Lusitania as part of his army.
This collective group of Alans then suffered defeat at the hands of Wallia’s forces.
Another possibility arises from the fact that we have no idea whether or not Addax was the
king of all of the Alans or simply those in Lusitania. None of our sources suggest that the
disparate barbarian groups in Spain worked together to face Wallia’s onslaught. In fact, Orosius
claims that they were actively hostile to one another. 436 In this scenario, Wallia’s army could
have defeated the Lusitanian Alans, while leaving those Alans settled in Carthaginiensis to their
own devices. From the perspective of Ravenna, a group of Alans settled somewhere in the large
and relatively unimportant province was hardly an issue provided they did not interfere with the
functioning of the imperial administration. 437 The provincial capital of Carthaginiensis was
Carthago Nova, a port city which imperial forces could retake through the use of a blockade. As
long as Ravenna possessed control of the provincial capital, they could resume the governmental
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machinery of tax collection. In contrast, the provincial capitals of Baetica and Lusitania were
located further inland and both provinces were important for other reasons. Baetica was
strategically important for access to Tingitania, while Lusitania was administratively important
for the diocesan capital at Mérida. It was therefore no coincidence that Wallia focused his
campaigns to restore imperial control on these provinces. 438 From the imperial perspective, the
residents of Carthaginiensis could afford to have some barbarian settlers in their midst.
This possible fate for the Alans of Carthaginiensis accords well with Hydatius’ account of the
Vandals and Suebi of Gallaecia. After his notice on the destruction of the Alans of Lusitania, the
chronicler tells us that “the Goths…were recalled to Gaul by Constantius and accepted
settlements in Aquitania from Toulouse right up to the ocean.” 439 The Vandals and Suebi, along
with the Alan survivors from Lusitania, were therefore left to continue their settlements in
Gallaecia, safe for the moment from imperial reprisals.
Constantius’ reason for leaving the Vandals and Suebi in control of the province of Gallaecia
has long been a subject of scholarly debate. Ultimately, the question is unduly influenced with
the benefit of hindsight. In 428/429 the Vandals of Gallaecia would take advantage of Roman
political distraction and cross into Africa, ultimately dealing a devastating blow to the Western
Roman Empire through the establishment of an African kingdom. In the context of 418,
however, such eventualities were unforeseeable and arguably unimaginable. Nevertheless, the
question and the debate in general offer valuable insights for Constantius’ goals during this
period and are therefore worth considering.
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Scholars have offered three plausible solutions for Constantius’ decision to leave the Vandals
and Suebi in control of Gallaecia. The first solution approaches the problem from the perspective
of the imperial administration. The second suggests that one or both of the barbarian groups in
Gallaecia, like Wallia’s followers, managed to secure their own agreements with the Honorian
regime. A third option, which ties the withdrawal of Wallia’s forces from Spain in 418 to events
in Gaul, will be examined in the context of the debate surrounding the Aquitanian settlement.
Kulikowski has approached the problem from the perspective of the imperial administration
during this period. In his view, Constantius’ ultimate goal for Wallia’s campaigns was the reimposition of a functioning imperial administration in the Spanish diocese, particularly for the
purpose of taxation. Wallia and his forces had fought and secured the most vital provinces,
Baetica and Lusitania, for exactly this purpose. Gallaecia, on the other hand, was located in the
mountainous northwest region of the Iberian peninsula, far from its main administrative centers.
From Ravenna’s perspective, the province was therefore of negligible importance to the
immediate needs of the imperial administration. Furthermore, the Vandals and the Suebi were
the weakest of the barbarian groups who had settled in Spain in 409. Once time and situation
permitted, imperial forces could easily deal with these barbarians. 440 For the moment, however,
they were contained. Over time, they might even assimilate to Roman life. 441
Kulikowski’s explanation relies on a sober understanding of the workings of the imperial
administration in this period, and offers the best approach to the campaigns of Wallia from 416418. The seemingly abrupt recall of Wallia’s forces in 418, which left the Vandals and Suebi in
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control of Gallaecia and possibly also some Alan settlements in Carthaginiensis, is therefore only
a puzzle to modern scholars who interpret the objective of Wallia’s campaigns as completely
ridding the Spanish peninsula of barbarians. If, however, the objective was simply to restore a
functioning administration in the diocese for the purpose of collecting tax revenues, then the
problem disappears. Wallia’s campaigns in Baetica and Lusitania had returned the two most vital
provinces to Roman control. The province of Gallaecia, by contrast, was both distant and
insignificant to this objective. Constantius’ decision to leave the Vandals and Suebi in control of
Gallaecia for the time being therefore makes sense from the perspective of the imperial
administration. As such, Kulikowski’s thesis has received the support of scholars such as
Halsall. 442
There is, however, a more speculative solution to the problem, often raised in older
scholarship, and recently revived by Gillett, which suggests that the Vandals and Suebi of
Gallaecia managed to obtain their own treaties with Ravenna during the course of Wallia’s
campaigns. 443 J. B. Bury first proposed this possibility in 1923, based on the testimony of
Orosius and the fact that, as we have seen, Hydatius records no campaigns against these
groups. 444 Orosius, writing during the course of Wallia’s campaigns in 417, tells us that various
kings of the barbarian peoples occupying Spain at least sought to establish some type of peace
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with Honorius. In the meantime, they had proceeded to fight amongst themselves. 445 Orosius
therefore presents a chaotic image of the wars amongst the barbarians in Spain, with general
fighting on all sides. As such, his testimony bears little relation to Hydatius’ careful itinerary of
Wallia’s campaigns. As a final word to the state of affairs in Spain, Orosius adds that trustworthy
messengers daily inform him of the battles and slaughter taking place among the barbarians, and
especially that “Wallia, king of the Goths, strives to achieve peace.” 446
Bury’s theory is plausible, though as we have seen, Orosius’ biblical rhetoric and overarching
thesis often compromise his presentation of events and thus his value as a contemporary
historical source. In the present case, the author balances the notice of the chaotic wars of the
barbarians in Spain with the overall benefit these wars provide for the Roman state as a whole.
Orosius’ final notice on Wallia’s pursuit of peace may simply have resulted from a desire to end
his work on an optimistic note in keeping with the overall theme of his narrative.
Nevertheless, later evidence suggests that Orosius’ statement on Wallia’s activities may have
some basis in reality. Andrew Gillett, drawing on the evidence of Sidonius Apollinaris, has
recently revived Bury’s thesis. Sidonius, in his panegyrics for the Emperors Majorian and
Anthemius, delivered respectively in 458 and 468, has frequent cause to praise the exploits and
heritage of the patrician and magister utriusque militiae (MVM) Ricimer. Ricimer was the most
successful late antique statesman and king-maker after the end of the Theodosian Dynasty in the
west. 447 He was also the grandson of Wallia, who seems to have married his daughter to a prince
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of the Suebian royal house. 448 As Wallia died shortly after the establishment of the Aquitanian
settlement in 418/419, he could only have negotiated this marriage during his tenure in Spain.
This fact seems to suggest that while campaigning for the Romans, Wallia was also engaged in
forming his own treaties with the other barbarian peoples in Spain. Gillett assumes that Wallia’s
marriage alliance could only have occurred if the Suebi of Gallaecia had also been allied with
Ravenna. He therefore concludes that the Vandals and Suebi of Gallaecia had entered into some
agreement with the imperial court by 418. 449
As with Bury’s conclusion, however, there are problems with Gillett’s argument, even beyond
the lack of evidence for treaty relations between Ravenna and the Vandals and Suebi. Primarily,
there is no reason to think that Wallia’s marriage alliance with the Suebian royal house
necessarily indicates that the Suebi had also reached an agreement with Ravenna. It is, in fact,
entirely possible to view the recall of Wallia’s forces to Gaul as a result of his “unauthorized”
peace overtures. Constantius could easily have interpreted Wallia’s marriage alliance with the
Suebi, an enemy of the state, as a dangerously independent action on the part of an allied Roman
official.
Nevertheless, while there are problems with the theories of scholars such as Bury and Gillett
which propose a treaty with one or both groups of barbarian settlers in Spain, the idea itself is not
beyond the realm of possibility, nor is it in complete discord with Kulikowski’s argument for an
448
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administrative solution. As we have seen, there is little reason to suspect that the eradication of
the Vandals and Suebi and the incorporation of Gallaecia were high on Constantius’ agenda in
418. It is therefore entirely possible that while intending to revisit the question at a later date,
Constantius confirmed peace with one or both of these groups or simply forced them to
recognize Roman authority. With or without battle or an elaborate treaty, such practices were
part and parcel of diplomatic policy on the Rhine/Danube frontier, and would make sense given
the circumstances. 450 Nevertheless, without positive source evidence, such assumptions must
remain hypothetical, and Kulikowski’s solution offers the best approach to the evidence.
Some scholars have suggested a third possible solution to the problem of the ostensibly abrupt
recall of Wallia’s forces from Spain, suggesting that the action was a response to the immediate
needs of the Honorian administration in the Gallic provinces. In examining this solution, we
must inevitably turn to the controversial topic of Constantius’ settlement of Wallia’s followers in
the province of Aquitania. Unfortunately, as with the Spanish campaigns, the evidence is sorely
lacking for both Ravenna’s political objectives as well as the mechanisms behind this settlement.
After examining the primary sources evidence, we will review the hypotheses of various scholars
concerning the purpose of this settlement for the Honorian administration.
In 418, Wallia had just spent two years conquering the Iberian peninsula, removing all
possible threats to the re-imposition of Roman rule. The sources provide no indication as to the
desires of Wallia and his followers, though it is reasonable to assume that these included regular
access to supplies and some type of settlement. Problems of supply had plagued their group at
least since Athaulf’s negotiations of 412, and the alleviation of this perpetual hunger remains the
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only visible gain of their peace negotiations with Constantius in late 415/416. 451 Though no
source specifies the demand, we may reasonably assume that settlement was also a common
desire of Wallia’s people through both reference to previous negotiations and treaties, as well as
consideration of the wayward migrations of Wallia’s own followers for the last eight years. The
obscure treaty of 382 seems to have included settlement for those barbarians willing to make
peace with the imperial government. 452 Lands for settlement had also formed a basic point in the
negotiations between Alaric and the court of Honorius from 408-410. 453 The followers of Wallia
and Athaulf had themselves attempted to settle at least twice on imperial lands, at Narbonne in
late 413/414 and Barcelona in 415. On each occasion, Constantius had forced them to disperse
and move on to new areas. 454 By 418, however, Wallia and his followers had just completed two
years of rigorous fighting for the imperial cause. If supplies and land were what they wanted,
Constantius was apparently more than willing to oblige his new auxiliaries.
Unfortunately, the sources provide few details concerning the settlement that grew from the
negotiations between Constantius and Wallia. Our closest contemporary source, Philostorgius,
almost certainly drawing on the earlier testimony of Olympiodorus, claims that Wallia and his
followers received part of Gaul for farming. 455 The author also suggests that the settlement was
established as part of the negotiations between Constantius and Wallia in 416. Two western
chronicles provide further contemporary evidence. In his entry for the year 419, Prosper of
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Aquitaine tells us that “Constantius, the patricius, confirms peace with Wallia after Aquitania
Secunda had been given to him for settlement along with certain cities of the bordering
provinces.” 456 Finally, as we have seen, Hydatius provides a comparatively late testimony,
stating in an entry for the year 418 that Wallia and his followers “were recalled to Gaul by
Constantius and accepted settlements in Aquitania from Toulouse right up to the ocean.” 457
The differing years that the sources offer for the settlement are not completely at odds. The
fact that Philostorgius relates nothing of the Spanish campaigns may suggest that either he or his
likely source, Olympiodorus, telescoped the events and complex negotiations of the years 416418 into a single treaty. 458 The works of both authors are fragmentary, however, and for this
reason it is difficult to argue for what they may or may not have included in their original texts.
Nevertheless, Philostorgius’ date of 416 for the settlement has some merit if we read his
testimony loosely to suggest that Constantius offered some possibility for eventual settlement
during his initial negotiations with Wallia. 459 This would certainly explain the vigor with which
Wallia and his followers undertook the Spanish campaigns of the following years as well as the
loyalty they seem to have shown the imperial government when they abandoned their successful
conquests and returned to Gaul upon Constantius’ command.

456

Prosper, Chronicon s.a. 419: Constantius patricius pacem firmat cum Wallia data ei ad inhabitandum secunda
Aquitanica et quibusdam civitatibus confinium provinciarum.
457

Hydatius, Chronicon 61 [69].

458

For this possibility, see Burns, “Settlement of 418”, 60-61; Burns, Barbarians, 271; Kulikowski, “Visigothic
Settlement”, 26.
459

As argued by Lütkenhaus, Constantius III, 91.

175

In a similar fashion, the dates that Hydatius and Prosper provide, 418 and 419 respectively,
are not so different that they require detailed argument in favor of one or the other. 460 If pressed,
Prosper’s Gallic origin and temporal proximity to the event clearly offer more support to the 419
date for the Aquitanian settlement. 461 Nevertheless, the chronicle genre allowed authors to group
related events by theme, sometimes spanning more than a single year. 462 Hydatius, writing from
the Spanish perspective, links the end of Wallia’s campaigns in 418 with the Aquitanian
settlement. As we have seen, Orosius, whose final lines were composed in 418, also alludes to
Wallia’s attempts to make peace in this year, suggesting that the wars were coming to a close.463
We may therefore interpret Hydatius’ testimony as simply a confirmation of the end of the
Spanish campaigns in 418, while his statement on the recall and settlement of Wallia’s troops
may belong to a later year. Prosper, who does not mention the Spanish campaigns, has no reason
to link the two events in his chronicle and fails to see the relationship. At the very least, we may
note that the movement of Wallia’s troops from Baetica to Aquitania probably required months
of preparation that spanned the years 418 to 419. 464 There is therefore little reason to see a direct
contradiction in the sources concerning the date of the settlement.
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Unfortunately, little else about the Aquitanian settlement is so easily explained. As we have
seen, the few sources we possess offer brief and generalized information, providing no details
concerning imperial motives for the settlement and few clues as to the means by which it was
established on Gallic soil. This lack of information has encouraged a wide range of speculation
and remains a highly contested topic in scholarly literature.
Two points unite the most recent approaches to the imperially authorized settlement of Wallia
and his followers in 418/419. First, the Honorian regime instituted this program from a position
of dominance. Constantius was in no way forced to settle Wallia’s followers in Aquitania. The
situation was not the result of some compromise in consideration of the overwhelming strength
of Wallia’s followers, or a case of Rome bowing to the inevitable pressures of the “barbarian
migrations”. 465 Since 412, Constantius had proven that he could skillfully control the movements
of these peoples, forcing them to come to terms with the imperial will through manipulation of
logistics alone. 466 As we have seen, after the return of Galla Placidia in late 415/416, Wallia had
little choice but to follow imperial dictates. By 418, the Gothic king had apparently learned this
lesson well enough to abandon his recent, hard-won conquests and humbly march his people
towards Gaul when commanded to do so. For this reason, we must see the Aquitanian settlement
as fulfilling some need for the imperial state and work to determine what that need was.
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A second generally agreed upon point is that later Visigothic Kingdom of Toulouse did not
spring up fully grown from the Aquitanian settlement of Wallia and his followers in 418/419.
This powerful entity emerged gradually and in response to specific imperial impetus or
neglect. 467 Older historical narratives attempted to define this slow transformation as a
Visigothic march towards independent sovereignty through treaty agreements with the Roman
state. 468 More recent research suggests that Rome never recognized an independent state within
the boundaries of the empire, and sees the emergence of a full-fledged and independent
Visigothic kingdom only in the late fifth century, by which point the political power of the
central government had declined to impotence. 469 Regardless, though debate still surrounds the
specific relationship between the original settlement of 418/419 and its later incarnation as the
Visigothic Kingdom of Toulouse, all seem to agree that this was a development that occurred in
stages, extending over generations.
This collective agreement has led scholars in recent decades to focus on the Aquitanian
settlement as a solution to the specific problems of the imperial government in 418/419.
Unfortunately, our sources for this period are lamentably silent as to the nature of these
problems, resulting in a variety of speculative, though more or less plausible interpretations. In
articles appearing in 1956 and 1961 respectively, E. A. Thompson and J. M. Wallace-Hadrill
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proposed that the Aquitanian settlement was established to defend Roman territory against
specific threats. For Thompson, this threat was the mysterious Bacaudae whose activities are
attested in the region of Armorica around the year 417. 470 For Wallace-Hadrill, it was Saxon
pirates raiding the Atlantic coastline of Aquitania Secunda. 471 While creative, neither solution
has stood the test of scholarly scrutiny. Thompson’s theory concerning the Bacaudae is based on
older interpretations of this group as social revolutionaries, peasants and slaves seeking to revolt
against their masters and thus overturn the imperial status quo. More recent and convincing
interpretations, however, depict the Bacaudae as local self-help groups, operating for the benefit
of their regions, though outside imperial recognition. 472 Likewise, Wallace-Hadrill’s solution
fails because our sources show Saxon raids to have been a phenomenon of the 460’s and
480’s. 473 There is no evidence for such activity in the first two decades of the fifth-century. 474
For these reasons, in a 1969 article, Bernard Bachrach disposed of Thompson and WallaceHadrill’s suggestions of one specific threat and instead suggests that Constantius intended the
Aquitanian settlement as one part of an interregional, barbarian “balance of power” in Gaul and
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Spain. 475 The MVM could draw auxiliaries from each of these groups or set them against one
another should any one settlement prove a threat to Roman supremacy in the future. There are
two main problems with Bachrach’s thesis. As we have seen, while the idea that Constantius
made some sort of peace with the Vandals and Suebi of Gallaecia is plausible, the evidence is
sorely lacking. It is therefore difficult to construct a thesis on such a flimsy basis. Second,
Bachrach’s theory that Constantius wished to construct a barbarian “balance of power”, while
not rejecting the dominant position of the imperial court in this endeavor, nevertheless suggests
that Constantius was forced to deal with an insolvable barbarian problem. Such a notion is
improbable. Wallia’s troops had proven their loyalty to Ravenna during their Spanish campaigns,
and the Vandals and Suebi were safely restricted in the distant province of Gallaecia with no
access to Gaul. Bachrach’s thesis therefore fails to properly account for the strength of the
imperial government in 418 and the weakness of the barbarian groups settled in the Roman
provinces. Nevertheless, his thesis has gained some support from scholars such as T. S. Burns. 476
In a 1992 article, Vincent Burns opened up a more promising approach with his suggestion
that we should see the Aquitanian settlement as part of Constantius’ reconstitution of imperial
authority in Gaul, rather than a response to a specific problem. 477 In Burns’ scenario, Wallia’s
forces were meant as a general defense of the region in lieu of a regular Roman army.
Constantius could use the “Goths” to deal with any threats to imperial authority that should arise,
whether from usurpers, barbarians, or Bacaudae. Nevertheless, Burns inadvertently weakens his
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thesis for close cooperation between the imperial government and the Aquitanian settlement by
suggesting that these barbarians continued to represent an active threat to the imperial agenda.
He argues that Wallia’s followers were settled in Aquitania Secunda due to the relative seclusion
of the province. They were therefore prevented from threatening the Mediterranean coastal cities
which formed the center of Roman strength. While offering an initially convincing approach,
Burns’ argument founders on this point. Aquitania Secunda was in no way remote from the other
provinces of Gaul and it is unlikely that Constantius viewed Wallia’s followers as a threat to his
political agenda. Both of these points, however, are rectified in a 2001 article by Kulikowski.
Kulikowski begins from the same assumption that the Aquitanian settlement represented part
of Constantius’ plans for the reconstitution of Ravenna’s authority in Gaul. Unlike Burns,
however, Kulikowski takes a nuanced view of the political situation in 418, drawing on the
history of Gallic usurpations in previous years. He therefore ties the Aquitanian settlement of
Wallia’s followers to the reestablishment of the Concilium Septem Provinciarum at Arles, as the
imperial government’s two-pronged method for addressing Gallic discontent. This council
allowed the landowners and aristocrats of southern Gaul to present and debate their concerns
under imperial auspices. The settlement of an army closely allied to the imperial government,
however, was an overt threat to remove any thought of future usurpation. 478
Kulikowski assesses the political atmosphere of the early fifth century, and undermines
notions of political action based on a strict “Roman”/“barbarian” dichotomy. Kulikowksi’s thesis
that the Aquitanian settlement was established to support the Honorian regime against Gallic
rebellion is therefore thoroughly convincing. A secondary thesis of the article, however, requires
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some consideration. Kulikowski postulates that Constantius chose Aquitania Secunda as the site
for the settlement of Wallia’s followers because that province’s inhabitants had shown no active
support for the regimes of Constantine III or Jovinus. This prevented discontented Gallic
notables from using Wallia’s forces for their own ends. 479
Halsall, however, has criticized Kulikowski’s suggestion, noting not only the fact that our
sources provide little evidence of the extent of Constantine or Jovinus’ support network, but also
the more solid detail that the only known member of Attalus’ Narbonese regime was Paulinus of
Pella, a Gallic aristocrat from Aquitania Secunda. 480 As we have seen, there is every reason to
assume that the notables of at least the towns of Narbonne, Toulouse, and Bordeaux, if not the
entire region, were complicit in Athaulf and Placidia’s separatist regime. Constantius, in effect,
settled Wallia and his followers in a province where they had previously known success in
encouraging local aristocrats to break their loyalties to Ravenna. Ostensibly, such a plan courted
disaster. The only conclusion is that the circumstances had changed considerably since the
departure of Athaulf and Placidia in 414/415, in terms of both the political atmosphere of the
region and Constantius’ own relationship with Wallia and his followers. The main component in
this change may have regarded the status of Galla Placidia herself.
Since his first appearance in the sources during the events of 410, Constantius had deftly
climbed the ranks of imperial power. He had earned his first consulship in 414 after destroying
the regimes of Constantine III, Jovinus, and Heraclianus. 481 He was named patricius possibly as
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early as 415, but certainly by March of 416. 482 Then, on January 1, 417, while Wallia was
fighting his campaigns under imperial auspices in Spain, Constantius entered his second
consulship alongside the Emperor Honorius. On this occasion, Honorius substantially increased
the honors shown to his patrician by offering him a true pathway to imperial power through
marriage to his sister, Galla Placidia. 483
We know nothing of Placidia’s life in the year between her surrender in late 415/416 and her
marriage to Constantius. Olympiodorus’ account of the latter event suggests that she was present
in Rome when Honorius and Constantius took up their consulships. She may therefore have
resumed her residence in this city. Olympiodorus also mentions that Constantius had grown
angry with certain of Placidia’s attendants due to her rejection of his romantic overtures. 484 This
statement suggests that Placidia in 416 possessed a group of individuals who were sufficiently
independent-minded to thwart the plans of the most powerful man in the western empire. While
court factions had always played a large role in the political life of the empire, Olympiodorus’
identification of these individuals as “attendants” or “servants” (θεράποντες) suggests that they
were not court officials. The only probable conclusion is that they were part of a group that
accompanied Placidia from Spain to Rome in 416.
A later fragment of Olympiodorus seems to confirm this. Olympiodorus tells us that after the
death of Constantius, Honorius and Placidia shared a close relationship that came to border on
482
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the scandalous. Placidia’s advisors, however, acted to turn this love into hatred. By the time of
Placidia’s exile in 422, the discord between the siblings had led to occasions of outright violence
because Placidia maintained a large body of loyal barbarians from her marriages to Athaulf and
Constantius. 485 Though discussing the events of 422, Olympiodorus’ mention of Athaulf in this
fragment suggests that Placidia probably already possessed a small train of barbarian protectors
and advisors in 416. These may have constituted some of the “attendants” who actively
encouraged her to reject the marriage proposals of Constantius. 486
The presence of men and women in Rome loyal to Placidia as Athaulf’s queen may in turn
shed some light on Wallia and Constantius’ negotiations in late 415/416 as well as Placidia’s
status for the interim year before her marriage to Constantius in 417. Wallia bowed to the
inevitable in late 415/416 and negotiated a peace with Ravenna. As we have seen, however, there
is good reason to view Wallia as a strong supporter of Athaulf and Placidia’s regime who
returned equilibrium to his people’s political affairs after a period of unexpected chaos. The
assassination of Athaulf and coup of Singeric had led to the politically motivated bloodbath of
Athaulf’s family as well as the degradation of Placidia herself. Upon taking the throne, Wallia
immediately returned Placidia to her former honorable status. 487 He also initially sought
alternatives to peace with Ravenna, which would have required him to turn over Placidia as the
base term of any agreement. 488
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After her marriage to Athaulf and their attempts to form a separate Roman regime, Placidia
was in no position to expect kind treatment from her brother Honorius or his patrician. Though
some sources suggest that Constantius had long planned to marry Placidia, this is best explained
as authors’ retrojection of the realities of 417 onto Constantius’ earlier career. 489 There is no
reason to think that Constantius’ desire to marry Placidia was common knowledge in 415. Nor
was the marriage itself a foregone conclusion even after she was surrendered to Roman control.
According to Olympiodorus, Placidia resisted Constantius’ proposals for almost a year, before
the Emperor Honorius himself forced the union. 490 As we have seen, having successfully
transformed herself into a locus of power as a Gothic queen among Athaulf’s followers, Placidia
could only have expected a bitter fate should she return to Roman control. Seclusion in women’s
quarters of the palace or a monastic establishment was the best she could have hoped for under
the circumstance. The fact that she seems to have suffered no indignity suggests that when she
and Wallia bowed to the inevitable and opened negotiations with Constantius, they included
some terms for her later well being.
The contrast between her probable fate in 415 and Olympiodorus’ depiction of her status in
417 is striking. Placidia was apparently unconfined, in possession of her own following, and
confident enough in her own status to resist the advances of Constantius for almost a year.
Constantius’ desire to eventually marry Placidia and thereby solidify his hold over imperial
power provides some explanation for the leniency that she seems to have experienced upon her
return to Roman control. Such considerations, however, do not explain the fact that she was
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apparently allowed her own, independent followers and possibly even a host of armed men for
her protection. 491 Unlike some of our primary authors, this suggests that Placidia did not actually
present herself as a captured Roman princess to her brother and his patrician. Rather, she
embraced the status of her last few years as a Gothic queen, complete with her own attendants
and bodyguard. The fact that such individuals were allowed to accompany her from Spain to
Rome suggests that Wallia and Placidia negotiated conditions for her surrender in late 415/416 in
order to ensure her safety. It is therefore possible to see Placidia, not simply as a returned Roman
princess, but as a person of high value among Wallia and his followers. 492 As such, her surrender
to Constantius, along with many other hostages of noble birth, may have played a key role in
ensuring the adherence of Wallia and his followers to the peace treaty of 415/416.
Having glanced back at the circumstances of Galla Placidia’s return to Italy and its political
implications, we can now look again to the Aquitanian settlement of 418/419: the continued
loyalty of Wallia and his followers to Galla Placidia as a former Gothic queen may offer some
explanation for exactly why Constantius felt that he could authorize a barbarian settlement on
Gallic soil. While the surrender of Placidia in 415/416 possibly ensured the loyalty of Wallia and
his followers to imperial dictates, her marriage to Constantius on January 1, 417, however
unwilling, represented a firm political union of imperial and barbarian interests.
This alliance was further strengthened by the rise of Theodoric as king in succession to
Wallia sometime in 418. We unfortunately know nothing of the details surrounding these events.
The chronicler Hydatius provides a notice for the death of Wallia just after his entry for the
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Aquitanian settlement, suggesting that both took place in 418. 493 Wallia may therefore have died
just before the settlement or in the process of moving his people into Gaul. We likewise know
nothing of Theodoric’s early history or what prompted his rise to kingship. The only visible
feature that may have played a role in his election is the fact that he seems to have married into
the family of Athaulf and Alaric. 494
In his panegyric to the Emperor Avitus, delivered on January 1, 456, Sidonius Apollinaris
recounts the new emperor’s rise to power through the aid and encouragement of King Theodoric
II. Theodoric II had himself only recently gained power after a coup against his elder brother
Thorismund, who had taken up the kingship after the long reign of their father, Theodoric I. In
highly rhetorical verse, Sidonius has Theodoric II convince Avitus to assume the vacant position
of emperor by recounting not only his long history with Avitus, but also his desire to rectify the
crime of his grandfather, who had captured Rome. 495 The reference is clearly to Alaric, yet there
is no evidence to suggest that Theodoric I was Alaric’s son, nor that Alaric had any male issue.
The only probable solution is that Theodoric had married a daughter of Alaric, a union which
had produced at least Theodoric II and probably his brothers. 496
Concerning Alaric himself, his only known wife was the sister of Athaulf, a fact which
illustrates the close relationship between the two men and may have partially provided the
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impetus for Athaulf’s own rise to leadership after Alaric’s death. 497 It is therefore probable that
the wife of Theodoric I and mother of Theodoric II was in fact the offspring of the union of
Alaric and the sister of Athaulf. In terms of extended family, she was therefore also the maternal
niece of Athaulf and Placidia.
We do not know if Athaulf’s sister survived her husband. Placidia, however, would certainly
have known and had some relationship with Athaulf’s niece from her time as his consort. 498 The
fact that this niece was married to Theodoric, the new king of Athaulf and Wallia’s followers,
suggests that a strong familial connection was established between the imperial court and the
barbarians of the new settlement of Aquitania Secunda in 418.
It is also possible that this connection played some role in the initial rise of Theodoric to the
kingship. In a recent article, Kulikowski notes that Rome managed the barbarian settlements on
Gallic soil in much the same way as they managed the barbarian kingdoms on the frontier. 499
One aspect of this “management” consisted of ensuring that only kings loyal to Roman interests
rose to power in their respective regions. This objective was accomplished in a variety of ways,
including the establishment of treaties with certain barbarian leaders over others, as well as the
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complex practice of gift-giving. In more overt cases, Rome might directly manipulate barbarian
leadership succession through imposing or removing candidates as they saw fit. 500
If we consider this past history of Roman “management” techniques as well as the sensitive
Gallic region in which Constantius settled Wallia and Theodoric’s followers in 418/419, then the
possibility that Constantius made some efforts to ensure the succession of a candidate loyal to his
dictates seems quite probable. In this situation, Constantius could have used the familial links
between Placidia and Theodoric’s wife to create a firm alliance between the two houses. If
Wallia had remained loyal to Ravenna from 416-418 out of respect for the memory of Athaulf
and Placidia’s regime, Constantius could trust the loyalty of Theodoric due to both personal
gratitude and strong familial bonds. 501
From this perspective, both the location and politics behind the Aquitanian settlement of
418/419 make some sense. As previously discussed, Kulikowski is almost certainly correct in his
thesis that the settlement represented a threat to the previously rebellious Gallic aristocracy. 502
Contrary to his secondary thesis, however, the Aquitanian settlement was not established in a
hitherto loyal province. Gallic aristocrats of Aquitania Secunda and Narbonensis Prima had
themselves only recently supported Attalus’ second regime. The geographical placement would
therefore suggest that Constantius intended the settlement as not only a threat, but a direct
punishment for these previously rebellious provinces. As Kulikowski hypothesizes, it is certainly
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possible that the Aquitanian settlement on the one hand and the provincial capital of Arles on the
other served to wedge the regions which had supported Constantine and Jovinus between two
bastions of imperial power. 503 We cannot overlook, however, the looming threat the settlement
also provided for Narbonensis Prima, nor the probable punishment Constantius leveled against
Aquitania Secunda.
Constantius could afford to settle Theodoric’s forces in this rebellious region because in
418/419, the political situation which had previously made Attalus’ second regime a viable
alternative to Ravenna no longer existed. Leadership over Athaulf’s barbarian coalition had
changed hands three times since their departure from Narbonne in late 415/416. Galla Placidia,
whose Theodosian dynastic connection had provided the foundation of legitimacy to Attalus’
regime, was now firmly entrenched in the political sphere of Ravenna. Finally, the rise of
Theodoric and his marriage to Athaulf’s niece brought the political aims of the barbarian settlers
fully into line with the imperial court of Honorius, Constantius, and Placidia. Unlike Athaulf’s
motley forces in 414, Theodoric’s barbarian coalition in 418 was clearly a seasoned imperial
army who took their orders from Ravenna. 504 There was therefore little chance of southern Gallic
aristocrats turning such forces to rebellion.
Perhaps even more than the political agenda, the mechanics behind the establishment of
Wallia and Theodoric’s followers on imperial soil, as well as the later settlements of barbarian
groups such as the Burgundian, Alans, and Ostrogoths in the sixth century, remains a highly
contested topic in scholarly literature. 505 On the most basic level, the debate concerns whether
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the imperial government provided for the maintenance of these groups through the distribution of
land for farming or through allotments of imperial taxation. The former option has some support
in contemporary sources, while the latter provides an answer for the curious fact that we have no
fifth-century evidence for large scale land confiscations. Historiography has seen the rise of two
principal models for barbarian settlement in the fifth and sixth centuries based on these
assumptions. Theodor Gaupp provided a model for the land allotment option in the midnineteenth century, drawing on the similarities in the fractional division of property into in both
the Theodosian Code (concerning the billeting of Roman soldiers) and the later Visigothic and
Burgundian Codes (concerning the division of lands). 506 Walter Goffart, on the other hand,
devised the model for tax allotment in 1980, after an exhaustive reevaluation of Theodoric the
Great’s sixth-century measures for the maintenance of his troops in Italy. 507 Goffart’s study
largely destroys the basis of Gaupp’s model, noting that Roman legislation assigning “thirds”
(tertia) or “lots” (sortes) of civilian property to billeted Roman soldiers had nothing to do with
the permanent division of land or property, but rather the temporary use of shelter. 508 We
therefore cannot read these Roman laws as the basis for the permanent settlement of barbarians
on Roman soil.
Instead, drawing on sixth-century evidence for the maintenance of Ostrogothic troops and the
fact that we have no evidence for aristocratic resistance to the seizure of property, Goffart argued
that the tertia and sortes of the later barbarian law codes were references to the distribution of
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imperial taxation. Such taxation was already filling the imperial coffers. In Goffart’s model,
these tax proceeds were simply redirected to barbarian leaders and their troops to provide for
their maintenance. The lack of outcry over the burden of barbarian settlement therefore derives
from the fact that individual Roman landowners lost nothing in this process. They simply paid to
an imperial official or directly to barbarian “settlers” what they were already required to pay to
the imperial government. 509
While it does seem to solve the very large problem of aristocratic silence over the kind of land
confiscations that Gaupp envisaged, Goffart’s model has received a wide variety of supporters
and critics. 510 The main problem is that there is little source evidence for the settlement of
barbarians outside sixth-century Italy, and there is little reason to assume that all of the barbarian
settlements were established using the same methods. 511 Furthermore, what source material
exists for settlements outside Italy does often seem to refer to the distribution of land rather than
taxes. 512 Accepting Goffart’s thesis therefore requires a forced reading of many of our sources as
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well as the unlikely assumption of a universal vocabulary for the economic techniques of
settlement. 513 Under the weight of these problems and others, the attempt to identify a universal
program for the establishment of barbarian settlements within the Roman Empire seems to have
stalled in recent years. For this reason, it seems best to deal with the individual barbarian
settlements of the fifth century on a case by case basis.
As we have seen, Athaulf had successfully billeted his troops on the towns and aristocratic
estates of Aquitania Secunda and Narbonensis Prima for an extended period from 414 to late
415/416. Our sources suggest that these troops were stationed along the Via Aquitana, extending
from Narbonne through Toulouse to Bordeaux. Athaulf’s troop distribution was probably a
strategic decision. Should Constantius have chosen to attack in force, Athaulf would have needed
to assemble his forces quickly. Dispersing his followers along the Via Aquitana provided a
means for the reconstitution of his army should the need arise.
If we return to the chronicle accounts on the Aquitanian settlement of 418/419, both Prosper
and Hydatius tell us that Constantius recalled Wallia’s followers and granted them settlements in
Aquitania as well as some surrounding cities. 514 While neither account provides an abundance of
detail, both chroniclers’ geographic descriptions could just as easily describe the distribution of
Athaulf’s troops in 414 as the placement of Theodoric’s troops in 418/419. The only real
difference is the absence of Narbonne as a settlement site. This suggests that Constantius may
have based his distribution of Theodoric’s troops on Athaulf’s earlier pattern, using the Via
513
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Aquitana as a frame of reference. Hydatius’ mention of the city of Toulouse, though certainly a
contemporary allusion to the seat of the later Visigothic kings, may nevertheless also support this
conclusion. 515
In terms of logistics, this decision would have made some sense. The cities and estates along
the Via Aquitana had already established the methods required for the long-term maintenance of
troops. Their previous experience under Athaulf had also provided some personal familiarity
with the soldiers they were ordered to maintain in 418/419. This is not to suggest, however, that
the cities and aristocrats welcomed the burden. Though Paulinus of Pella probably exaggerates
the extent of the devastation, the cities and estates of Aquitania Secunda and the surrounding
regions had certainly witnessed some destruction associated with the withdrawal of Athaulf’s
forces in late 415. The fact that the province was now the principal site for the settlement of
many of these same troops could only have been an insult to their previous injury. Nevertheless,
in the words of Wallace-Hadrill, the region “was probably overdue for a little rough
treatment.” 516
Many aristocrats of Aquitanian Secunda and Narbonensis Prima were directly responsible for
the maintenance of a usurper’s regime. While we possess no evidence of the state purges that
accompanied the fall of Constantine III, Jovinus, and Heraclianus, there is no reason to doubt
that punishment of some form was levied against the supporters or perceived supporters of
Attalus’ Narbonese regime. The form that this punishment took, however, is opaque given the
state of the surviving evidence. Our one known official of Attalus’ regime, Paulinus of Pella,
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seems to have suffered neither the death meted out to the supporters of Constantine and Jovinus,
nor apparently the direct confiscation of his properties. 517
With regard to the Aquitanian settlement of 419, however, Paulinus does provide one
potential piece of evidence. He tells us that his sons moved to Bordeaux because they desired
greater freedom, “though with a Gothic settler as a partner” (Gothico quamquam consorte
colono). 518 As with so much of the Eucharisticus, both the intended meaning and the temporal
context of the passage are obscure. Nevertheless, it may suggest that while Paulinus maintained
nominal ownership of his properties around Bordeaux, he was forced to allow some barbarian
settlers to take up residence. 519 If so, this situation could easily have resulted in legal
complications. Barbarian settlers would have had access to the influence of Theodoric in disputes
with their Roman landlord. Regardless of theoretical questions concerning the extent of
Theodoric’s power in the region at this time, the Roman legal system was often subject to the
intercession of powerful patrons on behalf of their clients. As Theodoric had the backing of
Ravenna, one would suspect that could easily have curtailed Paulinus’ rights as a Roman
landowner, especially given Paulinus’ status as a former Roman dissident. Such a situation might
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explain Paulinus’ mysterious reference to one son’s vacillating relationship to the Gothic king
and his loss of familial property. 520
Overall, the evidence suggests that Constantius’ settlement of Theodoric’s followers in
Aquitania Secunda and certain surrounding cities was an ad hoc affair, combining both the
Roman practice of billeting soldiers as well as the distribution of landed settlement in some
cases. Halsall has suggested that age was the dividing principle between these alternatives.
Certain of Theodoric’s troops who had served with Alaric since 395 were surely reaching
retirement age by 418/419. 521 These would have received plots of land either from agri deserti or
from the confiscation or forced settlement of aristocratic estates. 522 It is also reasonable to
assume that noble status among Theodoric’s followers probably played some role in the
distribution of land, though our limited understanding of the rank and file below Theodoric
prevents any speculation on their numbers.
Constantius probably billeted the vast majority of Theodoric’s troops, as Roman soldiers, on
the cities and aristocratic estates of Aquitanian Secunda and the surrounding provinces. These
men would have represented the military strength of the new auxiliaries. As Roman soldiers,
they would have had access to imperial tax allotments for their maintenance, either drawn from
individual citizens or government officials. 523 If Constantius built on Athaulf’s pattern of troop
distribution in 414, then the Via Aquitana would again have served as the primary pathway for
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mobilization. Once assembled, Constantius could dispatch these troops to other regions in
service to Roman initiatives.
We should therefore see the establishment of Theodoric’s followers in Gaul in 419 not as a
single settlement, but as a series of disparate groupings across more than one province. At one
level, they represented one part of the larger Roman military. Internally, however, some or all of
these groups probably acknowledged the royal status of Theodoric as a point of internal
cohesion. The unification of these separate groups of billeted soldiers and landed settlers into the
fifth-century Gothic kingdom only arose over time, probably as a consequence of imperial
neglect. The death of Constantius in 421 and the exile of Placidia in 422 served to temporarily
sever the close ties between Theodoric and the imperial court. These events, however, were only
the first of a rapid series that again brought crisis to the imperial center, culminating in the shortlived regime of the usurper John from 423-425. As always, crisis at the center of imperial politics
led to neglect of the periphery. The growth and strengthening of a politically, if not
geographically, unified “settlement” therefore possibly occurred as a result of the events of these
years, when the neglect of Ravenna led to Theodoric’s greater assumption of local control. 524
From the perspective of 418/419, however, Theodoric and his followers were Roman soldiers
closely allied to the imperial court at Ravenna. Roman officials still governed the province of
Aquitania Secunda and the surrounding regions in 418 as Honorius’ instructions for the Council
of the Seven Provinces makes clear. 525 Galla Placidia’s marriage to Athaulf in 414 had created
an alternative imperial regime, supported by barbarian troops, which served to rival the dynastic
claims of Honorius. In 419, however, Placidia’s continued ties to the Gothic royal family and her
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forced marriage to Constantius had ironically laid the foundation for the integration of these
formerly rebellious troops with the Honorian regime.
Nevertheless, while Ravenna reestablished its control over western empire in this period, the
weakness of the emperor himself continued to inform political events. In a relatively short span
of years, the MVM Constantius had succeeded in establishing a viable new pathway to imperial
power by working within the structures of the dynastically legitimate Theodosian regime. Unlike
his predecessor Stilicho, Constantius had no initial ties to the imperial house to use as a prop to
his power. Instead, his climb to dominance was founded on his ability to deal effectively with
outside challenges to the Honorian regime while he himself controlled the emperor from within.
Constantius’ forced marriage to Placidia, an act in violation of Theodosian marriage traditions,
serves as a testimony to the power that he wielded in these years. As we will see in Chapter 6,
this marriage in turn provided the opportunity for his own acquisition of imperial power in 421.
Finally, Constantius’ career offered a model to the ambitious generals who rose to prominence
after his death, ultimately altering the discourse of imperial power in the western empire.
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Chapter 6: Death of Constantius, Exile of Placidia

The imperial government in Ravenna had reason to feel optimistic in 419. The magister
utriusque militiae (MVM) Constantius had succeeded in restoring the rebellious Gallic provinces
to Honorian control and had forged a strong alliance with the followers of the Gothic king
Theodoric. Constantius could now turn his attention to secondary problems, among them
attempting to set the Gallic church on a proper footing and the restoration of the Rhine frontier.
While the former usurper Maximus launched a second bid for power sometime in 419/420, this
threat was confined to the relatively unimportant Spanish province of Gallaecia and quickly
succumbed to the energetic offensive of the comes Hispaniarum, Asterius. Overall, it must have
seemed as if the Honorian regime had finally reestablished a workable status quo in the western
empire.
Unfortunately, a quick succession of new conflicts at the imperial center shattered this
temporary calm, once again bringing conflict to the western provinces. First, after years of
service to the Honorian regime, Constantius launched his own bid for power in 421, forcing the
emperor to recognize him as co-emperor. While their period of co-rule lasted only seven months,
Constantius’ aggressive actions soured relations with the eastern court at Constantinople,
threatening to plunge the eastern and western empires into another cold war. More detrimental to
the future of the western empire were the crises that blew up after the death of Constantius. In
422, a dispute arose between Galla Placidia and Honorius that resulted in factional violence at
Ravenna and the exile of Placidia and her family to Constantinople. While the conflict may have
informed contemporary power struggles among ambitious individuals in the Roman government,
the practical result of the exile of Placidia and her son Valentinian meant that there was no
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member of the Theodosian dynasty present in the west to ease the transfer of power after
Honorius’ sudden death in August 423. Perhaps inevitably, a new usurper emerged to seize the
reins of power, forcing the Theodosian dynasty to once again use civil war to reestablish its
control over the western empire.
Finally, 422 also saw the development of lasting conflicts among ambitious officers at the
highest ranks of the Roman military. A dispute between the new MVM Castinus and his
subordinate officer Boniface over the leadership of a large campaign against the Vandals of
Baetica had devastating effects on the future of the western empire. Following the dispute,
Boniface rebelled against the Honorian regime and seized the wealthy provinces of Africa in an
aggressive play for power and influence. Castinus, on the other, proceeded with the Roman army
into Spain only to suffer a massive defeat at the hands of the Vandals. The military debacle of
422 therefore left the Vandals to continue their devastation of the southern Spanish provinces. At
the same time, Boniface’s aggressive negotiation tactics offered an ominous precedent for the
future of civil discord in the western empire.
This chapter argues several points within this overall narrative schema. First, building on
earlier scholars’ conclusions that show a connection between the attested campaigns of Asterius
in 420 and the defeat of the usurper Maximus (during his second usurpation), this chapter
combines a close reading of Hydatius’ Chronicle with comparative evidence from previous
usurpations to offer a portrait of Maximus’ Gallaecian regime. 526 In particular, this chapter
argues that Maximus established his court at the provincial capital at Braga and that the
mysterious “vicarius Maurocellus” mentioned in Hydatius’ entry for the year 420 was actually a
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member of the usurper’s administration. This chapter also argues that there is good reason to
assume that the Vandals of Gallaecia served as the military arm of Maximus’ regime.
With regard to the conflicts at the imperial center in 422, this chapter examines the primary
source evidence and concludes that there is little reason to see a connection between the factional
violence that characterized Honorius and Placidia’s dispute and the problems surrounding the illfated Vandal campaign of the same year. Contrary to the narratives of many scholars, this
chapter argues that Castinus and Boniface were not representatives of political factions allied to
Honorius and Placidia. Rather, the evidence suggests that the dispute between the generals was
due to personal rivalry and private ambition. Though it seems probable that Boniface used his
professed loyalty to Placidia to justify his seizure of the African provinces in 422, we must see
his actions on this occasion as an aggressive negotiation tactic in his rivalry with a fellow
military official, rather than a program of rebellion initiated by Galla Placidia. Similarly, though
Hydatius attributes one cause of the defeat of Castinus’ forces in the subsequent Vandal
campaign to “treachery” on the part of his Visigothic auxiliaries, the evidence does not permit us
to connect this obscure treachery to Placidia’s influence. Instead, given our meager evidence, it
seems far more probable that Castinus’ army suffered one of the rare occasions of Roman defeat
in a set-piece battle. Both events, however, would have grave consequences for the exercise of
power in the last decades of the western Roman empire.

Having solved the major problems of reestablishing Honorian control over the Gallic
provinces, Constantius now turned to other affairs. The extension of Constantius’ influence into
the ecclesiastical sphere had begun as early as 412, with the deposition of Heros, Bishop of Arles
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and probable ally of the usurper Constantine III, and the installation of Constantius’ own client,
Patroclus, into this now vacant seat. 527 Mathisen has shown that the history of the Gallic
usurpations had long included an ecclesiastical dimension, as both usurpers and bishops looked
for support beyond the secular/ecclesiastical divide to promote their own positions and pursue
personal rivalries. 528 Constantius’ promotion of Patroclus was therefore perfectly in keeping with
the tenor of Gallic politics as well as Constantius’ own plans for the reorientation of Gallic
affairs towards Ravenna.
Arles was destined to become the seat of the praetorian prefect of Gaul by 418, if not before.
As the influence of individual bishops often possessed a direct relationship to the status of their
cities within the secular imperial administration, Arles’ bishop stood to exert massive influence
in Constantius’ reorganization of the Gallic administration. Nevertheless, even if Constantius did
not harbor such plans in 412, the city had recently served as the imperial seat of the usurper
Constantine III and that alone would have raised its prestige within the Gallic context.
Constantius therefore needed someone he could trust in the episcopal see of Arles. With his
client Patroclus as bishop, the MVM could begin to exercise at least some of the same control
over the ecclesiastical structure of Gaul as he did over the secular administration. 529
This ambition seemed to come to fruition in 418 through Pope Zosimus’ changes to the Gallic
ecclesiastical administration. Soon after his election on March 18, 417, Zosimus granted
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Patroclus extraordinary powers over the other bishops of Gaul, including metropolitan status
over the provinces of Narbonensis Prima and Secunda as well as Viennensis. In addition, he
ordered that all Gallic ecclesiastics wishing to approach the episcopal see at Rome should obtain
formal permission from Arles. 530 Several scholars, including Duchesne, Kidd, Oost, and most
recently Lütkenhaus, have suggested that these actions may have been the result of an agreement
between Patroclus, with Constantius as his patron, and Zosimus: in exchange for the support of
the imperial house for his election to the papal throne, Zosimus agreed to make Constantius’
client the head of the Gallic ecclesiastical administration. 531 Such an interpretation, however,
closely relies on mistaken assumption that Patroclus was in Rome at the time of Zosimus’
election. Kulikowski, however, has shown that Patroclus is only recorded in Rome during the
summer of 418, months after Zosimus received his ordination. 532 It therefore seems more
probable that Zosimus’ dramatic reorganization of the Gallic ecclesiastical structures was a
response to the new secular administration of the Gallic prefecture as well as an effort to extend
his own influence into the Gallic ecclesiastical sphere. 533 Nevertheless, such an endeavor had the
potential to strengthen Constantius’ program of establishing central control over the Gallic
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provinces. 534 There is therefore good reason to believe that Zosimus’ plans received imperial
approval, even if Constantius did not provide the impetus for his actions.
Unfortunately for all involved, however, the controversy over the primacy of Arles seems to
have brought more discord than unity to the Gallic church. Patroclus faced stalwart opponents in
his attempts to exercise his new powers, most notably Proculus of Marseilles and Simplicius of
Vienne. As early as 422, shortly after the death of Constantius, Zosimus’ successor, Pope
Boniface, attempted to restrict the power of Arles. The conflict, however, continued to smoulder
throughout the first half of the fifth century, ultimately coming to a head, but not an end, in the
dispute between Pope Leo and Hilary of Arles in the mid-440s. 535
With central Gaul now under the firm political control of Ravenna by 419, Constantius turned
his attention to other troubled areas of the western empire. We have evidence of military action
along the Rhine frontier, probably in the year 421. 536 The fragmentary historian Renatus
Profuturus Frigeridus tells us that the comes domesticorum, Castinus, was sent to Gaul for a
campaign against the Franks. Different groups within this barbarian confederacy had in recent
years supported the regimes of both Constantine III and Jovinus. With the fall of these regimes,
either these or other groups of Franks had also sacked and burned the former provincial capital of
Trier. 537 Castinus’ campaign therefore suggests a concerted attempt to restore the Rhine frontier
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to imperial control. We have no notions of the success of this endeavor, though the fact that
when Castinus next appears in the sources, he is operating as MVM in 422 against the Vandals in
Spain, at least suggests that his campaign against the Franks achieved its objective. 538
A Burgundian group under the command of Guntiarius may also have received imperial
attention during these years. Guntiarius was one of the first supporters of Jovinus’ regime, along
with Goar of the Alans. 539 According to Prosper of Aquitaine, a group of Burgundians received
part of Gaul along the Rhine for settlement sometime in 413. 540 As this passage immediately
precedes Prosper’s notice of the rise and fall of Jovinus and his brother Sebastian, it is logical to
assume that Guntiarius received this settlement for his followers in return for his support of the
usurper’s regime. 541
After the fall of Jovinus, Guntiarius and his followers seem to have remained settled along the
Rhine frontier. In 435, Prosper records that Aëtius defeated a Burgundian king named
Gundichar, who was living in Gaul. Aëtius initially granted him peace, but the Huns later
destroyed the Burgundian settlement, killing Gundichar and many of his followers. 542 According

officials of Jovinus’ regime. The destruction of the city must therefore have occurred sometime between the fall of
Jovinus in 413 and Castinus’ campaign of c. 421. Bury, Later Roman Empire, 207, improbably dates the event to
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time of his writing in the early 440s. See Salvian, De gubernatione dei VI. 13.
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to the Gallic Chronicler of 452, Aëtius later settled the remnants of this Burgundian group in
Sapaudia in 443. 543
The names Γυντιάριος and Gundichar bear enough similarity to suggest that they possibly
represent the same person. 544 At the very least, the names may betray a familial connection.
Perhaps Gundichar was the son of the Guntiarius who had established the original settlement in
413. Regardless, the endurance of the Burgundian settlement between 413 and 435 suggests that
Ravenna had at some point given its tacit approval to Jovinus’ agreement with Guntiarius,
allowing the settlement to continue. A treaty between Constantius and Guntiarius may have
occurred as early as 413, shortly before or after the fall of Jovinus. 545 It may also plausibly
belong to this later period, c.421, when Constantius looked to reestablish the Rhine frontier once
the central Gallic provinces had again returned to imperial control.
Imperial attention also returned to the province of Gallaecia in Spain during this period. Since
the withdrawal of Wallia and his followers in 418, the imperial government had apparently
allowed the Suebi and Vandals of this province to remain in peace. However, Hydatius tells us
that in 419 a dispute arose between Gunderic, the king of the Vandals, and Hermeric, the king of
the Suebi. The Vandals then blockaded the Suebi in the Erbasian Mountains. 546 Hydatius
provides no indication of what caused this initial dispute between the Suebi and Vandals. 547
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Hydatius’ peculiar entry for following year, however, deserves to be translated in full: “After the
blockade of the Sueves had been abandoned, with Asterius the comes Hispaniarum threatening,
and after certain men under the vicarius Maurocellus had been killed in their flight from Braga,
with Gallaecia having been left behind, the Vandals crossed over into Baetica.” 548
Most scholarly narratives of this period interpret Hydatius’ passage as a Roman intervention
in a dispute between the Vandals and Suebi. 549 Some scholars also present Asterius campaign in
420 as a victory over the Vandals, at least partially because Asterius was raised to the status of
patricius sometime before 422, which might be construed as his reward. 550 As Kulikowski has
shown, however, this latter interpretation is impossible to maintain based on Hydatius’ text
alone. Not only does Hydatius mention the deaths of Romans in his passage, but the actual
consequence of Asterius’ campaign is the move of the Vandals from a largely insignificant
province into Baetica, the heart of Roman Spain. The key to understanding the success of
Asterius is to include a fact that Hydatius fails to mention. Either as part of his campaign against
the Vandals or as a separate action, Asterius’ real purpose in 420 was the suppression of the
second rise of the usurper Maximus. 551
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As we have seen, the general Gerontius raised Maximus to the purple in 409 in order to build
his own regime against that of his former master, the usurper Constantine III. Maximus remained
in power until 411, when the death of Gerontius led to his deposition. According to Orosius,
Maximus then fled for his own safety to live among the barbarians of Spain. 552
Our sources are far more fragmentary for the second usurpation of Maximus, amounting to
little more than chronicle notices. Three sources, the Gallic Chronicle of 452, the Consularia
Ravennatia, and the Chronicon of Marcellinus Comes, all testify to the fact that Maximus was
displayed and killed during the celebration of the thirty-year anniversary, or tricennalia, of
Honorius’ accession to the purple in 422. 553 Both the Consularia Ravennatia and Marcellinus
Comes also mention a second individual, referred to as “Jovinianus” and “Jovinus” respectively,
who also shared Maximus’ fate on this occasion. Although otherwise unknown, Marcellinus’
comment that both Maximus and Jovinus were led from Spain in irons, suggests that this Jovinus
or Jovinianus was a high-ranking member of Maximus’ regime. 554
While several chronicle accounts note the end of Maximus’ regime, we possess only a single
passage regarding the beginning of the second rebellion. The Gallic Chronicle of 452 tells us that
“The tyrant Maximus obtains the mastery of Spain by force.” 555 Though the internal chronology
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of the Gallic Chronicle is notoriously imprecise, Kulikowski establishes a rough date of between
July 419 and February 421 for the second rise of Maximus based on the evidence of surrounding
passages. 556 Kulikowski further shows that the comes Hispaniarum, Asterius, was engaged in a
campaign against a usurper in 420, drawing on the separate evidence of a letter of the layman
Consentius to Augustine of Hippo. 557 In consideration of the chronicler Hydatius’ evidence for
the career of the comes Hispaniarum in the province of Gallaecia during this year, Kulikowski
concludes that Asterius was engaged in a campaign against Maximus, with the Vandal campaign
serving as a side project or a direct consequence of the suppression of the usurper’s regime.
Asterius was therefore awarded the patrician dignity sometime in 421 for his success in defeating
and capturing Maximus. 558
Given that Maximus’ first usurpation in 409 and his second in 419/420 both occurred in the
Spanish provinces, it is interesting that Hydatius fails to mention the usurper in his chronicle,
especially as he provides detail on all of the other usurpers who rose and fell during the first two
decades of the fifth century. Considering his origin in Gallaecia, the province that saw Maximus’
second rise to power, it is possible that either Hydatius in his youth or certain of his relatives
were associated with Maximus’ second regime. We might therefore see the bishop’s failure to
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mention the usurper, even at the distance of over forty years, as a typical display of Roman
aristocratic silence concerning questionable associations in the past. 559
Regardless, Kulikowski’s article allows us to restore Maximus as the “elephant in the room”
to Hydatius’ entry for 420 cited above. As the entry stands, it is extremely difficult to establish
the relationship between the events that Hydatius describes. At its most basic, Hydatius tells us
that the Vandals crossed over into Baetica after Asterius had forced them to lift their siege of the
Sueves and after some men under the otherwise unattested vicarius Maurocellus had been killed
in their flight from Braga. The Latin seems to suggest that these two events, Asterius’ action
against the Vandals and the death of Maurocellus’ men, were somehow related to the Vandals’
entry into Baetica. Hydatius, however, is far from clear as to how these events fit together.
Kulikowski’s argument for Asterius’ campaign against Maximus in this year may provide
some speculative context for Hydatius’ disparate events. Previous readings of this passage have
assumed that Maurocellus, as a Roman official, was aligned to Asterius. As we have seen,
however, the presence of a usurper complicates the easy interpretation of political alignments
based on notions of ethnic identity. Though Hydatius seems at pains to frame these events as a
simple case of Romans versus barbarians, the previous examples of usurpations in the first two
decades of the fifth century speak against such a simple interpretation, and in fact make it
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essential that we try to look beyond the surface of his narration. 560 If Maximus usurped the
purple for the second time in 419, as the Gallic Chronicle of 452 states, he would have possessed
an administration in some form staffed by Romans, just as Constantine III, Jovinus, Attalus, and
Maximus himself had possessed during his first regime from 409-411. The “Jovinus” of
Marcellinus Comes or the “Jovinianus” of the Consularia Ravennatia, who was executed with
Maximus in 422, was probably one such high-ranking member of this imperial consistory. It is
also probable that Maximus would have established his court in an administrative center. 561
Braga was the provincial capital of Gallaecia and therefore the largest center of imperial power
(and the infrastructure it required) in the region. Braga is therefore the most likely site for
Maximus to have established his court.
This goes some way towards explaining the place of Maurocellus in Hydatius’ entry. A
vicarius was an imperial official responsible for the civil administration of a diocese. 562 The
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Spanish diocesan capital was located at Mérida, in the province of Lusitania, far away from
Braga in Gallaecia. It is therefore difficult to explain Hydatius’ placement of the vicarius
Maurocellus in Braga in 420. Furthermore, as a civilian official, the vicarius had no command
over imperial troops. 563 The men who died under Maurocellus therefore cannot have been
Roman soldiers. While it is true that certain non-commissioned, lieutenant commanders of
military units, usually serving in lieu of the official tribune, were referred to as vicarii, it is hard
to imagine why Hydatius would have felt the need to mention a man of such insignificant status,
much less by name. 564 A far more likely scenario is that Maurocellus was indeed a civilian
vicarius of the Spanish diocese. If he was serving at Braga in 420 that was probably because he
was a member of Maximus’ regime, occupying a fundamentally hollow position in much the
same way that Paulinus of Pella filled the role of comes privatarum largitionum for the usurper
Attalus in 414. 565 The men who died in their flight from Braga were therefore probably civilian
officials aligned to Maximus, fleeing the advent of Asterius’ army and the collapse of Maximus’
regime.
Maximus’ relationship to the Vandals and Suebi of Gallaecia is also unclear, though Orosius’
testimony for Maximus’ residence among the “barbarians” between usurpations, combined with
Hydatius’ entry for the year 420, suggests that they played some part in the events associated
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with the second usurpation. 566 Given what little know of this event, it is easy to see the Vandals
as supporters of Maximus’ regime and the Suebi as fighting on behalf of Ravenna. Some
scholars have hypothesized that Maximus’ second rise came at the instigation of Gunderic, the
Vandal king, who wished to play the role of barbarian “kingmaker” in much the same way as had
Alaric and Athaulf. 567 As we have seen, Wallia’s attested marriage alliance with the Suebian
royal family also suggests that the Suebi may have formed their own treaty with imperial
government of Ravenna. 568 Though the precise relationship between these groups is unknowable,
these general political alignments fit well with the current reconstruction.
In this scenario, Maximus received the support of the Vandals for his second usurpation in
419. Like the barbarian involvement with the regimes of Attalus and Jovinus, the Vandals
formed either part or the entirety of the military arm of the new regime. 569 Barbarian support
alone, however, counted for little without the active acquiescence of the Roman aristocracy to
form a viable government. As with the British and northern Gallic provincials in 407, the
Gallaecians had reason to feel neglected by the central government in Ravenna in 419. While
Constantius had used Wallia’s forces to deal with the barbarian intruders in the other provinces
of the Spanish peninsula, he had apparently left Gallaecia to continue to suffer the depredations
of the local Vandals and Suebi. Left to their own devices and dependent on local self-help, it is
possible that the Gallaecian noble families saw the potential for the return of some established
566
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order in the rise of Maximus, and consequently offered their support. 570 Maximus would
therefore have recruited men from local Gallaecian noble families to fill the ranks of his new
consistory, including Jovinus and Maurocellus, as well as possibly some relatives of the future
bishop and chronicler Hydatius. With this collective support, Maximus established his regime at
the Gallaecian provincial capital at Braga.
If the Suebi were allied to Ravenna, then the Vandal attack and blockade of this group in 419
would make some sense as a necessary consequence of their support for Maximus. Asterius
would have marched in 420 both to relieve Roman allies as well as to put down Maximus’
rebellion. 571 His campaign was successful on both fronts. The comes Hispaniarum successfully
diverted the Vandal blockade of the Suebi and then turned his attention to Maximus’
administrative stronghold at Braga. In addition to Maximus himself, Asterius also captured or
killed certain of the usurper’s officers, who attempted to flee the province once they realized that
their defeat was inevitable. Some of these officers may also have accompanied the Vandals in
their retreat from Gallaecia at the end of the campaign. 572 As the suppression of the Vandals was
not Asterius’ main objective, their movement into the heart of the Spanish diocese was an
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acceptable consequence of the suppression of Maximus’ regime. Previous experience with the
barbarians of Spain would have suggested that the imperial government could have dealt with
them easily when time and resources permitted. The Vandal entry into Baetica was therefore
only a disaster with the benefit of hindsight, a luxury which we, of course, possess but was
absent from contemporary views of Asterius’ campaign.
This reconstruction of Hydatius’ entry for 420 in light of recent scholarship on Maximus’
second usurpation must obviously remain an exercise in speculation. The surviving evidence
does not permit solid conclusions and the safest route is simply to acknowledge the established
facts of the events: Asterius successfully suppressed Maximus’ second usurpation and also
fought the Vandals in 420. For the former action, he received the honor of the patriciate
sometime after 421. 573 Maximus himself was paraded and executed in the celebration of
Honorius’ tricennalia in 422. 574 From the perspective of Ravenna, Asterius’ campaign had
restored the imperial status quo in the Spanish peninsula.
Perhaps the key factor in the decision to raise Asterius to the rank of patricius was
Constantius’ own elevation to the purple on February 8, 421. 575 While several sources use the
term patricius to identify the dominant military figure in the imperial court, the patriciate was in
fact a purely honorary title that denoted status rather than office. Stilicho never seems to have
held the title during his domination of the western court from 395-408, and several men are

573

Gregory of Tours, Historia II. 9. For the date, see Kulikowski, “Asterius”, 127-128.

574

Gallic Chronicle of 452, 89; Consularia Ravennatia s.a. 422; Marcellinus comes, Chronicon s.a. 422.

575

Kulikowski, “Asterius”, 127-128. For the date, see Theophanes, Chronographia AM 5913.

215

attested as patricii alongside the generalissimo Aëtius from 435-454. 576 Nevertheless, the title
denoted high dignity and influence, especially when awarded to a military officer. Constantius is
the only known imperial official to have received the title in the second decade of the fifth
century, a fact that may owe something to his on-going struggle for dominance in the court of
Honorius from 410 to 421. Constantius’ accession to the purple, however, firmly secured this
dominance and perhaps opened the way for others, such as Asterius, to receive the coveted
title. 577
Constantius’ rise to the imperial throne was the end result of a series of measures intended to
secure his position as the power behind Honorius’ throne. After the years of potential political
and dynastic complications associated with the marriage of Placidia and Athaulf, Constantius
refortified his position with his marriage to Placidia in 417. 578 This union produced a child in
either late 417 or 418, a daughter named Iusta Grata Honoria. 579 In early July, 419, Placidia gave
birth to a son, Placidus Valentinianus. 580 Constantius’ marriage into the imperial family and the
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birth of a clear heir to the western throne of the childless Honorius should have solidified the
MVM’s authority in the imperial court. The pressure he apparently exerted on Honorius to raise
him to imperial colleague, would therefore seem an unnecessary and possibly dangerous
initiative.
There is evidence, however, that Constantius was correct to view his position in 420/421 as
potentially unstable. Not only had Honorius repeatedly displayed his susceptibility to the
intrigues of court factions, Olympiodorus is clear that Constantius’ marriage to Placidia was far
from a model of contentment. As we have seen, after her return to her brother’s control in late
415/416, Placidia rejected Constantius’ overtures for a year, creating a minor court scandal. She
seems to have acquiesced to the marriage only after Honorius himself forced her to do so on
January 1, 417. 581 A second anecdote from Olympiodorus, set in the brief period of Constantius
and Honorius’ co-rule, suggests that these problems continued in later years. According to the
historian, Placidia threatened to divorce the Emperor Constantius unless he ordered the execution
of a magician who claimed to have to power to fight barbarians with magic rather than
swords. 582 While the anecdote offers tantalizingly suggestive evidence of Placidia’s religious
sentiments as well as the possibility of some barbarian threat in 421, for our purposes it is a clear
indication that, even after four years of marriage, Placidia was willing to use the threat of divorce
to force Constantius’ adherence to her will regarding an apparently minor incident. 583
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Finally, Honorius does not seem to have willingly acknowledged Valentinian as his heir. The
emperor was childless in 419. The fact that he had dissolved his marriage to Stilicho’s daughter
Thermantia in 408 and never remarried made it even more likely that he would die without issue.
The birth of Valentinian in 419, however, provided a clear heir to the western throne of the
Theodosian dynasty. As Valentinian’s father, Constantius could expect to continue his
dominance of the imperial court at least through his son’s childhood and possibly beyond.
Nevertheless, Olympiodorus tells us that Honorius conferred the standard title of nobilissimus
puer on Valentinian only at the urging of Placidia. 584 The fact that Placidia was forced to work
through her brother suggests that the event occurred before the rise of Constantius to the purple
in 421. If Valentinian had not received this rank by the time of Constantius’ accession, then there
is every reason to assume that Constantius himself would have conferred the dignity in much the
same way as he would later join with Honorius to raise Placidia to the rank of Augusta. 585 Since
Olympiodorus suggests that Honorius alone approved the decision, the event must belong to the
period between July 419 (Valentinian’s birth) and February 421 (Constantius’ imperial
accession). 586
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The title of nobilissimus was little more than an honorary rank for children born to the
imperial family. 587 Placidia herself had received the title nobilissima at some point in her youth,
as her brother Honorius had been named nobilissimus in c. 386. 588 In the eastern empire, three of
the daughters of the Emperor Arcadius, Pulcheria, Marina, and Flaccilla are also attested as
bearing the title. 589 For this reason, the dignity seems to have represented little more than that the
recipient was an acknowledged member of the imperial house. Nevertheless, the facts of
Honorius’ childlessness and Valentinian’s pedigree meant that the emperor’s official recognition
of Valentinian as a member of the imperial family was also tantamount to adding the imperial
stamp on the child’s obvious biological claims to western throne. 590 As such, Honorius’ granting
the dignity to Valentinian could only provide an additional prop to the power of his sister,
Placidia, and especially to that of his dominant MVM, Constantius. We might therefore see
Honorius’ reluctance to grant Valentinian the title of nobilissimus as the emperor’s attempt to
maintain his position in the face of the growing power of Constantius and Placidia’s regime. In
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the end, however, Honorius was again swayed from his hard-line position and succumbed to
Placidia’s pleas, granting Valentinian the dignity sometime before 421. 591
Olympiodorus’ testimony suggests that Constantius’ hold on power remained tenuous before
421. His marriage to Placidia, which should have ensured the stability of his position, was
troubled from the beginning and seems to have remained a rocky affair. It was therefore difficult
for him to predicate his claims to power on the same sort of community of interest that Placidia
and Athaulf had previously shared. Moreover, the Emperor Honorius seems to have worked
passively against Constantius’ attempts to establish further support for his influence, as
suggested by the emperor’s initial failure to acknowledge the birth of Valentinian. In these
circumstances, Constantius may have seen his survival as contingent on his rise to the purple,
regardless of the obviously inherent advantages of occupying the imperial throne.
In February of 421, Constantius therefore forced the Emperor Honorius to recognize him as
an imperial colleague. In light of Honorius’ past actions, we hardly require Olympiodorus’
confirmation that Honorius did so involuntarily. 592 Constantius’ rise to the purple was no more
popular among the eastern branch of the Theodosian dynasty. The Emperor Theodosius II
rejected the portraits sent to the east to proclaim Constantius’ assumption of the imperial dignity.
According to Olympiodorus and Philostorgius, Constantius planned to avenge this slight through
a military expedition against the eastern empire. 593 We may debate whether or not such a civil
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war would ever have actually broken out between the eastern and western empires, but the
potential for another “cold war” such as had occupied the two halves of the empire under
Stilicho’s regime was certainly present. 594 Both scenarios, however, were averted with the death
of the new emperor from pleurisy in early September 421. In the end, Constantius himself seems
to have regretted his elevation, not for the staunch opposition he faced from the Theodosian
dynasty, but for the more mundane consideration of the hindrances the imperial title brought to
the daily conduct of his life. 595 The ultimate irony, however, is that after a career built on the
suppression of usurpers, we might view Constantius as the most successful usurper of the first
two decades of the fifth century. Working within the legitimate power structures of the Honorian
regime, Constantius managed to force his way to the height of imperial power. As with the
deaths of the previous usurpers, however, there is little reason to believe that anyone among the
Theodosian dynasty mourned his passing.
Constantius’ death seems to have brought an initial period of concord between the siblings.
Olympiodorus tells us that the close relationship between the emperor and his sister caused
Honorius to ignore the many lawsuits that poured into Ravenna concerning Constantius’ illegal
acquisition of property during his marriage to Placidia. 596 The historian also provides the detail
that the relationship between the siblings grew so close that scandalous rumors began to
circulate, particularly due to their frequent habit of kissing on the mouth. 597 Court rumors aside,
it is probably best to see such behavior as the result of Constantius’ absence. Honorius could
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now enjoy his power as the single emperor, while Placidia could probably relish her
independence from an onerous husband. 598
Nevertheless, such concord at the imperial court was short lived. Olympiodorus claims that a
conspiracy of Placidia’s advisors, including a woman named Spadusa, her nurse, Elpidia, and the
curator of her estates, Leontius, caused the downturn of the siblings’ relationship. 599 These may
represent the same advisors who had previously encouraged Placidia to reject Constantius’
marriage proposals, thus earning the ire of the MVM in 416. 600 As on this previous occasion,
however, there is little reason to credit Placidia’s actions solely to the whims of her advisors.
Over the years, Placidia had proven herself an ambitious individual, fully capable of navigating
the intricacies of imperial politics. By 422, she held the official rank of Augusta and possessed
strong ties to the military aristocracy, including Theodoric’s court in Gaul. Most importantly, she
was the mother of the obvious heir to the western throne. Such considerations perhaps made the
conflict that erupted between Placidia and Honorius in 422 the inevitable result of two
individuals determined to maintain and exert their own power.
Regardless, the conflict that began in the court eventually led to fighting in the streets of the
imperial capital. Placidia possessed a large following of barbarian protectors from her marriages
to Athaulf and Constantius, in addition to whatever likely support she received from political or
military factions outside her immediate entourage. Olympiodorus tells us that partisans of
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Placidia and Honorius therefore frequently engaged in violence at Ravenna. 601 This conflict
between the siblings came to an end with an apparent victory for Honorius’ faction. Placidia and
her followers retreated to Rome. Sometime in late 422/423, Honorius took the further step of
banishing Placidia and her children, Honoria and Valentinian, from the western empire
altogether. The family was therefore forced to take up residence with the eastern branch of the
Theodosian dynasty at Constantinople. 602
The factional discord that broke out between Placidia and Honorius in 422 may also have
played a direct or indirect role in the events surrounding the disastrous Vandal expedition of the
same year. As we have seen, Asterius crushed the second regime of Maximus in 420. One
unintended consequence of his victory, however, was the retreat of the Vandals from the
province of Gallaecia into Baetica. 603 From the perspective of 420, this was hardly more than a
modestly irritating byproduct of a successful campaign against a usurper, and probably did little
to blemish Asterius’ fame. Nevertheless, Baetica was the heart of the Spanish diocese, and
Ravenna could hardly allow this threat to the functioning imperial administration to continue
indefinitely. The moment of reckoning came in 422, when an imperial army under the command
of the new MVM Castinus, along with a detachment of Visigothic auxiliaries, was sent to Spain
to bring Gunderic and his Vandals to heel. Unfortunately for the Roman forces, the resulting
campaign was an unmitigated disaster.
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Even before departing Ravenna, the military leadership of the campaign suffered from
internal friction. Boniface, one of the subordinate officers, refused to accept Castinus’ command
and fled to Africa, where he seems to have established a quasi-independent regime. 604 Now
lacking an important commander, Castinus and the Roman forces proceeded into Spain. After
initial successes against the Vandals, the Roman army suffered a massive defeat on the
battlefield. Hydatius, our only detailed source for the battle, at least partially credits the defeat to
some mysterious treachery of Castinus’ Visigothic auxiliaries. The Vandals were left in Baetica
to regroup, leading to further depredations of the Spanish provinces, while Castinus and the
surviving Roman forces retreated to the province of Tarraconensis. 605
Scholars have long viewed the problems surrounding the Vandal campaign of 422 in light of
the contemporary conflict between Placidia and Honorius. Because of Boniface’ attested loyalty
to Placidia after her exile, several scholars have interpreted the conflict between Castinus and
Boniface as resulting from factional discord within the imperial house. These narratives present
Castinus as the champion of Honorius, and therefore the implacable enemy of Placidia, while
Boniface’s political alignment rested solely with the Augusta. 606 Scholars such as Freeman,
Stein, Oost, and Zecchini take this hypothesis one step further to suggest that Boniface was
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acting on Placidia’s behalf in seizing control of the African provinces. 607 Finally, Zecchini sees
Placidia’s ties to the Visigoths as the cause of the obscure Visigothic treachery that cost Castinus
his victory against the Vandals of Baetica in 422. 608
All of these reconstructions are certainly possible. As we have seen, Placidia had already
attempted to establish her own control over the western empire from 414-415. She also seems to
have maintained close ties to the Visigothic royal family of Theodoric, upon whom she may have
called for support before her exile in 423. Similarly, Boniface’s loyalty and support for Placidia
would characterize much of his subsequent career. 609 It is therefore tempting to assume that
Placidia brought the full force of her influence to bear during her dispute with Honorius in
422/423, resulting in a large-scale effort to wrest imperial power from her weak brother and
claim the regency for her son Valentinian. Nevertheless, the evidence for such a dramatic
reconstruction is severely lacking, and in some cases, our sources offer far more mundane
solutions. Therefore, while the crisis at the imperial center in 422 probably informed events
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elsewhere in the western empire, it is difficult to interpret any of these events as a direct result of
Placidia’s influence. 610
The disastrous 422 campaign against the Vandals was apparently plagued with problems from
the outset. Even before Castinus had left Ravenna, a serious conflict had arisen among the
military leadership of the campaign. Prosper tells us that Castinus, “by a foolish and harmful
command, turned Boniface, a man famous enough in the arts of war, from participation in his
expedition. For that man, having considered it dangerous to himself and unworthy to follow one
who had proven himself disagreeable and proud, quickly rushed away to Portus and from thence
to Africa. This was the beginning of the many following hardships and disasters for the state.” 611
Since his first appearance in the sources as the defender of Marseilles against the forces of
Athaulf in 413, Boniface seems to have risen quickly through the ranks of Constantius’ military
establishment. Four years after Marseilles, we find him in Africa commanding a body of
federates against Mauretanian raiders. Though we do not know his rank, his fame seems to have
grown from the daring military exploits which he carried out during this period. 612 He also seems
to have used this fame to build an important base of support in Africa. He carried on an active
epistolary exchange with Augustine of Hippo and obviously established important contacts with
other regional officials, both civilian (including ecclesiastical) and military, which would aid him
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in the years to come. 613 The fact that Boniface was present at Ravenna in 422 may suggest that
he had received promotion to tribune of the imperial scholae for his exemplary service in
Africa. 614 Members of this body were frequently detached for special assignments and military
service in various regions. His orders to support Castinus’ campaign in 422 would therefore fit
well with the expectations of this position. As the tribunes of the scholae reported to the magister
officiorum, rather than the MVM, however, this assignment may also explain some of the friction
between Boniface and Castinus. 615
Following his conflict with Castinus, Boniface fled the palace in Ravenna and retreated to
Africa. Prosper, though noting that the conflict was a source of future problems for the state,
clearly supports Boniface and therefore presents his flight to Africa in an ambiguous light.
Hydatius, however, is much more direct in his presentation. After the entry describing Castinus’
disastrous campaign against the Vandals, he states simply, “Boniface, abandoning the palace,
invades Africa” (Bonifatius palatium deserens Africam inuadit). 616 Boniface therefore seems to
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have taken control of the African provinces illegally, in essence usurping the imperial
prerogative of the Honorian regime. 617
Our sources for this period provide no details for Boniface’s invasion of the African
provinces or the methods he used to establish his control over the region. As previously
discussed, Boniface’s military fame derived from his exploits in this region of the empire and he
seems to have created a network of influential contacts during his earlier residence. These
contacts may have made the invasion and Boniface’s rise to power a relatively bloodless affair,
especially if he presented his actions as a consequence of the conflict between Placidia and
Honorius at Ravenna during this year. Boniface raised no usurper in the African provinces and
could therefore claim continued allegiance to the Theodosian house through his support for the
Augusta Placidia.
It is easy to interpret Boniface’s conflict with Castinus and his invasion of Africa as part of
the factional violence between Placidia and Honorius during this year. 618 The sources are clear
that Boniface fled from the palace to Africa, suggesting that his conflict with Castinus began at
Ravenna in 422. Boniface’s support for Placidia during her period of exile is also well
attested. 619 Such a scenario may also explain the apparent ease with which Boniface usurped the
command structure of the African provinces. Italian senators had long held effective control over
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the African provinces as both imperial officials and extensive landowners. 620 If the factional
conflict between Placidia and Honorius came to involve the major Italian senatorial families,
then it is possible that senatorial supporters of Placidia colluded with Boniface, as her emissary,
to ensure the establishment of her control over this rich and vital region. 621
While such a scenario is indeed possible, our single source for the cause of Boniface’s
African invasion suggests a much more mundane solution. Prosper clearly attributes Boniface’s
actions in 422 to a dispute between two ambitious military leaders. In preparation for the
campaign against the Vandals, Castinus gave an order that offended Boniface and made him
averse to joining the expedition under Castinus’ leadership. Boniface then fled the palace,
apparently to avoid the repercussions of his insubordination. 622
Prosper’s explanation of the affair as a clash of egos is both succinct and thoroughly
believable. Rather than attributing the conflict between Castinus and Boniface to court
factionalism, Prosper suggests that Boniface only later utilized the dispute between Placidia and
Honorius to justify the result of his own ambitions and wounded pride. As a professed supporter
of Placidia, Boniface could claim continued loyalty to the Theodosian house, while actively
subverting the will of Honorius through his illegal seizure of the African provinces. Indeed, the
general would use the same tactic in his dispute with another superior officer, Constantius Felix,
while serving under Placidia’s own administration. 623 As this later rebellion shows, Boniface was
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perfectly capable and willing to use violent action to achieve his own ambitions, regardless of
imperial politics. There is therefore little reason to suspect that some ulterior motive associated
with his loyalty to Placidia’s faction in 422 drove him to seize the African provinces. 624
Boniface therefore seems to have positioned himself as a quasi-imperial official in 422,
manipulating a crisis at the imperial center for his own ends. In this role, he followed the
example of both Alaric (395-408) and Gildo (397-398), who had previously navigated the
conflicts between the eastern and western empires in pursuit of their own advantage. 625 All three
men used aggression to advance their positions while operating thoroughly within existing
imperial power structures. The dispute between Placidia and Honorius at Ravenna in 422 simply
allowed Boniface to narrow the context of his play for power to the western empire alone.
Ultimately, Boniface’s manipulation of the conflict at the center of Roman power was
successful. His actions in 422 brought no visible reprisals and his control of Africa seems to have
received official recognition by at least late 423. The award of the rank of comes Africae could
have come from either Honorius or from Theodosius II after the death of his uncle in August of
423. 626 Circumstantial evidence, however, would suggest that Honorius himself regularized
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Boniface’s position, thereby establishing a working status quo with his errant official after the
exile of Placidia in early 423. 627
What effect, if any, Boniface’s absence had on the subsequent outcome of the Vandal
campaign is unknown. 628 Hydatius provides our only real details of this disastrous conflict. The
chronicler tells us that Castinus was initially successful, starving the Vandals into submission
through the use of an effective siege. The tide turned, however, when Castinus attempted to
engage the Vandals in open battle. According to the chronicler, Castinus was defeated due to
both his own rash decision and the treachery of his auxiliaries. After the battle, he was forced to
flee to Tarraco. 629
Hydatius’ account of the battle provides few details, and though he cites two causes for the
Roman defeat, the exact circumstances remain unclear. Based solely on the evidence that
Hydatius provides, it is difficult to interpret Castinus’ decision to engage the Vandals as
somehow rash or reckless (inconsulte). In addition to the fact that the Vandals were weakened by
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source survival, it is difficult to imagine that Ravenna would allow this most implicit threat of Boniface’s illegal
control of Africa to linger from 422 until the death of Honorius in August of 423. For these conclusions, see de
Lepper, “Bonifatii”, 38-39.
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As previously noted, Sirago suggests that Boniface’s absence on the campaign caused the Visigothic troops to
rebel from Castinus’ leadership. His conclusions, however, are speculative given what little we know of the battle.
See Sirago, Galla Placidia, 235-236.
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Hydatius Chronicon 69 [77]: Castinus magister militum cum magna manu et auxiliis Gothorum bellum in Betica
Vandalis infert; quos cum ad inopiam ui obsidionis artaret adeo ut se tradere iam pararent, inconsulte publico
certamine confligens auxiliorum fraude deceptus ad Terraconam victus effugit.
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starvation, the Roman army traditionally excelled in set-piece battles. Castinus would have had
little reason to doubt that his army would perform well under these circumstances. 630
Hydatius is also unclear with regard to his second stated cause of the Roman defeat, the
treachery or deceit (fraus) of the Visigothic auxiliaries. Specifically, it is impossible to determine
the nature of this “treachery” or when it occurred in relation to the battle. 631 Nevertheless, if
Hydatius’ information is correct on the weakened conditions among the Vandal army before the
battle, then Visigothic insubordination on the battlefield may offer some explanation for the 422
debacle.
While Hydatius offers no explanation for the cause of this Visigothic “treachery” in 422, it is
possible to see this action as deriving from the factional conflicts between Placidia and Honorius
at Ravenna in this year. 632 As we have seen, Placidia possessed strong family ties to the court of
Theodoric which probably played a large role in securing Visigothic loyalty to imperial
initiatives after 419. As these ties bound the Visigoths directly to Placidia rather than to the
central government of Honorius, it is reasonable to assume that any threat or action against the
Augusta had the potential to strain the political alliance between Theodoric and the Honorian
regime. We may therefore interpret whatever treacherous action the Visigothic auxiliaries took in
422 as a direct result of the dispute between Placidia and Honorius at the imperial center,
especially if Honorius had already exiled Placidia from Ravenna at the time of the battle. The
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Stein suggests that the Visigoths joined the Vandal troops. See Stein, Histoire, I. 275. Wolfram, however,
assumes that the Visigothic auxiliaries simply deserted from the Roman army. See Wolfram, History of the Goths,
175. Heather finds Hydatius’ statement suspect, noting the chronicler’s hatred for the Visigoths. See Heather,
Roman Empire, 266.
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absence of Placidia as the locus of Visigothic loyalty would have considerably weakened the
active adherence of Theodoric and his followers to imperial initiatives.
A late source, the Chronicon of Cassiodorus, composed in the first half of the sixth century,
may offer some suggestive evidence that Placidia actively recruited Visigothic support in her
conflict with Honorius. The chronicler claims that Honorius exiled Placidia and her children
from the western empire on the suspicion that Placidia had summoned enemies (hostes) against
him. 633 Cassiodorus places this entry under the year 423, the date of Placidia’s exile to the east.
The chronicler gives no indication as to the identity of these “enemies” and it is possible that the
entry is simply a reference to the factional violence that consumed Ravenna in the year 422.
Nevertheless, the chronicler’s statement that Placidia was suspected of “summoning” these
enemies (invitatorum hostium) at least suggests that they were located outside the political
sphere of Ravenna. Given the close ties between Placidia and Theodoric’s court, the obvious
conclusion is that Placidia was suspected of calling the Visigoths to her aid in her struggles with
her brother, Honorius. 634
With regard to the current discussion, however, it is important to note that Cassiodorus briefly
mentions the expedition against the Vandals in an entry for the year 422 and makes no effort to
tie the results of this campaign to Placidia’s suspicious activity recorded under the year 423. 635
The chronicler does not mention Visigoths in either context, nor does he address the disastrous
failure of Castinus’ campaign. These circumstances render any effort to tie Hydatius’ Visigothic

633

Cassiodorus, Chronicon s.a. 423: His conss. Placidia Augusta a fratre Honorio ob suspicionem invitatorum
hostium cum Honorio et Valentiniano filiis ad Orientem mittitur.
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Cassiodorus, Chronicon s.a. 422: His conss. excercitus ad Hispanias contra Vandalos missus est.
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“treachery” in 422 to Placidia’s direct influence inconclusive. If the Visigoths are indeed the
“enemies” that Placidia was suspected of summoning to her aid in c.422/423, her efforts to
recruit these allies must have occurred sometime after their participation in Castinus’ campaign.
If her pleas occurred earlier, their active participation in the imperial endeavor would make little
sense. Therefore, while the Visigoths’ treachery during the battle may have resulted from the
conflict between Placidia and Honorius at the imperial center, it is difficult to use the suggestive
evidence of Cassiodorus to explain this treachery.
Given Hydatius’ vague account, the most plausible solution is that the battle simply
represents one of the rare military flukes that sometimes cost the Romans so dearly. The
chronicler’s inability to pinpoint any one cause for the defeat suggests that there were a variety
of different contemporary viewpoints on where the blame should ultimately lie. The accusations
of Visigothic treachery and Castinus’ recklessness therefore may represent little more than
scapegoats for contemporaries attempting to make sense of the inexplicable defeat of a Roman
army by weary band of barbarians. If we associate Castinus’ debacle with the Gallic Chronicle of
452’s later notice of the Vandal slaughter of 20,000 Roman troops, then the resulting scale of the
defeat would certainly indicate that such scapegoats were required. 636 Even if the Gallic
Chronicler inflated the number of Roman dead, the defeat was apparently decisive, forcing a
complete retreat from the province of Baetica. Castinus himself would have required some
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Gallic Chronicle of 452, 107: XX ferme milia militum in Hispaniis contra Vandalos pugnantium caesa. For the
attribution of this entry to Castinus’ 422 campaign against the Vandals, see Kulikowski, Late Roman Spain, 371, n.
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explanation to maintain his position and Visigothic treachery might have provided a convenient
excuse. 637
While it is therefore tempting to view the military and political tumults of 422 as the active
efforts of Placidia to seize control of the western empire, the sources as they stand cannot
support such an interpretation. The conflict between Placidia and Honorius that brought violence
to the streets of Ravenna in this year certainly seems to have informed events elsewhere,
particularly in the case of Boniface’s rebellion, but scholarly attempts to argue for lines of direct
causation are fundamentally weakened by a lack of evidence. As we have seen, Hydatius offers
no explanation for the purported Visigothic treachery in Castinus’ campaign. Furthermore, while
Boniface may have used his loyalty to Placidia to justify his seizure of the African provinces,
there is no indication that he actually took this action on her behalf. The same general would use
similar tactics under Placidia’s regency in 427 in his dispute with another superior officer, the
MVM Constantius Felix. Boniface’s actions on both occasions would suggest that he was
utilizing a new, more subtle form of political revolt: rather than raising a usurper, he was content
with usurping the imperial prerogative while professing continued loyalty to Theodosian
dynasty. Such tactics would have both a long future and a devastating effect on the later political
life of the western empire.
While we cannot see Placidia as the direct author of the larger problems that plagued the
empire in 422, Honorius seems to have interpreted her actions as enough of a threat to warrant
the expulsion of his sister and her family from the western empire. In late 422/423, Placidia and
her children traveled to take refuge with the eastern branch of the Theodosian dynasty at
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Constantinople. Unfortunately for the former Augusta, there is every reason to suppose that she
faced a bleak reception in the eastern court. Placidia was the widow of both Athaulf, whose death
was celebrated in Constantinople, and the Emperor Constantius III, who had received no
recognition in the eastern empire. 638 Rumors of her association with homoean Christianity while
married to Athaulf, as suggested in the Chronicon Paschale, may also have offended the
orthodox sensibilities of the eastern court. 639 Finally, contrary to the claims of Valentinian,
Theodosius II may have had his own plans for the future of the western empire. Honorius
himself had probably stripped Placidia and Valentinian of their titles, of Augusta and
nobilissimus respectively, during the conflict with his sister in 422. 640 Neverthless, Theodosius II
seems to have made no move to restore these ranks, possibly suggesting that he intended to
extend his own control over the western empire once his uncle died without a recognized heir. 641
If Theodosius harbored such thoughts 423, however, the events following the death of
Honorius in August of the same year made the error of his judgment quite clear. The exile of
Placidia and Valentinian meant that there was no representative of the Theodosian dynasty
present in the west to smooth the transition of imperial power. In this circumstance, a new
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Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 33. 1 = Müller-Dindorf 34; Philostorgius, Historia ecclesiastica XII. 12.

Chronicon Paschale s.a. 385: Θεοδόσιος ὁ Αὔγουστος ἔσχεν πρώτην γυναῖκα πρὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτοῦ Γάλλαν τὴν
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639

640

No source tells us when Placidia and Valentinian lost these dignities. Olympiodorus simply relates that
Theodosius II restored the titles just before the family set out for the campaign against the usurper John in 425. See
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641

As suggested by Stein, Histoire I, 282-283; Oost, Galla Placidia, 179-180; Holum, Theodosian Empresses, 128129; Stickler, Aëtius, 29-30. The proposition that Theodosius entertained such ambitions is rejected by Millar, Greek
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usurper claimed the imperial seat, forcing the Theodosian house to once again go to war to assert
its dominance over the western empire.
Overall, the events of these years bore ominous signs for the future conduct of political life in
the western empire. The second rise of the usurper Maximus represents that last attempt to
directly challenge the dynastically legitimate authority of the emperor Honorius in the Roman
provinces. By 420, however, such methods for the expression of political discontent with the
ruling regime were already becoming obsolete. After the death of the emperor Honorius in 423,
the western empire would see one final usurpation of Theodosian dynastic authority in the
regime of John from 423-425. As we will see in Chapter 7, however, John’s regime grew from
the confused political atmosphere in Italy following the death of Honorius and wholly failed to
garner widespread support.
Boniface’s African rebellion in 422 set the path for the future pursuit of political discontent in
the western empire. The career of Constantius III had already established techniques for the
acquisition of personal power within the structures of the dynastically legitimate ruling regime.
In rebelling against the emperor Honorius while continuing to maintain loyalty to the Theodosian
house, Boniface’s actions in 422 established a new method for political revolt on the
Constantinian paradigm. In the coming years, this new, more insidious, form of rebellion would
prove a far more devastating threat to the power and authority of reigning emperors than the
more direct challenge of usurpation, effectively undermining the authority of the imperial throne
from within, while shifting power to prominent generals in the emperor’s administration. As
such, Boniface’s rebellion in 422 is pivotal for understanding the decline of the prestige and
authority of the western imperial throne during the course of the fifth century.
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Chapter 7: Usurpation of John and the Rise of Valentinian III

The exile of Placidia and her family in 423 and the subsequent death of the emperor Honorius
later in the same year, once again threw the western empire into the political turmoil of a
usurpation. John, a former primicerius notariorum under Honorius, seized the now vacant
imperial throne on November 20, 423. The result was a new civil war between the eastern and
western empires for the restoration of the Theodosian dynasty. After a brief and largely bloodless
campaign, the usurper was defeated, and the six-year old son of Galla Placidia and Constantius
III, Valentinian, was acclaimed Augustus in the city of Rome on October 23, 425.
This chapter examines several themes within this overall narrative. First, it argues that John’s
regime was already on the verge of collapse before the eastern army set out from Thessalonica in
425. The true failure of John’s regime lay in his inability to garner wide-spread support for his
regime, especially among the western military administration. This fact further informs a
discussion of the role of the magister utriusque militiae (MVM) Castinus in John’s regime. In
contrast to the narratives of many scholars, this chapter argues that Castinus played no part in
John’s seizure of the purple and only offered lukewarm support to the subsequent regime. We
should therefore see Castinus’ consulship in 424 as John’s effort to recruit the general to his
cause.
After an examination of the progress of the 425 campaign, this chapter concludes that the ease
of the eastern invasion was a direct result of the military inadequacies of John’s regime. It also
situates the late arrival of a Hunnic auxiliary army under John’s cura palatii Aëtius in the larger
sphere of Hunnic political activity. Finally, this chapter offers some conclusions about the effects
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of the vicissitudes of power within the Honorian regime on the later political history of the
western empire.
As we saw in the last chapter, a calm seems to have settled on the western empire after the
conflict within the imperial family at Ravenna in 422. The ultimate consequence of Placidia and
Honorius’ dispute only emerged in the late summer of 423. On August 27, 423, the emperor
Honorius died of dropsy at the age of 38, roughly a year after celebrating his tricennalia. 642 His
death finally ended a disastrous reign marked by repeated usurpations and the serial domination
of various strongmen. Honorius’ lack of issue and the exile of Placidia and her children to
Constantinople further meant that there was no member of the Theodosian dynasty present in the
western empire to take up the imperial mantle. In many ways, Honorius’ failure to designate a
successor therefore marks the final act of misrule in a long history of ineptitude.
Given the turbulent history of the western empire under the Honorian regime, it seems
inevitable that a new usurper would rise to fill the power vacuum at the imperial center in
precisely the way that one did. Even in the best of times, imperial deaths offered immediate
opportunities for ambitious individuals, and the weak rule of Honorius had made the western
empire an arena for power contests for over thirty years. The surprising fact is therefore not that
a new usurper soon held the western throne, but that it took three months from the death of a
legitimate Theodosian emperor for him to do so.
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The sources provide two dates for the death of Honorius. Olympiodorus and the so-called Consularia Ravennatia
cite the date as August 27, 423. See Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 39. 1 = Müller-Dindorf 41, and the
Consularia Ravennatia s.a. 423. The eastern ecclesiastical historian Socrates Scholasticus, however, cites the death
of Honorius as having occurred on August 15, 423. See Socrates Scholasticus, Historia ecclesiastica VII. 22. 20.
The date is therefore variously reported in modern historical works on the period. For example, scholars in favor of
August 27, include Oost, Galla Placidia, 178; Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 236. Those in favor of August 15,
include Stein, Histoire, I.275; PLRE I: Fl. Honorius 3; Matthews, Western Aristocracies, 379. While all of the
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Following the death of Honorius on August 27, the western court seems to have initially
bowed to dynastic protocol and dispatched letters relating the news to the emperor’s nephew,
Theodosius II, at Constantinople, who was now the senior emperor. 643

According to the

ecclesiastical historian Socrates Scholasticus, however, Theodosius did not immediately act on
this information. Instead, he worked to suppress the knowledge of the death of Honorius in the
eastern empire, while secretly sending a military force to secure Salona in Dalmatia as a forward
base of operations if the western court chose to take independent action. After he had taken these
precautions, Theodosius publically announced the death of his uncle. 644
Theodosius’ decision to actively suppress the information concerning Honorius’ death was
probably due to a range of factors that prevented his responding immediately to the situation.
The death of Honorius seems to have come as a surprise to the eastern court (as, seemingly, it
was in the west) and there were certainly pressing problems that required the eastern emperor’s
attention before he could consider what appropriate action he should take. The chronicler
Marcellinus comes notes that there were widespread earthquakes in 423, followed by famine. 645
Perhaps in an attempt to deal with these problems, the eastern court was itinerant in August of
423. It is therefore possible that Theodosius received the news of his uncle’s death while he was
away from Constantinople dealing with other matters. 646
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Socrates Scholasticus, Historia Ecclesiastica VII. 23.

645

Marcellinus comes, Chronicon s.a. 423.
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In terms of logistics, the eastern empire had just concluded a brief war with Persia in 422 and
the bulk of the eastern army was probably still focused on the eastern frontier in 423. 647 Indeed,
Ardabur, the general who would eventually lead the assault against the western usurper John in
425, had previously distinguished himself in this eastern conflict. 648 The year 422 had also seen
the first emergence of new a Hunnic confederacy onto the imperial stage. The Hunnic king Rua
had taken advantage of the preoccupation of the Roman army on the eastern front, and the
consequently denuded Danube frontier, to launch a massive invasion of Thrace. According to the
ecclesiastical historian Theodoret of Cyrrhus, who describes the invasion in apocalyptic terms,
Rua’s army even threatened the capital city of Constantinople on this occasion. 649 If Theodosius
II suspected that the western court might resist his decisions on the succession, it would take
time to organize his troops for a western invasion. 650 Even after the rise of John was confirmed,
the eastern court still required almost a year to launch the campaign against the usurper. 651
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Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Historia ecclesiastica V. 36. 4. For the date, see Brian Croke, “Evidence for the Hun
Invasion of Thrace in A.D. 422” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 18:4 (1977:Winter) 347-367. Croke’s article
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scholarship.
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Socrates Scholasticus, Historia ecclesiastica VII. 23. Socrates’ testimony suggests that Theodosius may have
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Valentinian’s proclamation as Caesar at Thessalonica, which preceded the launch of the campaign, occurred in
late October 424. See Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 43. 1 = Müller-Dindorf 46; Philostorgius, Historia
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Theodosius may also have harbored unrealistic plans for the western succession after the
death of his childless uncle. As previously discussed, the eastern emperor failed to restore the
nobilissimus title of Valentinian, the obvious heir to the western throne, upon his arrival in
Constantinople in early 423. For this reason, several scholars have suggested that the eastern
emperor may have entertained dreams of reuniting the two halves of the empire under his sole
rule. At the very least, he may have looked forward to the birth of a son upon whom he could
bestow the western throne at some future time. 652 The sudden death of Honorius would have
moved this distant possibility to the present, requiring a careful reevaluation of the plan’s
potential for success in the current circumstances.
Some scholars have seen the consulship of the western MVM Castinus in 424 as evidence that
Theodosius had already begun to put his plans for sole role of the Roman Empire into action
during the three-month interregnum between the death of Honorius and the rise of John. Noting
the fact that the consulship of Castinus appears in the Chronicon of Marcellinus comes and the
Chronicon Paschale, Seeck concluded that Theodosius had originally named Castinus as western
consul for 424, only to remove him from the office later, after the general supported the
usurpation of John. 653 This belated revocation of Castinus’ consulship would explain its absence
from the revised and edited laws of the later Codex Theodosianus, as well as the accidental
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survival of the consulship in the unofficial consularia that Marcellinus comes and the Chronicon
Paschale used among their various sources. 654
Building on Seeck’s idea, Stein proposed that Theodosius named Castinus consul as part of
the eastern emperor’s plan to bring both halves of the Roman Empire under his sole rule. In
Stein’s reconstruction, the consulship marked an agreement between the emperor and the
western MVM that would designate Castinus as the vice-regent of Theodosius over the western
empire. In this view, only the antagonism of Boniface, who both vigorously supported the claims
of Placidia and also cut off the African grain supply to undermine the authority of his enemy,
Castinus, caused this plan to collapse. Without the active assistance of Constantinople in this
pressing problem, Castinus bowed to the inevitable and supported the regime of the usurper
John. For this reason, Theodosius annulled Castinus’ consulship for 424 and ultimately
abandoned his plans for sole rule of the reconstituted empire. 655
Unfortunately, while Stein’s reconstruction explains Theodosius’ apparent indecision
following the death of Honorius, there is absolutely no evidence that Theodosius intended
Castinus to act as vice-regent for the western empire. Furthermore, the evidence for Seeck’s idea
that Theodosius nominated Castinus as consul for 424 is questionable at best. The consulship of
Castinus is widely recognized in western sources. As Seeck noted, however, it appears in only
two eastern sources, the Chronicon of Marcellinus comes and the Chronicon Paschale. Of these,
we know that Marcellinus comes used a version of the western Consularia Italica as a source for
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much of the fifth century. 656 It is probable that the author of the Chronicon Paschale was
similarly influenced by sources reflecting the western consularia tradition. 657 Both sources were
also composed long after the events of the early fifth century, which would have dulled the insult
of the usurpation and the memory of precisely which emperor named Castinus consul in 424.
Marcellinus comes composed his Chronicon in the early sixth century, while the Chronicon
Paschale dates to the early seventh. In contrast, the contemporary Codex Theodosianus fails to
list the consulship of Castinus, as previously mentioned.
While Seeck’s suggestion that Theodosius initially appointed Castinus to the consulship
remains a possibility, the overwhelmingly western orientation of the evidence for his consulship
actually suggests that a western monarch raised the MVM to consular status. If we wish to
maintain Seeck’s logic that the emperor Theodosius originally accepted Castinus’ consulship, it
is possible that Honorius himself nominated the general before his death on August 27, 423.
Consuls were regularly appointed in the year prior to their assumption of the office, and notices
of the appointees of each imperial court were then submitted to the other. 658 An early notice of
the Emperor Honorius may therefore have already begun to filter into eastern consularia before
Castinus gave his support to the western usurper. Though the last known military engagement of
Castinus was the Vandal debacle in 422, Honorius may have intended the consulship as a sop to
his MVM’s ego after the forced imperial recognition of Boniface’s control of Africa. Castinus
consulship might therefore have served as part of Honorius’ attempt to restore order to the
military establishment of the western empire after the events of 422/423.
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It is far more probable, however, that the usurper John appointed Castinus to the consulship in
424. 659 Establishing the proper context for Castinus’ appointment, however, requires some
examination of the evidence for John’s usurpation. As we have seen, either through negligence
or preoccupation, Theodosius II appears to have taken little action following the western
announcement of Honorius’ death on August 27, 423. As the months wore on, it is possible that
the members of the western court began to fear for the maintenance of their offices and honors in
view of the imminent extension of eastern power into the western political sphere. 660 If
Theodosius did indeed send his forces to secure Salona, as Socrates Scholasticus maintains, then
the presence of an eastern army in western territory, perched and ready to strike the western
imperial center, would have offered an ominous sign for the future of the administration. 661
Constantius III’s rise to the purple had brought the eastern and western courts into conflict as
recently as 421. 662 Those officials who had sided with Honorius during the factional conflict of
422 would also now have had good reason to fear the vengeance of Placidia in the absence of
their imperial patron. 663 Even aside from these legitimate fears, the courts of emperors had
always been hotbeds for the conspiracies of ambitious individuals and it is probable that many
saw the now vacant western throne as a means to forward their own careers.
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The result was the usurpation of John, a civilian bureaucrat and former primicerius
notariorum of Honorius, on November 20, 423. 664 Procopius, writing in the sixth century, claims
that John owed his rise to the members of the western imperial court. 665 While most of the
historian’s other details on John’s usurpation are demonstrably incorrect, we would be able to
surmise this particular fact even without Procopius’ explicit testimony. 666 As primicerius
notariorum, one of John’s primary responsibilities under Honorius was the distribution of the
codicils of office to all appointees of the civil administration, both actual and honorary, from
provincial governor to the higher ranks. 667 Such a position would therefore have made John a
powerful and respected member of the imperial court, capable of organizing a vast network of
contacts in the civil bureaucracy to his own advantage. It thus seems probable that John owed his
rise in 423 to his ability to consolidate these numerous contacts among the now threatened
western administration into a formidable political force. 668
Attributing John’s usurpation to his own initiative and the resources he controlled by virtue of
his office within the civil bureaucracy also explains the fundamental weakness of his regime.
Unlike previous civilians raised to the purple, John seems to have possessed no strong patron or
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support among the military establishment. 669 Even before the advent of Theodosius’ troops in the
spring of 425, John’s regime seems to have been on the verge of collapsing through the lack of
strong military leadership. From the chronicle of Prosper of Aquitaine, we know that the Gallic
soldiery at the imperial stronghold at Arles mutinied as early as 424, claiming the life of the PPO
Galliarum, Exuperantius, and probably also John’s magister equitum, Gaudentius. 670 The comes
Africae Boniface is known to have rejected John’s rule in support of the claims of Galla Placidia
and her son, Valentinian. It is therefore probable that he withheld the African grain supply from
Rome. This act caused John to launch a failed invasion of Africa, which ultimately weakened the
defenses of Italy when Theodosius’ army arrived in 425. 671
This discussion brings us to the role of Castinus in John’s regime. Though several scholars
have seen Castinus as the ultimate author of John’s usurpation and the power behind his throne,
Prosper’s testimony on the usurpation renders such interpretations problematic. 672 As we have
seen, Prosper seems to have possessed no affection for the general, and he attributed the dispute

669

For examples of previous close relationships between usurpers and their military supporters, see PLRE I: Fl.
Eugenius 6 and Arbogastes; PLRE II: Priscus Attalus 2 and Alaricus 1. For discussion of the latter usurpation, see
Chapters 1 and 2.
670

Prosper Chronicon s.a. 424: Exuperantius Pictavus praefectus praetorio Galliarum in civitate Arelatense militum
seditione occisus est, idque apud Iohannem inultum fuit. A notice concerning the death of Exuperantius also appears
in the Gallic Chronicle of 452, entry 97. In the same narrative unit, the chronicler also tells us of the death of
Gaudentius who was killed by Gallic soldiers. Gallic Chronicle of 452, 100: Aetius Gaudenti comitis a militibus in
Galliis occisi filius cum Chunis Iohani opem laturus Italiam ingreditur. This would seem to suggest that Gaudentius
also died in the mutiny of soldiers at Arles in 424. See below for discussion.
671

For Boniface’s actions during the civil war of 425, see Prosper, Chronicon s.a. 424. See also the general
sentiments on Boniface’s loyalty to Placidia as expressed in Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 38 = Müller-Dindorf
40.
672

See, for example, the narratives of Oost, Galla Placidia, 181; Matthews, Western Aristocracies, 379; Halsall,
Barbarian Migrations, 236; Heather, Roman Empire, 259.

247

between Castinus and Boniface in 422 to Castinus’s arrogance and incompetence. 673
Nevertheless, Prosper casts doubt on the active participation of Castinus in John’s usurpation in
two different chronicle entries. In his entry for 423, the chronicler notes: “Honorius dies and
John seizes his authority, with Castinus, who was in control of the army as magister militum,
turning a blind eye to the fact, as it was believed (ut putabatur).” 674 Following his account of the
successful overthrow of John’s regime in 425, he adds “Castinus, however, was driven into exile,
because it seemed (videbatur) that John would not have been able to assume royal power without
his connivance.” 675
Prosper’s passive criticism of the treatment of Castinus at the hands of the Theodosian
dynasty is noteworthy not only for the mild support it suggests for a secular official condemned
by the imperial government, a rare occurrence in literary works of the period, but also because
the chronicler had previously attributed the disastrous Vandal campaign in 422 and subsequent
imperial misfortunes to Castinus’ faults alone. 676 Prosper’s clear dislike of Castinus makes his
quiet hints at the general’s innocence with regard to John’s usurpation all the more believable. It
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is therefore probable that Castinus played no part in the usurpation and offered only lukewarm
support to John’s regime. 677
Prosper’s account of the ultimate fate of Castinus further supports this impression. The chief
officers of usurpers could generally expect to meet the same fate as their patrons after the fall of
their regimes. After his defeat and capture in 425, the usurper John suffered both orchestrated
humiliation and execution at Aquileia. 678 Prosper tells us that Castinus, by contrast, was only
condemned to exile. The fact that Castinus did not meet death in the same arena as John suggests
that the imperial authorities were uncertain of his active participation in the usurpation. Castinus’
sentence would also speak against any notion of an agreement between Castinus and Theodosius.
As there is no evidence that Castinus resigned his post under John, he must have offered at least
passive support to the usurper’s regime. If we assume, with Seeck and Stein, that Castinus had
previously negotiated some arrangement with Theodosius, then the meager support that he
probably offered the usurper would also have been tantamount to breaking his oath to the eastern
emperor. It is difficult to imagine that this double guilt would have resulted in anything less than
execution. Castinus’ exile combined with Prosper’s testimony would therefore again suggest that
John rose to power on his own initiative, without the aid of a powerful military patron.
Accepting Castinus’ lack of support for John’s regime also provides the probable context for
his appointment to the consulship in 424. The collective evidence suggests that John’s usurpation
was a power grab internal to the imperial bureaucracy with little support from the other power
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centers of the western empire, in particular the Roman Senate and military establishment. 679 This
lack of support would have forced John to court the favor of both groups if his regime was to
have any hope of success. While we have no evidence of John’s probable overtures towards the
Roman aristocracy, his appointment of the head of the western military establishment to the
consulship, even before the usurper’s own assumption of the office, would have served as a
powerful incentive for Castinus to offer John support. Nevertheless, Prosper’s account would
suggest that the appointment did little to motivate Castinus to assume more than nominal
acquiescence in the new regime.
The proclamation of John on November 20, 423, seems to have shaken the eastern court into
action. If Theodosius did harbor any notions of ruling the combined empire in his own name, the
usurpation quickly showed that such ambitions were unrealistic. While the myth of the unity of
the Roman Empire was still an essential element of imperial policy and propaganda, the
usurpation of John showed that the west, in reality, required the presence of its own legitimate
sovereign. The eastern emperor could therefore only act to ensure that this new western ruler was
a member of the Theodosian dynasty. As the child Valentinian was the only male offspring of
appropriate lineage, Theodosius was forced to belatedly restore the former dignity and ranks of
Placidia and her son. Sometime before October of 423, Placidia was once again acknowledged as
Augusta and Valentinian as nobilissimus. 680
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Nevertheless, Theodosius does not seem to have agreed to support the claims of his exiled
relatives without some stipulations of his own. Though no contemporary sources record the
details of these negotiations, some modern narratives of this period plausibly assume that
Placidia and Theodosius agreed on two interrelated terms in 423 which would go into effect in
the future. 681 The first was an arranged marriage between Valentinian, Placidia’s four year old
son and the future western emperor, and Eudoxia, the infant daughter of Theodosius II. The
marriage would take place in 437, when both of the children had reached their majority. 682 In
423, however, this arrangement would serve as a power symbol of unity between the eastern and
western courts after the intermittent political conflicts of the last generation.
It is also possible that Theodosius attempted to remove a longstanding, though variously
prosecuted, territorial dispute between the two halves of the Roman Empire at this time. The
former Illyrian prefecture had formed an administrative battleground in conflicts between the
eastern and western empires since the reign of Theodosius the Elder. 683 Two sixth-century
sources, Cassiodorus and Jordanes, suggest that Placidia ceded western claims to the prefecture
as the cost of the marriage of her son to the eastern princess in 437. 684 Both sources are hostile to
Placidia, however, and it is probable that the Augusta only ceded claims to the dioceses of
eastern Illyricum, specifically Dacia and Macedonia. 685 Regardless, Theodosius was the clear
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beneficiary of the agreement. As the eastern emperor had the upper hand in 423 and the sources
closely bind the cession of territory to the marriage of Valentinian and Eudoxia, it is possible that
both points were negotiated before the campaign against John and postponed to a later date. 686
After his proclamation, John dispatched an embassy to Theodosius II, as was customary,
seeking the recognition and approval of the senior emperor. Philostorgius tells us that
Theodosius treated these men with contempt before exiling them to various locations in the
Propontis. 687 With this action, Theodosius’ hostility was made public and an assault against the
western usurper was assured, even though organizing the logistics of such a massive campaign
then took some time. Preparations extended through the spring and summer of 424. In the
autumn, the expeditionary force under the supreme command of the MVM Ardabur gathered at
Thessalonica. The sources also provide the names of two subsidiary commanders who were to
play major roles in expedition, Ardabur’s son, Aspar, and an otherwise unknown general named
Candidianus. 688 On October 23, 424, the magister officiorum, Helion, raised the five year old

extent of Placidia’s negotiated secession, however, remains a contested topic in scholarly literature. Stein, Oost, and
Stickler all suggest that the agreement only ceded western claims to eastern Illyricum. See Stein, “Der Verzicht der
Galla Placidia auf die Präfektur Illyricum,” Wiener Studien XXXVI (1914) 344-347; Oost, Galla Placidia, 43 n. 56;
Stickler, Aëtius, 42-43. For the assumption that Placidia also ceded claims to Pannonia, see J. J. Wilkes, “A
Pannonian Refugee of Quality at Salona,” Phoenix 26:4 (Winter, 1972) 377-393; Frank E. Wozniak, “East Rome,
Ravenna and Western Illyricum: 454-536 A.D.,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 30:3 (1981) 351-382.
686

Stickler, who places the initial negotiations for the territorial secession in 423, suggests that the interim period
between 423 and 437 was needed for a coordinated reestablishment of Roman control over the Balkan provinces.
See Stickler, Aëtius, 42-43.

687

688

Philostorgius, Historia ecclesiastica XII. 13.

Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 43. 1 = Müller-Dindorf 46; Philostorgius XII. 13. For these generals, see
PLRE II: Fl. Ardabur 3, Fl. Ardabur Aspar, & Candidianus 3. As previously discussed, there is absolutely no reason
to identify the eastern military commander of 424/425 with the obscure western advisor (PLRE II: Candidianus 2)
who encouraged the marriage of Placidia and Athaulf in 413/414.

252

Valentinian to the rank of Caesar in the presence of the army. 689 This lesser imperial rank was
probably intended to ensure the continued supremacy of Theodosius II as sole Augustus in the
event of the campaign’s failure. 690 Nevertheless, the events would prove such cautionary tactics
unnecessary.
From Thessalonica, Placidia and Valentinian accompanied the eastern army to Salona on the
Dalmatian coast. As we have seen, Socrates Scholasticus tells us that Theodosius dispatched an
eastern army to hold this city shortly after learning of the death of Honorius in 423.
Philostorgius, however, claims that Ardabur’s forces stormed the city in 424/425 to use as a
forward base of operations. 691 If this discrepancy is not the result of error on the part of one of
our historians (or their excerptors and abbreviators), we must assume that forces loyal to John
regained control of the city at some point during the long interim period. 692 The apparent ease
with which the provincial capital fell, however, suggests that John failed to provide adequate
defenses for this essential strategic base. The fall of Salona may therefore serve as an additional
testament to the military weakness of John’s regime.
This weakness is further suggested by the swiftness of the campaign that unfolded in the
spring of 425. From Salona, the eastern army launched a two pronged attack on the Italian
peninsula. While Arbabur crossed the Adriatic Sea by ship, Aspar and Candidianus, along with
the imperial family, took the land route, moving north along the Dalmatian coast before circling
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down into the Italian peninsula. Philostorgius tells us that Aspar and Candidianus quickly
captured the stronghold of Aquileia along the way due to the swiftness of their march. 693
Perhaps even more than the capture of Salona, the fall of Aquileia to the eastern army raises
serious questions concerning western support of John’s western regime. The city was in many
ways the gateway to Italy and it lay less than two hundred modern miles from John’s capital at
Ravenna. More importantly, the city’s ability to withstand sieges was legendary. 694 In 238,
during the opening salvos of the so-called third-century crisis, the career of the unpopular
emperor Maximinus came to an end before the walls of Aquileia, when a long siege exacerbated
discontent among his commanders. 695 During the civil war between emperors Julian and
Constantius II in 361, the city managed to similarly withstand the forces of the Julian, before
news of the death of the Constantius led to their inevitable surrender. 696 Finally, the sixth-century
historians Procopius and Jordanes, probably drawing on the earlier account of Priscus, claim that
Attila was on the verge of abandoning his own lengthy siege of Aquileia in 452, when omens of
the city’s fall encouraged him to redouble his efforts and eventually take the city. 697 Before the
events of 452, however, there is no record of the city falling to besieging force.
Given Aquileia’s history, Philostorgius’ attribution of the city’s capture to the marching speed
of the eastern forces of Aspar and Candidianus is possible, though unlikely. Later events would
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prove that John was well aware of the approach of the eastern army. As the defense of Aquileia
was essential to the defense of the Italian peninsula, the usurper can hardly have failed to take
precautions for its survival. Even if, as Prosper suggests, John’s forces were depleted in 425
because of his ill-timed conflict with Boniface in Africa, Aquileia’s natural defenses, combined
with a modest number of defenders, should have ensured a stumbling block to the progress of the
eastern army. 698 The easy capture of Aquileia therefore suggests that the city capitulated to the
eastern commanders upon their arrival. Either through his failure to win the loyalty of the local
aristocracy or through his lack of support among the western military establishment, John seems
to have lost Italy without a fight.
Our sources record that the eastern forces experienced only one setback during their campaign
against the western usurper. This setback, however, owed nothing to John’s defenses. As he was
leading his forces across the Adriatic, the ships of the MVM Ardabur were caught in a storm. As
a result, the general and at least some contingents of the eastern army fell into the hands of the
usurper. 699 Olympiodorus tells us that news of the capture of Ardabur delivered a severe blow to
the morale of his son, Aspar, and the imperial family. The overwhelming success of the land
army under the command of Candidianus, however, managed to restore hope for the
expedition. 700
Ultimately, the capture of Ardabur proved an advantage to the goals of the campaign,
allowing the eastern general to manipulate conflicts within John’s own regime. The usurper still
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desperately wished to establish a treaty with Theodosius II and hoped that holding the eastern
general hostage would force Constantinople to come to terms. As this political strategy relied on
Arbabur’s good treatment, John afforded the MVM all of the considerations of honorable
captivity, including the freedom of movement around Ravenna. Ardabur, however, used this
situation to meet with disgruntled members of the military aristocracy, specifically former
generals retired from their posts, and to rally their support for a conspiracy against the usurper.
He then sent word to Aspar encouraging his son to march on Ravenna. 701
John’s fall seems to have come quickly after the arrival of the eastern forces under Aspar.
Philostorgius claims that after a minor conflict, John was betrayed by his own officials through
the conspiracy of Ardabur. 702 Socrates Scholasticus further tells us that Aspar found the gates of
the city open upon his arrival and quickly overpowered the usurper. 703 The ease of this victory,
however, does not seem to have spared Ravenna from the fate that so often befell conquered
cities. The Gallic Chronicle of 452 claims that the eastern troops pillaged Ravenna, presumably
with the permission of Ardabur and Aspar. 704 John himself was sent to the imperial family
waiting at Aquileia. There, he was subjected to orchestrated humiliation before the eyes of the
populace. After the amputation of one of his hands, he was led on an ass around the local circus
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to the jeers of stage performers. He was then publicly beheaded. 705 When news of the usurper’s
fall reached Constantinople, Theodosius is said to have abandoned the previously scheduled
games for the day and led the city in a public ceremony of thanksgiving to God. 706
John’s death in the circus at Aquileia should have officially brought the eastern campaign to a
close. Whatever the admirable personal qualities of the usurper as enumerated by Procopius, he
had wholly failed to court the loyalty, and thereby enjoy the protection, of the western military
establishment. He had lost Africa and presumably Gaul even before the launch of the eastern
campaign in late 424. Once the eastern army had marched, this lack of support further crippled
his defense of Italy, leading to the easy conquest of Salona and Aquileia. Finally, Ardabur was
able to personally use the dissatisfaction among the military aristocracy to launch a court
conspiracy, resulting in John’s capture and execution. This fundamental flaw in the usurper’s
regime made the eastern campaign of 425 a largely bloodless affair. It is therefore ironic that the
only visible battle that we can associate with the civil war of 425 occurred after the death of the
usurper and the collapse of his regime.
Philostorgius tells us that three days after the execution of John in the circus at Aquileia,
Flavius Aëtius, a junior officer in the usurper’s regime, arrived at the head of a relief army of
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sixty thousand barbarian mercenaries. 707 Aëtius had served as a diplomatic hostage among the
Huns at some time in his youth and had managed to maintain strong ties among these groups
during his subsequent life. 708 This fact may have played a role in his rise to the rank of cura
palatii in the usurper’s administration. 709 When war with the eastern empire became increasingly
inevitable, John had dispatched Aëtius to recruit his allies for the defense of the western empire.
According to the now lost historian, Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus, John had intended to use the
Huns to attack the eastern army from the rear once it had entered the Italian peninsula. John
himself planned to meet the eastern forces on the battlefield with the regular western Roman
army. 710
If Frigeridus is correct that this was John’s ultimate strategy, then it seems to have failed
miserably even before the start of the civil war. The historian claims that the usurper had
dispatched his cura palatii to the Huns soon after word had reached him concerning the failure of
his embassy to Theodosius II. This statement would suggest that Aëtius departed from Ravenna
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in the later spring or early summer of 424 at the latest. 711 At first glance, this would seem like an
extraordinary amount of time for the purposes of Aëtius’ embassy. Nevertheless, certain
considerations suggest the accuracy of Frigeridus statement. First, it would take time for the
Huns to logistically organize such a massive expedition. While we should certainly doubt
Philostorgius’ number of sixty thousand for the Hunnic army that approached Aquileia in 425,
the results of this intervention fully suggest that the Hunnic army was substantial enough to
intimidate the relatively small eastern forces. 712 Second, and more importantly, the plan that
Frigeridus relates bears all of the arrogance of John’s first months in office, before the real
deficiency of his support among the Roman military was abundantly clear.
As we have seen, it is possible to interpret the consulship of Castinus in 424 as an attempt to
court the MVM’s favor for the new regime. The rise of Aëtius from what might have been a
stalled career among the protectores et domestici as well as the probable return of Aëtius’ father
Gaudentius from retirement to the office of magister equitum per Gallias may also suggest that
John had some early indication of his lack of support among Honorius’ military establishment
and sought allies wherever he could find them. 713 Regardless, in the interim between Aetius’
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and the son-in-law of a comes domesticorum, was apparently still serving in the protectores et domestici in 423
while in his early thirties, suggests that his career in the imperial administration had indeed stalled. Gaudentius
himself seems to have enjoyed a promising career under Stilicho’s regime, rising from the protectores et domestici
to assume the position of comes Africae from 399-401. For his career in Africa, see Augustine, de civitate dei XVIII.
54; Liber de Promissionibus et Praedictionibus Dei, Caput XXXVIII; Consularia Constantinopolitana, 399.
Gaudentius disappears from the sources after 401, though Frigeridus claims that he rose to the position of magister
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departure in early months of 424 and the arrival of the eastern army in the spring of 425, these
initial fears became a reality. John’s own defenses had already dissolved pitifully before the
arrival of Aëtius’ relief army. Whether through lack of support or through improper organization,
he led no regular forces against the eastern invasion of the Italian peninsula. If any minor
conflicts with the western army did occur, they have left no trace in the written record. Even
beyond the death of the usurper, Aëtius therefore arrived to find a situation for which he was
totally unprepared. He had left as an officer of the western empire. He had returned a traitor,
leading a hostile barbarian invasion against the legitimate Theodosian regime.
The only advantage that Aëtius had upon his arrival in 425 was the fact that he possessed a
powerful and ambitious patron among the Huns. The Hunnic king Rua, like his distant
predecessor Uldin from c.401-408, had succeeded in creating a powerful confederacy of
barbarian groups beyond the Danube limes during the second decade of the fifth century. Also
like Uldin, Rua apparently wished to extend his influence into the political affairs of both the
eastern and western halves of the Roman Empire.
As we have seen, Rua had already launched a devastating invasion of Thrace in 422. 714 The
Emperor Theodosius II had probably denuded the Danube limes in order to reinforce the troops
along the eastern frontier against the contemporary Persian threat. King Rua seems to have
recognized this opportunity and struck with amazing force. Theodoret of Cyrrhus describes the
invasion in apocalyptic terms complete with divine vengeance falling upon the attackers. “And

equitum per Gallias. The sources provide no dates on when he held this position. The Gallic Chronicle of 452, 100,
claims that he was killed in a military revolt in Gaul and seems to connect this event to the death of the praetorian
prefect of Gaul, Exuperantius, also killed in a military revolt in 424. With Zecchini, I therefore believe that John
raised Gaudentius from retirement to support his regime. See Zecchini, Aezio, 137.
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indeed, when Rouila, the leader of the Scythian nomads, crossed the Ister along with the largest
army possible and was laying waste and plundering Thrace and was threatening to besiege and
take the royal city [i.e. Constantinople] without a blow and ruin it, God striking from on high
with thunderbolts and storms burned him thoroughly and wasted his whole army.” 715
Marcellinus comes is much more succinct in his chronicle. For the third entry under the year 422,
he states simply that “The Huns devastated Thrace”. 716
Theodoret’s account of the invasion of Thrace, however, is misleading. As with many
ecclesiastical historians, Theodoret distorts his evidence in order to construct a narrative of
God’s providence at work in Roman affairs. He therefore ends his account of the 422 Hunnic
campaign with the death of King Rua, an event that demonstrably occurred in the mid-430s. 717
This amalgamation of two chronologically disparate events allowed the ecclesiastical historian to
present a narrative in which divine vengeance falls upon a heathen king for his villainous action
against the pious Emperor Theodosius II. 718 Unfortunately for our understanding of the period,
this narrative conceit also leaves us with no real knowledge about the immediate result of the
Hunnic campaign.
Brian Croke, however, has argued that we may derive information on the conclusion of this
invasion from the surviving fragments of Priscus’ work. In his description of the terms of the
Theodoret, Historia ecclesiastica V. 36. 4 καὶ γὰρ ἡνίκα Ῥωḯλας, Σκυθῶν τῶν νομάδων ἡγούμενος, τόν τε
Ἴστρον διέβη μετὰ στρατιᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα πλείστης καὶ τήν τε Θρᾴκην ἐδῄου καὶ ἐληḯζετο καὶ τὴν βασιλίδα πόλιν
πολιορκήσειν τε καὶ αὐτοβοεὶ αἱρήσειν καὶ ἀνάστατον ἠπείλει ποιήσειν, σκηπτοῖς ἄνωθεν ὁ θεὸς καὶ πρηστῆρσι
βαλὼν καὶ αὐτὸν κατέφλεξε καὶ τὴν στρατιὰν κατανάλωσεν ἅπασαν.
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aforementioned Treaty of Margus, concluded between the imperial court and the co-rulers Bleda
and Attila in c.435, Priscus mentions that the brothers raised the annual amount paid to the Huns
to 700 pounds of gold. Previously, he says, the annual payment was 350 pounds. 719 Croke
therefore plausibly argues that Priscus is here referring to the treaty established after the invasion
of Thrace in 422, and this interpretation has gained general acceptance. 720
Many scholars have interpreted the Hunnic forces who entered the western empire in 425 as
simply mercenaries recruited and paid by the usurper John. Indeed, the fragmentary historian
Frigeridus tells us that John sent Aëtius to recruit the Huns due to the intimate friendship that he
maintained with them from his time as their hostage. He also tells us that Aëtius carried a large
sum of gold to pay for their service. 721 Nevertheless, in light of the recent invasion of Thrace and
the subsequent elaborations of their political agenda in the following decades, it would be a
mistake to view the Hunnic intervention in the civil war of 425 as a mere example of mercenary
activity. 722 Throughout his career, Rua would follow parallel and complementary policies in
dealing with the eastern and western empires. Threats or violent action in one half of the Roman
Empire were repeated within a short time in the other, with the ultimate aim of negotiating or
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renegotiating imperial treaties. 723 Following this scenario, it is plausible to see Rua’s appearance
in the western empire in 425 as a corollary to his 422 invasion of Thrace.
From the Hunnic perspective, the events of 425 probably offered the necessary excuse to
force a treaty on the western empire in the same way that they had cowed the eastern empire only
three years before. In this instance, however, the Huns received money and consequently,
imperial acknowledgement of their strength from the beginning. The situation was also
politically advantageous. As before, imperial forces were distracted. If Rua succeeded in
securing the throne for John, he could expect to wield enormous influence over the western
empire. If he failed in this endeavor, the Huns would still pose enough of a threat to the Italian
peninsula to ensure a favorable treaty with the new regime. As it happened, the latter scenario
occurred.
We possess few sources on the battle that erupted between Rua’s Hunnic confederacy and
Theodosius II’s eastern forces or the subsequent negotiations that ended the conflict.
Philostorgius tells us that after the arrival of Aëtius, the Hunnic forces and the eastern army
under Aspar engaged in a great battle, with massive casualties on both sides. “Thereafter, Aëtius
arranged peace with Placidia and Valentinian and received the rank of comes. And the barbarians
laid down their anger and weapons for gold, both having given hostages and taken pledges of
faith, and then returned to their homes.” 724 According to the chronicler Prosper, the new
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government pardoned Aëtius because he managed to secure the withdrawal of the Huns from
Italy. 725
From the perspective of Placidia and the leaders of the eastern army in 425, these results of
the Hunnic conflict were perfectly acceptable. Philostorgius’ testimony on the handing over of
hostages and “pledges of faith” or “oaths” (τὰ πιστὰ) suggests that a treaty was established
between the Huns and the new western regime. 726 Rua had probably negotiated a similar treaty
with the eastern court of Theodosius after the Hunnic invasion of Thrace in 422. 727 This previous
treaty, negotiated with the much more stable and entrenched regime of the eastern branch of the
Theodosian dynasty, would have informed and justified Placidia’s approach to a similar problem
in the western empire.
Furthermore, the immediate Hunnic conflict was, at best, an afterthought in what had been an
otherwise enormously successful and apparently bloodless campaign to destroy the regime of a
usurper. As we have seen, the retreat of the Vandals from Gallaecia into the heart of the Spanish
diocese had done nothing to diminish the prestige of Asterius’ otherwise successful campaign
against the usurper Maximus in 420. 728 The Hunnic threat in 425 was probably considered even
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less vital an issue. Unlike the Vandals, who still remained in imperial territory, the Huns could
be expected to retreat back to their homelands beyond the Danube upon the conclusion of a
nominal treaty. If necessary, whatever threat they offered in the future could be dealt with once
Placidia’s regime was firmly established at Ravenna.
Finally, Placidia’s pardon and recruitment of Aëtius, while probably only a temporary
solution, was perfectly in keeping with past imperial solutions to usurpation. Upon the
conclusion of civil wars, victorious commanders had always recruited heavily from the officers
and armies of defeated rivals. Though the result was not always beneficial, this tactic at least
offered the possibility of strengthening the military forces of the victorious regime and
preventing the outbreak of further resistance. 729 Placidia’s regime probably had little choice in
pardoning Aëtius in 425. The relatively small eastern army at her disposal was apparently
unprepared for the Hunnic invasion. Nevertheless, as with her treaty with Rua, she could couch
Aëtius’ pardon and recruitment in previous precedent. In time, perhaps he would even become a
useful supporter of her regime.
While these considerations probably informed Placidia’s reaction to the Hunnic conflict in
425, we know from the benefit of hindsight that the event heralded ominous signs for the future
political stability of Placidia and Valentinian’s regime. The Huns under Rua, and later under his
nephews Bleda and Attila, would constitute an ongoing threat to both halves of the Roman
Empire until Attila’s death in 453. This threat was primarily military for the eastern half of the
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empire. 730 For the west, however, the continued Hunnic support for their client Aëtius, at least
through 439, brought the Huns into a close relationship with the political life of the western
empire, severely limiting the free exercise of Placidia’s control. Just as Boniface had with his
aggressive seizure of the African provinces in 422, Aëtius would also prove perfectly capable
and willing to use violent tactics against the imperial government in pursuit of his own private
ambitions. Unlike Boniface, however, Aëtius’ staunch allies among the Huns meant that he
possessed an independent power base outside the Roman political sphere. This relationship
ensured that Aëtius could continue to exert influence over the imperial court even when his
Roman support base was weakened or completely defeated, as it was in the civil war of 432433. 731 Aëtius was therefore destined to become a powerful political figure in the following
years, emerging as the dominant military official by 433 and maintaining a formidable influence
over the imperial court of Placidia and Valentinian until his death in 454.
Nevertheless, neither Placidia nor her eastern partners could have expected such eventualities
in the heady atmosphere of victory in 425. The eastern army had successfully overthrown the
usurper John’s regime and the careful exercise of diplomacy had removed a major Hunnic threat.
With Italy now secured for the new regime, the imperial family proceeded first to Ravenna and
later to Rome for Valentinian’s coronation and the formal reestablishment of Theodosian control
over the western empire.
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Socrates tells us that Theodosius II had originally planned to travel to Italy and personally
perform the ceremony raising his young cousin to Augustus. He had also planned to use the
occasion to instruct the Italians on the folly of raising usurpers. Theodosius, however, fell ill at
Thessalonica and was forced to return to Constantinople. He therefore sent the imperial diadem
to the west in the care of Helion, his magister officiorum et patricius, who had previously
performed Valentinian’s investiture as Caesar. 732 With Helion once again officiating, Valentinian
was raised to the rank of Augustus at Rome on October 23, 425, exactly a year after he had
assumed the title of Caesar. 733 Unfortunately for the strength of his new regime, Valentinian III
was six years old when he obtained mastery over the western Roman empire. His youth therefore
ensured that Galla Placidia would wield effective power as regent for her son until he reached
maturity. Indeed, following his notice on the accession of Valentinian, the Gallic Chronicler of
452 includes the caustic remark, “At last, Placidia had been advanced to the royal power she
desired.” 734
The circumstances that led to Valentinian’s assumption of the purple and the new regime
founded on his dynastic legitimacy bear striking similarities to those surrounding the rise of his
uncle Honorius in 395. Like Honorius, Valentinian was brought to power through the campaign
of an eastern army against a western usurper. Also like his uncle, Valentinian’s youth required
the establishment of a regency that could guide the empire until the child was old enough to
assume direct control. In the case of Honorius, these circumstances had resulted in a weak
imperial center and the consequent chaos of usurpation. The fact that Valentinian’s regime was
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spared such overt threats is a testimony to the changed political climate of the western empire
after the disastrous reign of Honorius.
We may attribute this new political situation to a variety of factors. First, Valentinian’s
regime enjoyed a close relationship with the eastern empire. The vicious political antagonism
that characterized relations between east and west during the regency of Stilicho saw no
reflection in the politics of 425. Instead, Theodosius’ role in establishing Valentinian’s regime in
425, and then the marriage alliance between Valentinian and Eudoxia that was celebrated in 437,
served to bind the interests of the eastern and western branches of the Theodosian dynasty. 735
While some scholars have suggested that this amounted to eastern dominance of the western
court and therefore a limitation on free exercise of western power, the regime of Valentinian
could nevertheless rely on eastern support for western initiatives. 736 The result was joint
east/west campaigns against the Vandals in Africa from 431-435 and again in 441. 737 While
neither initiative was ultimately successful in eradicating the Vandal threat (in fact, the 441
campaign never even left Sicily), such campaigns served not only as a visible symbol of the
importance of Africa to both halves of the empire, but also of the close relationship of eastern
and western interests.
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For the themes of this study, however, the most striking change to Roman political life in the
reign of Valentinian is the absence of any instance of usurpation, the phenomenon that had so
characterized the rule of Honorius. The closer ties between the eastern and western branches of
the Theodosian dynasty as well as the eastern show of strength in 425 may have played some
role in preventing direct challenges to the ruling regime. The more probable explanation,
however, is that usurpation had simply ceased to be a viable avenue into which to channel
political discontent within the western empire.
While we must locate the cause of the many usurpations that plagued the western empire from
407-420 in the political weakness of the central government, the Honorian regime had proven
remarkably resilient and successful in eradicating the various challenges to its imperial authority.
As we have seen, these were years of political chaos, in which at least nine men attempted to
claim the purple. Where our meager sources provide evidence, we find that many of these men
enjoyed substantial support among the military and senatorial aristocracies. Indeed, Constantine
III seems to have enjoyed overwhelming support in the Gallic provinces during the early years of
his reign. Attalus, on the other hand, had received the backing of the Roman senate during his
first rise to power and the support of Galla Placidia and the southern Gallic aristocracy for his
second. Nevertheless, each of these men had succumbed to either internal dissent or the tireless
efforts of Honorius’ generals. The overwhelming failure of these challenges to Honorius seems
to have transformed the future expression of political discord with the ruling regime, rendering
usurpation an obsolete phenomenon. If any notions of the viability of this path to power still
lingered after 420, the further dismal failure of John’s regime to garner wide-spread support from
423-425, even in the absence of a reigning western emperor, seems to have laid such ambitions
to rest.
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In the new political atmosphere after 425, political discontent would shift from the open threat
of usurpation to a more insidious form of rebellion: internal struggles among ambitious
strongmen, all under the supposed aegis of the ruling dynasty. Thus, civil war would continue to
characterize the history of the following decades, but the disputants now fought for personal
ambition and status within Valentinian’s regime, with the ultimate goal of dominating the
imperial court in the same way as Stilicho and Constantius had dominated Honorius in the past.
As we have seen, the beginnings of this shift in the dynamics of political conflict had emerged as
early as 422, when Boniface seized control of the African provinces to use as an independent
power base in his struggles with the imperial court. From 425-439, the main generals of Placidia
and Valentinian’s regime, Constantius Felix, Boniface, and Aëtius would freely employ such
tactics in their internal struggles for military dominance over the western regime.
Unfortunately for the future of the western empire, the adoption of this new form of political
conflict would fundamentally alter the discourse of imperial power during the course of the fifth
century. The prestige of the emperor would continue to decline as true power was increasingly
located in the figure of the dominant general. While Stilicho and Constantius had set the
precedent for the military domination of a weak emperor, such a situation need not have
characterized the regime of Placidia and Valentinian. As we have seen, Placidia was already an
astute and ambitious political actor in 425. The evidence would further suggest that Valentinian
III in his mature years bore little relation to his uncle Honorius, possessing both determination
and ambition in his own right. 738 We must therefore attribute the later decline of western
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imperial prestige to the new tactics of political dispute that arose after 425, as otherwise capable
emperors failed to meet the challenges offered by their own military officials.
These problems that shaped the later history of the western Roman empire ultimately led to
the permanent collapse of central authority, but they find their origins in both the failures and
successes of the Honorian regime. The weakness of the emperor Honorius required the existence
of firm military leadership to maintain control over the western empire. The overwhelming
success of this military leadership in eradicating the various threats to the dynastic legitimacy of
the imperial house served both to increase the prestige of dominant military figures and to force
the exercise of political discontent and the pursuit of personal ambition to operate within the
structures of the existing imperial administration. Ironically, the practice of usurpation had by its
very nature maintained and reinforced the traditional imperial ideology that situated power in the
person of the emperor. The shift away from direct threats of usurpation to the more subtle form
of political domination from within the ruling regime, however, seems to have had a far more
devastating effect on the political authority of Valentinian and his successors, as well as on the
overall prestige of the imperial throne. We should therefore see the political vicissitudes of the
Honorian regime as essential for our understanding of the later course of the western empire.
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Conclusion

This dissertation has offered a new analytical narrative of the political trials and conflicts of
the Theodosian dynasty during the years 405-425 C.E. It serves both to correct older scholarly
views of the period as a time of severe ethnically-driven barbarian/Roman conflict as well as to
present nuanced readings of particular events and of the careers of individual political actors. As
we have seen, the weakness of the western empire under the regime of the emperor Honorius led
to a variety of major crises, including numerous usurpations of imperial authority and the influx
of unauthorized barbarian groups into the Roman empire. In many instances, the regimes of
usurpers received support from barbarian groups whose leaders were generally seeking
acceptance in the Roman political sphere. This is particularly true of the regime of the Gallic
usurper Jovinus from 411-412, the first and second regimes of Attalus in the years 409-410 and
413-415, and probably the second usurpation of Maximus in 420. The fact of close
collaborations and mutually beneficial relationships between Romans and barbarians during this
period necessarily complicates the traditional view of an inherent Roman/barbarian antagonism,
which so often informs scholarly readings of the primary sources. While this dissertation in no
way seeks to deny that some barbarian groups carried out massive depredations on Roman
territory, we must see such violent action as closely tied to the intra-Roman political conflicts of
these years, while also acknowledging the multiple instances of Roman/barbarian alliances both
against and in support of the Honorian regime. The resulting narrative therefore offers a far more
complex image of Roman/barbarian relationships during this period.
The measures of the central government to reclaim control over the west required the rise of a
military strongman, as well as efforts to find a viable means to include barbarian groups in the
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western political sphere. The first requirement was fulfilled in the career of the MVM and later
emperor Constantius III. As we have seen, Constantius enjoyed enormous success in restoring
Honorian control to the western empire during this period, eradicating the threats of both
usurpers as well as unauthorized barbarian groups. Consequently, he was able to dominate the
weak Honorian regime and then force the emperor to raise him to co-emperor in 421.
Constantius’ successes both eliminated usurpation as a viable means of expressing political
discontent and provided a precedent for the pursuit of personal ambitions within the
administrative structure of the legitimate regime in a way that would inform the careers and
objectives of many later military officials.
Similarly, the rise of Honorius’ half-sister Galla Placidia as a political actor also played a
significant role in shaping the future of political life in the later empire. Placidia initially worked
to exploit the weakness of her brother’s regime during the years 414-415, marrying the Gothic
king Athaulf and forming an alternative, yet potentially legitimate, Theodosian regime based in
southern Gaul. This action made her a viable locus of power for both Gallic provincial aristocrats
dissatisfied with the regime of her brother, as well as for Athaulf’s followers who sought
imperial recognition and inclusion in Roman power structures on their own terms. After the
death of Athaulf and the return of Placidia to Ravenna, her continued relationship with the
Gothic royal family formed the binding principle for the integration of this group into the
Honorian regime. Placidia’s marriage to Constantius in 417 further promoted this union of
interests, which found physical manifestation in the Visigothic settlement in Aquitania in the
following year. Nevertheless, the fact that Placidia was both a member of the Theodosian
dynasty and a political actor in her own right continued to provide ambitious individuals with a
pathway to rebellion against the Honorian regime long after Placidia herself had returned to
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Ravenna. As we have seen, the general Boniface seems to have exploited an internal dispute
between Placidia and Honorius in 422 to justify his seizure of the African provinces in pursuit of
his own ambitions. While rebelling against the Honorian regime, Boniface could continue to
maintain his loyalty to the ruling Theodosian dynasty by professing his support for Placidia.
Collectively, the challenges that the emperor Honorius and the Theodosian dynasty at large
faced during the period resulted in fundamental changes to the political life of the western
Roman empire. The overwhelming success of Constantius in dealing with usurpers from 411 to
420, followed by the complete failure of John’s regime in 425, effectively ended the attraction of
usurpation as an expression of personal ambition as well as political discord. Direct threats to the
Theodosian dynasty therefore fell away as a new, more subtle form of revolt came to dominate
the political life of the western empire. Following the example of Constantius, political discord
now took the form of ambitious generals seeking to dominate the ruling dynasty from within the
structures of the imperial administration. Ultimately, this form of rebellion had a far more
disastrous effect on the future of the western Roman empire, as it resulted in a fundamental
change in the discourse of imperial power. Where usurpation had emphasized the authority of the
imperial throne, this new form of revolt increasingly caused prestige and power to shift away
from the person of the emperor to his dominant general. By the late fifth century, the emperor
had become a mere figurehead, while true authority lay with his powerful minister.
The events of this period also set precedents for the use of barbarians as third-party interest
groups in Roman political life. As we have seen, this period saw the influx of large number of
non-Romans seeking recognition and integration in the western Roman empire. These objectives
led many barbarian groups to form close relationships with Roman authorities, including both
usurpers and the legitimate Honorian regime. Galla Placidia’s marriage alliance with Athaulf and
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her subsequent close relationship with the royal family of Theodoric resulted in the integration of
the Visigoths into the Roman political sphere and their settlement in the southern Gallic province
of Aquitania. While there is little reason to believe that Constantius intended this settlement to be
a permanent fixture of the Roman landscape, the death of Constantius in 421 and the subsequent
years of imperial distraction allowed the settlement, and its court at Toulouse, to gradually
become a regional center of political authority. As such, the Visigoths were destined to play a
tremendous role in later Roman political life.
These political transformations which arose as a result of the weakness of the western Roman
administration under Honorius culminated in the political struggles that characterized the regime
of his nephew, the emperor Valentinian III. The emperor’s mother and regent, the Augusta Galla
Placidia, proved unable to control the internal disputes of her generals, the new MVM
Constantius Felix, the comes Africae Boniface, and the MVM per Gallias Flavius Aëtius. The
years 425-433 were therefore a period of political chaos and civil war, as each of these men
fought to achieve dominance over the new regime, while ostensibly maintaining their allegiance
to the Theodosian dynasty. This conflict ended in 433 with the emergence of Flavius Aëtius as
the dominant military strongman.
In much the same way as Placidia had relied on the followers of Athaulf for the promotion of
her own political interests in 414-415, Aëtius’ rise to power and maintenance of political control
over the regime of Valentinian was predicated on his close relationship to the independent power
of the Hunnic confederation of Rua, Bleda, and Attila. As we have seen, Rua had already secured
Aëtius’ position in the new regime as a consequence of the Hunnic conflict in 425. Following the
defeat of Aëtius’ Roman army in 432, Rua again invaded the western empire on behalf of his
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client, forcing Placidia to recognize Aëtius as her dominant military official, a position that he
would hold until his assassination at the hands of the emperor Valentinian III himself in 454.
Aëtius’ political ambitions and his primary tactics for maintaining control over the imperial
court make his career the natural result of the political transformations of Honorian regime.
Aëtius first appears in our sources as the supporter of the usurper John in 425. Nevertheless,
while he frequently found himself at odds with the regime of Galla Placidia and Valentinian, he
never resorted to such outdated measures in his later career. Instead, he followed tactics similar
to those employed by Boniface in 422, launching rebellions against the imperial court while
seeking position and status in the imperial administration. In this manner, Aëtius, like
Constantius before him, succeeded in dominating the new Theodosian regime from within its
own ranks.
Aëtius’ relationship with the Huns also reflected the pattern of using barbarians as outside
interest groups in intra-Roman political struggles against the legitimate Honorian regime. Galla
Placidia herself had engaged in such tactics through her alliance with Athaulf in 414-415, and
her continuing relationship with the royal family of Theodoric saw the rise of the Visigothic
settlement as a vital source of political support for her regime after 425. In the same way, Aëtius
relied on the Huns as valuable, independent supporters in achieving his personal ambitions in the
Roman political sphere. Following the decline of direct Hunnic patronage in 439, Aëtius formed
relationships with the Alans and the Burgundians, establishing new barbarian settlements on
Roman soil, in keeping with the precedent set by Constantius in 418/419.
Finally, the long duration of Aëtius’ career solidified these new political realities in the
western Roman administration and directly influenced the careers and political mindset of the
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young officers who served under him. Following the death of Aëtius in 454, and then the end of
the western branch of the Theodosian dynasty in 455, the prestige of the imperial throne was
almost completely overshadowed by the power and authority of the dominant general. The career
of Aëtius’ protégé, the MVM and kingmaker Ricimer, which saw the rise and fall of no less than
five emperors from 456 to 472, serves as a vivid testimony to this fact.
The political trials and conflicts of the Theodosian dynasty from 405-425 and the imperial
responses to these challenges therefore directly inform our understanding of the history of the
western Roman empire in the later fifth century. Ultimately, the changes initiated during the
Honorian regime resulted in the shift of political focus away from the imperial throne, first to
dominant imperial officials and gradually to more regional centers of authority, particularly the
courts of the barbarian kings. While this was a slow process extending over decades and subject
to a variety of influences, we must see the new political realities that emerged as a result of the
weak regime of Honorius as the basic preconditions that led to the dissolution of Roman
administration in the west.
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